On Point: C. Unpublished Opinions

Rock County v. J.J.K., 2020AP2105, District IV, 5/6/21 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

This is the sequel to the Rock County v. J.J.K.. 2020AP1085 above. The decision is alarming because the circuit court found J.J.K. dangerous enough for a recommitment based on the 5th standard, but the court of appeals affirmed based on the 4th standard. The opinion also further highlights the need for SCOW to elaborate its decision in Winnebago County v. C.S., 2020 WI 33, 391 Wis. 2d 35, 940 N.W.2d 875. Specifically, can a court order involuntary medication for a person undergoing recommitment without evidence that he is dangerous as defined by §51.61(1)(g)3?

State v. B.W.R., 2020AP1726, District 2, 4/28/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The odor of marijuana gave police probable cause to believe evidence of a drug crime would be found in B.W.R.’s home and the odor plus the occupants’ awareness the police were knocking gave the police reason to conclude the evidence would be destroyed if they took time to get a warrant.

State v. Davonta J. Dillard, 2020AP999, 4/13/21, District 1, (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Officers patrolling in Milwaukee noticed a vehicle idling and apparently unoccupied. One approached the vehicle and shined his flashlight through a window; he saw a person (Dillard) in the back seat who immediately ducked out of view (most of the windows were highly tinted, impeding the officer’s view). The officer opened the rear driver’s side door, and the person then opened and ran out the door on the other side. Other officers tasered and detained him. The officer who’d opened the door saw a handgun on the floor of the car, which ultimately led to Dillard’s conviction for carrying a concealed weapon.

Milwaukee County v. K.M., 2019AP1166, 4/13/21, District 1; (1-judge opinion ineligible for publication); case activity

The saga continues. Portage County v. E.R.R. 2019AP20133 presented the question of whether appeals from recommitment orders are ever moot due to their collateral effects. When SCOW split 3-3 in that case, it granted review in Sauk County v. S.A.M., 2019AP1033 and ordered the parties to brief whether it may order the court of appeals to decide commitment appeals before they expire. See our post here. Some might see the S.A.M. order as a red flag signaling “proceed with caution” on mootness. But, like a bull, the court of appeals charges ahead to dismiss another recommitment appeal as moot.

Village of Grafton v. Elizabeth A. Wesela, 2020AP1416, District 2, 4/7/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Wesela concedes police had reaonsable suspicion to make the initial stop of the car she was driving, but complains, fruitlessly, that the officer didn’t have reasonable suspicion to extend the stop to conduct field sobriety tests or to ask for preliminary breath test.

State v. V.S., 2021AP136, District 1, 4/6/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The record shows the circuit court considered all of the § 48.426(3) factors relevant to determining the best interests of the child and properly applied them to the facts in deciding whether to terminate V.S.’s parental rights to D.D.S.

Village of Greendale v. Matthew R. Derzay, 2019AP2294, District 1, 3/30/31 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The burden of proof for a petitioner under § 968.20 is preponderance of the evidence, but the circuit court applied the clear and convincing standard and demanded Derzay provide certain kinds of proof to meet that burden. This was error.

Jackson County DHS v. M.M.B., 2021AP98 & 2021AP99, District 4, 4/1/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

M.M.B. stipulated that there were grounds for terminating her parental rights to her two children, but argued at the disposition phase that termination wasn’t in the best interest of the children. At that hearing, the County presented the testimony of a psychologist who had assessed M.M.B.’s “psychosocial functioning, including issues related to parenting and substance abuse.” M.M.B. objected, arguing the psychologist’s evaluation was not contemporaneous to the dispositional hearing, but had been conducted two years earlier, and thus wasn’t relevant to the issue of the children’s best interests. (¶¶3-6). The circuit court didn’t err in admitting this testimony.

Fond du Lac County v. J.L.H., 2020AP2049, 3/24/21, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Wisconsin Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)e. lays out the “fifth standard” for dangerousness; a person can be committed under it if his or her mental illness prevents him or her from understanding the advantages and disadvantages of treatment, and a lack of treatment will cause a substantial probability that the person will be harmed and become unable to function. But there’s a limitation on this standard that the other standards lack: a person can’t be dangerous under it if care is available, either in the community at large or through ch. 55, that diminishes the threat of harm so that it is not substantial.

State v. A.M.-C., 2021AP94 & 2021AP95, 3/30/21, District 1 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The state petitioned to terminate A.M.-C.’s rights to two of her children on failure-to-assume and continuing-CHIPS grounds. After being told (apparently via interpreter, as Spanish is her first language) that she had to attend all hearings, A.M.-C. moved to New York City. The circuit court rejected her request to attend by telephone, found her in default, and after prove-up, found her unfit. It later found termination of her rights to be in the children’s best interest.