On Point blog, page 81 of 262
COA reverses trial court’s hearsay ruling but affirms on harmless error
State v. Tyler J. Yost, 2018AP2251-CR, 9/18/19, District 2, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Loose lips sink ships. They can also land you in jail for another year. That’s what happened to Yost when he and other inmates started bad mouthing their probation agent while chilling in the common area of the Waukesha County Jail. Yost allegedly called his agent a “bitch” and said that when he got out he was going to “crimp her brake lines,” and he didn’t care if her kids or family were in the car.
COA grants reconsideration, reverses in part due to illegality of sentence
State v. Larry C. Lokken, 2017AP2087-CR, 9/17/19, District 3 (unpublished), case activity (including briefs)
Lokken, a long-time Eau Claire County Treasurer, pled “no contest” to 3 counts of misconduct in office and 5 counts of theft in a business setting for stealing $625,758.22 from taxpayers. The circuit court ordered $681,846.92 in restitution and imposed an unusual condition of probation on one of the counts: if Lokken failed to pay restitution in 4 1/2 years, the 10-year probation period on Count 2 would be revoked.
COA – conviction for carrying a concealed gun in a car constitutionally sound
State v. Taurus Donnell Renfro, 2019AP193, 9/17/19, District 1 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Renfro was a passenger in a car stopped by the police. He was riding from his old residence to his parents’ house–he was moving in with them. When asked, he told the officers that he was carrying a gun in his pocket, and that he didn’t have a concealed-carry permit. A jury convicted him of violating Wis. Stat. § 941.23.
COA upholds admission of prior confrontations with police in disorderly conduct trial
State v. Eric L. Vanremortel, 2018AP417, 9/4/19, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Vanremortel was charged with disorderly conduct for an incident in which he followed the wife of a retired police officer in her car, then repeatedly got out of his own car and shouted at her. The state sought to admit evidence of three prior incidents involving Vanremortel following and/or shouting at police officers, including one that happened a few weeks before the charged conduct and involved the wife’s retired-officer husband. The circuit court admitted the evidence, finding it satisfied the test of State v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 576 N.W.2d 30 (1998), and Vanremortel appeals.
COA affirms TPR – parent’s claims fall on credibility grounds
State v. T.L.G., 5018AP1291, 9/4/19, District 1 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
T.L.G., who is cognitively limited, appeals the termination of her parental rights to her son. During the proceedings below her lawyer requested a competency evaluation; eventually the court appointed T.L.G. a guardian ad litem. T.L.G. ultimately pleaded no-contest to the asserted ground of continuing CHIPS, and her rights were terminated.
May courts presume a person is competent to agree to commitment for treatment if a doctor opines that he isn’t?
Dane County v. N.W., 2019AP48, 8/29/19, District 4 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
N.W. entered a written stipulation to extend his Chapter 51 involuntary mental commitment. On appeal he argued that due process required the circuit court to conduct a colloquy to determine whether he knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily agreed to the extension before approving it. Ironically, the court of appeals held that in Chapter 51 cases–where a person’s mental capacity to make treatment decisions is directly at issue–circuit courts have no obligation to inquire whether he knows that he is voluntarily agreeing to an involuntary commitment for treatment.
DOT rule governing tinted car windows is valid, and so is the stop based on its suspected violation
State v. Richard Rusk, 2019AP135-CR, 8/29/19, District 4 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
An officer stopped Rusk because he believed that tinting on the windshield of Rusk’s vehicles extended so far down as to violate Wis. Admin § Trans 305.34(6)(c)(May 2014). Rusk argued that this was a mistake of law because the rule was invalid and moved to suppress evidence of an OWI 3rd. He lost the circuit court, and loses again on appeal.
Standard OWI jury instruction sufficiently conveyed meaning of “impaired”
State v. Kari E. Mravik, 2018AP2300-CR, District 4, 8/29/19 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
At her OWI 2d trial, Mravik asked the judge to modify Wis. J.I.—Criminal 2663’s definition of “under the influence of an intoxicant.” The trial judge declined. The court of appeals finds no error because the instruction as a whole conveys the correct meaning of the phrase.
Defense wrestles State into conceding Batson error, but doesn’t get new trial
State v. Patrick D. Zolliecoffer, 2018AP1639-CR, 8/20/19, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Zolliecoffer challenged two of the State’s peremptory strikes as racially based. On appeal, the State conceded that the circuit court failed to apply the 3-step procedure for analyzing Batson claims, which On Point recently explained here. Zolliecoffer urged the court of appeals to remand for a new trial. The State sought a remand to apply Batson. Surprise! The State won.
Statements driver made before arrest admissible; so was retrograde extrapolation testimony
State v. Christopher J. Durski, 2018AP1750-CR, District 2, 8/21/19 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Durski was arrested at a motel, where he had decamped after a family dispute. In investigating the family dispute police learned Durski drank alcohol before leaving for the motel, so they tracked him down. Durski wasn’t in custody during the officers’ initial questioning of him at the motel, so his statements were admissible despite the lack of Miranda warnings. So was the state’s retrograde extrapolation evidence.