On Point: C. Chs. 939: Inchoate offenses

State v. Garrett L. Huff, 2009 WI App 92, PFR filed 6/3/09
For Huff: Jeffrey W. Jensen

Issue/Holding: Impossibility of fulfilling goal of conspiracy (here: election bribery, where other “conspirators” were undercover officers ineligible to vote) doesn’t preclude conviction, given Wisconsin’s recognition of “unilateral” conspiracies, State v. Sample, 215 Wis. 2d 487, 573 N.W.2d 187 (1998):

¶11   … Thus,

State v. Henry E. Routon, 2007 WI App 178, PFR filed 7/23/07
For Routon: Jefren E. Olsen, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶18   Wisconsin Stat. § 939.31 sets forth the elements of the crime of conspiracy applicable under Wis. Stat. § 961.41(1x).[8] Section 939.31 provides:

…. whoever, with intent that a crime be committed, agrees or combines with another for the purpose of committing that crime may,

State v. Henry E. Routon, 2007 WI App 178, PFR filed 7/23/07
For Routon: Jefren E. Olsen, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶36   Routon, as noted above, argues that the single sale to Agent Smith is, as a matter of law, insufficient evidence of an agreement. However, in the cases on which he relies, there was no evidence, as there is here,

State v. Neil P. Jackson, 2005 WI App 104
For Jackson: Timothy A. Provis

Issue/Holding:

¶7 Jackson alleges that the jury instruction on conspiracy violated his right to due process because, he contends, “conspiracy to attempt” is a nonexistent crime. Jackson relies on United States v. Meacham, 626 F.2d 503 (5th Cir. 1980), and People v. Iniguez,

State v. Edward Leon Jackson, 2004 WI App 190, PFR filed 10/15/04
For Jackson: Meredith J. Ross, LAIP, UW Law School

Issue/Holding:

¶2 In 1996, Jackson admitted to his role in a plan to fire bomb a Milwaukee police officer’s home. Jackson and two other men conspired to fire bomb the house, enabling two others to shoot people fleeing from the building.

State v. James F. Brienzo, 2003 WI App 203, PFR filed 10/10/03
For Brienzo: Jerome F. Buting

Issue: Whether attempted sexual assault of a child (by intercourse), § 948.02(2), is a crime known to law, in that the offense lacks an intent element and any crime of intent, § 939.32, requires specific intent for the completed act.

Holding: Sexual contact explicitly requires “intentional touching,” and therefore supports a charge of attempted assault by contact, 

State v. Brian D. Robins, 2002 WI 65, on bypass
For Robins: Craig W. Albee

Issue/Holding:

¶37. The crime of attempt is complete when the intent to commit the underlying crime is coupled with sufficient acts to demonstrate the improbability of free will desistance; the actual intervention of an extraneous factor is not a “third element” of the crime of attempt, although it is often part of the proof. 

State v. Brian D. Robins, 2002 WI 65, on bypass
For Robins: Craig W. Albee

Issue: Whether attempted child enticement is a prosecutable offense, where the “child victim” was in fact a government agent posing as a child as part of a government sting operation.

Holding: That the “victim” was fictitious is the extraneous factor intervening to make the crime attempted rather than completed enticement. 

State v. Thomas W. Grimm, 2002 WI App 242
For Grimm: Daniel W. Hildebrand

Issue/Holding: State v. Robins, 2002 WI 65, 253 Wis. 2d 298, 646 N.W.2d 287, and State v. Koenck, 2001 WI App 93, 242 Wis. 2d 693, 626 N.W.2d 359, which permit enticement charges where a fictitious online “victim” is thought by the defendant to be a child,

State v. Thomas W. Grimm, 2002 WI App 242
For Grimm: Daniel W. Hildebrand

Issue/Holding: The rationale of State v. Robins, 2002 WI 65, 253 Wis. 2d 298, 646 N.W.2d 287, and State v. Koenck, 2001 WI App 93, 242 Wis. 2d 693, 626 N.W.2d 359, which permit enticement charges where a fictitious online “victim” is thought by the defendant to be a child,