On Point blog, page 1 of 3
COA: State does not need to prove intent to conceal victim’s homicide to prove defendant hid corpse with intent to conceal a crime.
State v. Roger A. Minck, 2022AP2292-CR, 5/28/25, District III (recommended for publication); case activity
In a case of first impression, the COA held in a decision recommended for publication that hiding a corpse with intent to conceal a crime under Wis. Stat. § 940.11(2) requires the State to prove the defendant intended to conceal any crime, not a crime related to the victim’s homicide. The COA found the evidence sufficient to affirm the jury’s verdict finding Roger Minck guilty of hiding a corpse.
Court of Appeals construes “directed at” element of stalking statute
State v. Korry L. Ardell, 2017AP381-CR, District 1, 3/6/18 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Ardell was convicted of stalking in violation of § 940.32(2) for sending emails about N., a woman he had dated, to a former employer of N. (¶¶3-20). The court of appeals rejects his arguments that, under the plain language of the statute: 1) conduct or statements regarding N. but directed at a third party were irrelevant absent proof Ardell either intended such information to be passed on to the alleged victim or intended the third party to harass the alleged victim based on the information; and 2) the jury instructions failed to apprise the jury that the state had to prove that intent before they could convict him.
Challenges to sufficiency of evidence and self-defense instruction in reckless homicide case rejected
State v. Phillip Kareen Green, 2015AP1126-CR, 4/26/16, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Green argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of first degree reckless homicide because it didn’t prove he acted with utter disregard for human life. He also argues for a new trial in the interest of justice on the grounds that: 1) the jury wasn’t fully instructed about the interaction between self-defense and the utter disregard element; and 2) important facts were not introduced or placed in proper context. The court of appeals rejects Green’s claims in a decision heavy on facts and light on analysis.
Multiple counts for single sexual assault were neither “inconsistent” nor multiplicitous
State v. Jama I. Jama, 2014AP2432-CR, District 4, 2/25/16 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Jama was convicted of both second degree sexual assault of a person too intoxicated to give consent, § 940.225(2)(cm), and third degree sexual assault (sexual intercourse or contact without consent), § 940.225(3), for the same act. The court of appeals rejects Jama’s claim that he can’t be convicted of both counts.
Victim’s injuries provided sufficient factual basis for plea to first degree reckless injury
State v. Antonio Reyes-Ortiz, 2013AP268-CR, District 1, 11/26/13; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity
Reyes-Ortiz argued there was an insufficient factual basis for his plea to first degree reckless injury because the victim’s injuries rose only to the level of “substantial bodily harm” under § 939.22(38), not “great bodily harm” under § 939.22(14), as required by § 940.23(1)(a).
§ 940.30, False Imprisonment – Sufficiency of Evidence – Elements: “Confined” or “Restrained”; “Consent”
State v. Michael Scott Long, 2009 WI 36, affirming in part and reversing in part unpublished opinionF
For Long: Joseph L. Sommers
Issue: Whether “restrained or confined” element of false imprisonment was established where the defendant hugged the complainant tightly while committing an act of sexual contact.
Holding:
¶28 This court has previously explained that confinement is the “restraint by one person of the physical liberty of another.”
Kidnapping, § 940.31(1)(b) – Elements – “Hold to Service Against Will”
State v. Jeremy Denton, 2009 WI App 78 / State v. Aubrey W. Dahl, 2009 WI App 78
For Denton: Paul G. Bonneson
For Dahl: Patrick M. Donnelly
Issue/Holding: Though merely incidental to robbery, kidnapping charge is supported on theory that ordering the victim to relinquish property holds that person to service against his or her will:
¶26 … The defendants contend that,
§ 940.23(1), Reckless Injury – “Utter Disregard for Human Life” – Insufficient Proof, Interplay of Self-Defense
State v. James D. Miller, 2009 WI App 111, PFR filed 8/3/09
Pro se
Issue/Holding: Miller incontrovertibly had some basis to fire a shotgun at his drunken, violent antagonist and even if not adequate to establish full self-defense was enough to defeat the reckless injury element of utter disregard for human life, thereby requiring entry of judgment of acquittal on remand, ¶¶31-44.
Lengthy clips from the court’s detailed analysis omitted,
§ 940.25(1)(a), Injury by Intoxicated Use — No Duty to Clarify Meaning of “Materially Impaired” Element Upon Jury Request
State v. Jonathan J. Hubbard, 2008 WI 92, reversing 2007 WI App 240
For Hubbard: Steven W. Zaleski
Issue: Whether, upon jury request for clarification of “materially impaired” under the instructions for injury by intoxicated use of a vehicle, § 940.25(1)(a), the trial court properly responded that the should “give all words not otherwise defined in the jury instructions their ordinary meaning.”
Holding:
¶57 The circuit court had discretion to determine the necessity for,
§ 940.225(7), Sexual Intercourse with Corpse – Defendant Didn’t Cause Death
State v. Alexander Caleb Grunke / State v. Dustin Blake Radke, 2008 WI 82, reversing 2007 WI App 198
For Grunke: Suzanne Edwards
For Radke: Jefren E. Olsen, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue: Whether § 940.225 criminalizes sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a victim already dead at the time of the sexual activity when the accused did not cause the death of the victim.