On Point: 22. Sec. 940.225

State v. Jeff C. Hilgers, 2017 WI App 12; case activity (including briefs)

Hilgers, a correctional officer at a county jail, had sex with an inmate while she was on home detention. He was properly convicted of second degree sexual assault under § 940.225(2)(h), which prohibits a correctional officer from having sexual intercourse or sexual contact with “an individual who is confined in a correctional institution.”

State v. Jama I. Jama, 2014AP2432-CR, District 4, 2/25/16 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Jama was convicted of both second degree sexual assault of a person too intoxicated to give consent, § 940.225(2)(cm), and third degree sexual assault (sexual intercourse or contact without consent), § 940.225(3), for the same act. The court of appeals rejects Jama’s claim that he can’t be convicted of both counts.

State v. Bernard Ikechukwel Onyeukwu, 2014AP518-CR, 2/26/15, District 4 (not recommended for publication); click here for briefs.

The State charged the defendant with 10 counts of sexual assault, 5 of which required proof that the victim suffered from a mental deficiency and that the defendant knew it. The jury acquitted on 6 counts. Just 2 of the convictions required proof of mental deficiency. They spawned interesting grounds for appeal, but this decision just wasn’t up to the task.

State v. Dion M. Echols, 2010AP2626-CR, District 1, 9/27/11

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Echols: Amelia L. Bizzaro; case activity

Evidence held sufficient to establish “great bodily harm” element of 1st-degree sexual assault, § 940.225(1)(a), where the harm was inflicted a short time after the assault.

¶23      In this case, the trial court properly determined that Echols’ shooting M.F. subsequent to the nonconsensual sexual contact constituted great bodily harm.  

State v. Dennis J. Thornton, 2009AP3074-CR, District 2, 4/13/11

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Thornton: Angela C. Kachelski; case activity

Scienter is not an element of § 940.225(3). State v. Lederer, 99 Wis. 2d 430, 433, 299 N.W.2d 457 (Ct. App. 1980) (statute requires proof of victim’s nonconsent – in contradistinction, presumably, of defendant’s knowledge of lack of consent –

State v. Kelly J. McCredie, 2010AP1179-CR, District 2, 3/2/11

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for McCredie: William E. Schmaal, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity

For purposes of 3rd-degree sexual assault, § 940.225(3), the actor cannot obtain consent by deceiving the victim as to his true identity. McCredie misled the victim into thinking he was his brother (she was sleeping in a dark room when he suddenly appeared;

State v. Michael Scott Long, 2009 WI 36, affirming in part and reversing in part unpublished opinion
For Long: Joseph L. Sommers

Issue: Whether use of force element of second-degree sexual assault was established where the defendant asked the complainant to rate his penis then hugged her so that she could feel his penis through their clothing.

Holding:

¶24      Long’s arguments are not persuasive.

State v. Alexander Caleb Grunke / State v. Dustin Blake Radke, 2008 WI 82, reversing 2007 WI App 198
For Grunke: Suzanne Edwards
For Radke: Jefren E. Olsen, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether § 940.225 criminalizes sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a victim already dead at the time of the sexual activity when the accused did not cause the death of the victim.

State v. Delano L. Terrell, 2006 WI App 166
For Terrell: Martin E. Kohler, Brian Kinstler, Christopher M. Eippert

Issue: Whether a sheriff’s deputy assigned to work as a court bailiff is a “correctional staff member” so as to come within § 940.225(2)(h).

Holding: A “correctional staff member” is defined as an individual who works at a correctional institution, § 940.225(5)(ad). Terrell was a deputy assigned to work as a courthouse bailiff—a courthouse isn’t a correctional institution,

State v. Steven A. Harvey, 2006 WI App 26
For Harvey: Christopher William Rose

Issue/Holding: Rejecting the JI Committee definition of “cunnilingus,” the court “ conclude(s) that the statutory scheme of the sexual assault law does not require proof of ‘stimulation of the clitoris or vulva,’” ¶¶11-21.

¶21      The complaint and the undisputed evidence presented at the preliminary hearing demonstrated that Harvey performed an act of nonconsensual cunnilingus by placing his mouth on the victim’s genital area.