On Point: 23. Sec. 940.23

State v. Antonio Reyes-Ortiz, 2013AP268-CR, District 1, 11/26/13; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity

Reyes-Ortiz argued there was an insufficient factual basis for his plea to first degree reckless injury because the victim’s injuries rose only to the level of “substantial bodily harm” under § 939.22(38), not “great bodily harm” under  § 939.22(14), as required by § 940.23(1)(a).

State v. Donovan M. Burris, 2011 WI 32, reversing unpublished decision; for Burris: Byron C. Lichstein; case activity

Utter Disregard for Life – After-the-Fact Conduct

¶7   We conclude that, in an utter disregard analysis, a defendant’s conduct is not, as a matter of law, assigned more or less weight whether the conduct occurred before, during, or after the crime.  We hold that,

decision below: unpublished; prior On Point post; for Burris: Byron C. Lichstein

Issue (from Table of Pending Cases):

Was the trial court’s supplemental jury instruction that was issued in response to a question from the jury and that quoted verbatim from a Supreme Court opinion an impermissibly misleading instruction under the standards established by State v. Lohmeier, 205 Wis. 2d 183,

State v. James D. Miller, 2009 WI App 111, PFR filed 8/3/09
Pro se

Issue/Holding: Miller incontrovertibly had some basis to fire a shotgun at his drunken, violent antagonist and even if not adequate to establish full self-defense was enough to defeat the reckless injury element of utter disregard for human life, thereby requiring entry of judgment of acquittal on remand, ¶¶31-44.

Lengthy clips from the court’s detailed analysis omitted,

State v. Rachel W. Kelty, 2006 WI 101, reversing unpublished decision
For Kelty: Michael J. Fairchild

Issue/Holding: The defendant’s striking the victim “twice with two separate objects, each time committing herself to strike the baby, each blow separate, distinct, not identical in fact,” supports two separate charges of first-degree reckless injury, § 940.23(1)(a), ¶¶49-50.

State v. Stephen L. Jensen, 2000 WI 84, 236 Wis. 2d 521, 613 N.W.2d 170, affirming unpublished decision
For Jensen: James L. Fullin, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue1: Whether the first degree reckless injury (§ 940.23(1)) element of “utter disregard for human life” requires proof of the actor’s subjective awareness of the risk of death.

Holding: “¶17 Although ‘utter disregard for human life’ clearly has something to do with mental state,

State v. Jene R. Bodoh, 226 Wis.2d 718, 595 N.W.2d 330 (1999), affirming State v. Bodoh, 220 Wis.2d 102, 582 N.W.2d 440 (Ct. App. 1998)
For Bodoh: Michael D. Mandelman

Holding: A dog can be a dangerous weapon if used or intended or intended to be used in a manner calculated or likely to cause death or great bodily harm. (This holding has the effect of ratifying a prior court of appeals decision on this point,