On Point blog, page 1 of 2
Court of Appeals construes “directed at” element of stalking statute
State v. Korry L. Ardell, 2017AP381-CR, District 1, 3/6/18 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Ardell was convicted of stalking in violation of § 940.32(2) for sending emails about N., a woman he had dated, to a former employer of N. (¶¶3-20). The court of appeals rejects his arguments that, under the plain language of the statute: 1) conduct or statements regarding N. but directed at a third party were irrelevant absent proof Ardell either intended such information to be passed on to the alleged victim or intended the third party to harass the alleged victim based on the information; and 2) the jury instructions failed to apprise the jury that the state had to prove that intent before they could convict him.
Stalking statute was not unconstitutional as applied to defendant; letters on which stalking convictions were based constituted a “true threat”
State v. Donald W. Maier, 2013AP1391-CR, District 4, 5/8/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity
The First Amendment did not preclude prosecuting Maier for stalking based on letters he sent because the letters constituted a “true threat” and thus were not protected speech.
First Amendment — Speech — “True Threats.” Stalking and extortion — sufficiency of the evidence
State v. James D. Hills, 2012AP1901-CR, District 4, 4/11/13; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity
Hills sent letters and made at least one phone call to an assistant city attorney (ACA) who, he believed, had wrongfully prosecuted him under the city’s disorderly conduct ordinance. In those communications he berated the ACA (calling her incompetent, corrupt, dishonest, deceitful, worthless, and worse), accused her of prosecuting him with perjured testimony so she could collect money for the city,
Stalking, § 940.32(2m)(a): Overbreadth Challenge
State v. Gary M. Hemmingway, 2012 WI App 133; case activity
Stalking, § 940.32(2m)(a), which previously survived overbreadth and vagueness challenges based on rights to travel and equal protection, State v. Ruesch, 214 Wis. 2d 548, 571 N.W.2d 898 (Ct. App. 1997), now withstands a free-speech challenge: The statute isn’t a facially overbroad regulation of protected speech, in that the first amendment doesn’t immunize intentional conduct aimed at causing serious distress or fear of bodily harm.
Stalking, § 940.32: Notice of Charge, “Course of Conduct” / Elevation from Class I to H Felony Status
State v. Janet A. Conner, 2011 WI 8, affirming 2009 WI App 143; for Conner: Stephen E. Mays; case activity; Conner BiC; State Resp.; Reply
Stalking, § 940.32 – Notice of Charge, “Course of Conduct”
Stalking requires proof of, among other elements, a “course of conduct” which “means a series of 2 or more acts carried out over time,
Stalking, § 940.32: Sufficiency of Evidence
State v. Carl Ralph Eichorn, 2010 WI App 70; for Eichorn: Melissa Fitzsimmons, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate; BiC; Resp.; Reply
Evidence was sufficient to support stalking conviction, though the requisite “course of conduct” occurred over short span of time:
¶9 In sum, there is more than sufficient evidence under our standard of review to support beyond a reasonable doubt Eichorn’s stalking conviction.
§ 940.32(2), Stalking, Generally: “Three Distinct Classifications”
State v. Janet A. Conner, 2009 WI APP 143, PFR filed 9/28/09
For Conner: J. Steven House
Issue/Holding:
¶11 Wisconsin Stat. § 940.32 creates three distinct classifications of stalking offenses. See State v. Warbelton, 2009 WI 6, ¶24, 315 Wis. 2d 253, 759 N.W.2d 557. Subsections (2) and (2e) each set forth separate requirements for Class I felony stalking.
§ 940.32(2m)(b), Stalking – “Course of Conduct” Acts: Timing, Admissibility
State v. Janet A. Conner, 2009 WI APP 143, PFR filed 9/28/09
For Conner: J. Steven House
Issue/Holding:
¶19 We conclude that the seven year time restriction specified in Wis. Stat. § 940.32(2m)(b) requires that only the final act charged as part of a course of conduct occur within seven years of the previous conviction, and does not restrict by time the other acts used to establish the underlying course of conduct element of sub.
§§ 940.32(2) & (2m)(a), Stalking, Having Prior Conviction for Violence – Prior Conviction Is Element, not Penalty Enhancer
State v. Jeffrey A. Warbelton, 2009 WI 6, affirming 2008 WI App 42
For Warbelton: Paul G. Lazotte, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue/Holding: Prior conviction for a violent crime is element, not penalty enhancer, of stalking, §§ 940.32(2) & (2m)(a):
¶30 First, sub. (2m)(a) designates a list of specific crimes that elevate a simple stalking offense to a Class H felony. These enumerated prior convictions are for a specific set of violent crimes,
Unfair Prejudice, § 904.03 – Jury Exposure to Proof of Element of Prior Conviction for “Violent Crime” on Stalking Trial
State v. Jeffrey A. Warbelton, 2009 WI 6, affirming 2008 WI App 42
For Warbelton: Paul G. Lazotte, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue/Holding: On a trial for stalking, § 940.32, where one of the elements is prior conviction for “violent crime,” the defendant may blunt prejudicial impact of proof of the prior by stipulating to the existence of the conviction for a violent crime (thus precluding proof of its details);