On Point: D. Ch. 940: Against life/body

State v. Nicole Schutte, 2006 WI App 135, PFR filed 7/21/06
For Schutte: Donald T. Lang, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding1: Evidence of the driver’s marijuana use just before the accident resulting in the charged homicide by negligent use of vehicle was relevant and admissible:

¶48      Although the toxicology expert could not tie the level of THC detected in Schutte’s blood to a specific level of impairment,

State v. Rachel W. Kelty, 2006 WI 101, reversing unpublished decision
For Kelty: Michael J. Fairchild

Issue/Holding: The defendant’s striking the victim “twice with two separate objects, each time committing herself to strike the baby, each blow separate, distinct, not identical in fact,” supports two separate charges of first-degree reckless injury, § 940.23(1)(a), ¶¶49-50.

State v. Peter A. Fonte, 2005 WI 77, reversing unpublished decision
For Fonte: Martha A. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: § 940.09 is constitutional, as against a challenge that it relieves the State of proving a causal connection between intoxication and death; reasoning in, and result of, State v. Caibaiosai, 122 Wis. 2d 587, 363 N.W.2d 574 (1985) reaffirmed, ¶38.

State v. Peter A. Fonte, 2005 WI 77, reversing unpublished decision
For Fonte: Martha A. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: Fonte’s emotionally charged statement to a police officer at the scene that he “thought the boat was out of gear,” corroborated by a companion’s “grudging admission that he had agreed that Fonte was operating the boat” is sufficient to satisfy the § 940.09 element of “operating,” ¶21.

State v. Mahlik D. Ellington, 2005 WI App 243
For Ellington: Andrea Taylor Cornwall

Issue/Holding: The following instruction is sufficient: “Great bodily harm means serious bodily injury.  You, the jury, are to alone to determine whether the bodily injury in your judgment is serious.” (La Barge v. State, 74 Wis. 2d 327, 333, 246 N.W.2d 794, 797 (1976) and Cheatham v. State,

State v. Michael A. DeLain, 2005 WI 52, affirming, as modified, 2004 WI App 79
For DeLain: Robert R. Henak

Issue/Holding:

¶9        To obtain a conviction for a violation of Wis. Stat. § 940.22(2), the State must prove three elements beyond a reasonable doubt:  (1) that the defendant was or held himself or herself out to be a therapist; (2) that the defendant had intentional sexual contact with a patient or client;

State v. William E. Draughon III, 2005 WI App 162, (AG’s) PFR filed
For Draughton: Stephen L. Miller

Issue/Holding: Draughon, a pastor, was concededly a “clergy” member within § 940.22(2); however, the instructions relieved the State of its burden of proof on the element of whether he performed “therapy” in this capacity, in that they told the jury that a member of the clergy is a “therapist,” without specifically requiring that Draughon in fact performed therapy:

¶13      Jury instructions that have the effect of relieving the State of its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the offense charged are unconstitutional under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.

State v. Obea S. Hayes, 2004 WI 80, affirming 2003 WI App 99, 264 Wis. 2d 377, 663 N.W.2d 351
For Hayes: Philip J. Brehm:

Issue/Holding:

¶64. We agree with the court of appeals that M.M.’s testimony did not follow a chronological order. A reasonable factfinder could, however, draw the inference that the defendant verbally threatened to have retaliatory sex with M.M.

State v. Brandon L. Mason, 2004 WI App 176
For Dawson: Ellen Henak, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate

Issue/Holding: The felony murder statute, § 940.03 (1999-2000), contains characteristics suggestive of both penalty enhancers (it adds a specified term to the maximum penalty applicable to the underlying crime), ¶15, and also substantive offenses (it is located in a chapter that defines substantive offenses; and it incorporates the elements of offenses located elsewhere),

State v. Eugene M. Perkins, 2004 WI App 213, PFR filed 11/9/04
For Perkins: Jeffrey W. Jensen

Issue Whether expert testimony is required to establish the victim’s mental illness, an element of § 940.225(2)(c).

Holding: This element may be shown through credible lay opinion testimony:

¶17 Here, the State had to prove four things: (1) that Perkins had sexual contact or intercourse with H.V.;