On Point blog, page 8 of 13
§ 940.32(2), Stalking, Generally: “Three Distinct Classifications”
State v. Janet A. Conner, 2009 WI APP 143, PFR filed 9/28/09
For Conner: J. Steven House
Issue/Holding:
¶11 Wisconsin Stat. § 940.32 creates three distinct classifications of stalking offenses. See State v. Warbelton, 2009 WI 6, ¶24, 315 Wis. 2d 253, 759 N.W.2d 557. Subsections (2) and (2e) each set forth separate requirements for Class I felony stalking.
§ 940.32(2m)(b), Stalking – “Course of Conduct” Acts: Timing, Admissibility
State v. Janet A. Conner, 2009 WI APP 143, PFR filed 9/28/09
For Conner: J. Steven House
Issue/Holding:
¶19 We conclude that the seven year time restriction specified in Wis. Stat. § 940.32(2m)(b) requires that only the final act charged as part of a course of conduct occur within seven years of the previous conviction, and does not restrict by time the other acts used to establish the underlying course of conduct element of sub.
§§ 940.32(2) & (2m)(a), Stalking, Having Prior Conviction for Violence – Prior Conviction Is Element, not Penalty Enhancer
State v. Jeffrey A. Warbelton, 2009 WI 6, affirming 2008 WI App 42
For Warbelton: Paul G. Lazotte, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue/Holding: Prior conviction for a violent crime is element, not penalty enhancer, of stalking, §§ 940.32(2) & (2m)(a):
¶30 First, sub. (2m)(a) designates a list of specific crimes that elevate a simple stalking offense to a Class H felony. These enumerated prior convictions are for a specific set of violent crimes,
Unfair Prejudice, § 904.03 – Jury Exposure to Proof of Element of Prior Conviction for “Violent Crime” on Stalking Trial
State v. Jeffrey A. Warbelton, 2009 WI 6, affirming 2008 WI App 42
For Warbelton: Paul G. Lazotte, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue/Holding: On a trial for stalking, § 940.32, where one of the elements is prior conviction for “violent crime,” the defendant may blunt prejudicial impact of proof of the prior by stipulating to the existence of the conviction for a violent crime (thus precluding proof of its details);
Due Process – Notice of Charge – Sufficient to Allege Elements, Specific Acts Unnecessary
State v. Janet A. Conner, 2009 WI App 143, PFR filed 9/28/09
For Conner: J. Steven House
Issue/Holding: An information alleging the elements of stalking, § 940.32(2m)(b), but not the acts allegedly establishing the “course of conduct,” provided adequate notice of the charge; court rejecting argument that Connor deprived of notice of “time frame in which the crime allegedly occurred.”
State v.
§ 940.25(1)(a), Injury by Intoxicated Use — No Duty to Clarify Meaning of “Materially Impaired” Element Upon Jury Request
State v. Jonathan J. Hubbard, 2008 WI 92, reversing 2007 WI App 240
For Hubbard: Steven W. Zaleski
Issue: Whether, upon jury request for clarification of “materially impaired” under the instructions for injury by intoxicated use of a vehicle, § 940.25(1)(a), the trial court properly responded that the should “give all words not otherwise defined in the jury instructions their ordinary meaning.”
Holding:
¶57 The circuit court had discretion to determine the necessity for,
§ 940.225(7), Sexual Intercourse with Corpse – Defendant Didn’t Cause Death
State v. Alexander Caleb Grunke / State v. Dustin Blake Radke, 2008 WI 82, reversing 2007 WI App 198
For Grunke: Suzanne Edwards
For Radke: Jefren E. Olsen, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue: Whether § 940.225 criminalizes sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a victim already dead at the time of the sexual activity when the accused did not cause the death of the victim.
§ 940.21, Mayhem – Elements – Generally – Includes “Forehead”
State v. Leonard J. Quintana, 2008 WI 33, affirming 2007 WI App 29
For Quintana: James B. Connell, Robyn J. DeVos, William R. Kerner
Issue/Holding:
¶70 To constitute mayhem, the State must show that the defendant had (1) the specific intent to disable or disfigure; (2) by cutting or mutilating the tongue, eye, ear, nose, lip, limb, or other bodily member;
§ 940.09(2), Defense to Homicide by Intoxicated Use: Death Would Have Occurred Anyway – Admissibility of Evidence of Deceased’s Prior Conduct as Relevant to Intervening Cause
State v. Steven P. Muckerheide, 2007 WI 5, affirming unpublished opinion
For Muckerheide: Mark S. Rosen
Issue/Holding: On a trial of homicide by intoxicated use of a motor vehicle, § 940.09(1)(b), where the defense was that the death would have occurred anyway because the deceased grabbed the wheel just prior to the accident, evidence that the deceased “had, on prior occasions, gestured as if to grab the steering wheel of his father’s vehicle and,
§ 940.10(1), Homicide by Negligent Operation of Vehicle — Elements
State v. Nicole Schutte, 2006 WI App 135, PFR filed 7/21/06
For Schutte: Donald T. Lang, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue/Holding:
¶19 Wisconsin Stat. § 940.10(1) provides that a person who “causes the death of another human being by the negligent operation or handling of a vehicle is guilty of a Class G felony.” The term “negligent” as used in § 940.10 requires proof of “criminal negligence.” See Wis.