On Point blog, page 2 of 2
Evidence sufficient to to support juvenile delinquency finding
State v. J.L.M., 2015AP1695, 4/19/16, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
The State charged J.L.M. with one count of robbery with use of force, as a party to a crime, due to his alleged involvement with a group of youths who stole M.H.’s bike and struck him several times in the process. J.L.M. lost at trial and challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction.
Multiple counts for single sexual assault were neither “inconsistent” nor multiplicitous
State v. Jama I. Jama, 2014AP2432-CR, District 4, 2/25/16 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Jama was convicted of both second degree sexual assault of a person too intoxicated to give consent, § 940.225(2)(cm), and third degree sexual assault (sexual intercourse or contact without consent), § 940.225(3), for the same act. The court of appeals rejects Jama’s claim that he can’t be convicted of both counts.
Evidence sufficient to prove robbed bank was “chartered”
State v. James Lee Eady, Jr., 2016 WI App 12; case activity (including briefs)
Under the forgiving standard for assessing the sufficiency of evidence, the state managed to introduce enough circumstantial evidence to prove that the bank Eady robbed was “chartered” by a state of the federal government, and therefore was a “financial institution” for purposes of § 943.87.
State v. Patrick K. Tourville, Case Nos. 2014AP1248-CR thru 2014AP1251-CR, petition for review granted 9/9/15
Review of an unpublished per curiam court of appeals decision; affirmed 2016 WI 17; case activity (for 2014AP1248-CR, which links to the other consolidated cases)
Issues (composed by On Point from the PFR)
Where the State agreed to cap its sentence recommendation on four cases at the “high end” of the recommendation of the presentence investigation (PSI) and the PSI did not recommend whether the sentences in the cases should be served concurrently or consecutively, did the State breach the plea agreement by recommending consecutive sentences?
Was there a sufficient factual basis for a plea to party to the crime of felony theft for “taking and carrying away” property when the defendant had no knowledge of the theft, but only received the stolen property and then moved it to a different location?
Scattershot attack on conviction for criminal damage to property and armed robbery misses marks
State v. Clifton Robinson, 2014AP1575-CR, 3/31/15, District 1 (not recommended for publication); click here for briefs and docket
The court of appeals here rejects a barrage of challenges to Robinson’s conviction for criminal damage to property and armed robbery with use of force–everything from a Batson challenge, to severance issues, to the sufficiency of evidence, to the admission of prejudicial evidence and more.
Identity theft doesn’t require proof defendant knew the identifying information belonged to an actual person
State v. Fernando Moreno-Acosta, 2014 WI App 122; case activity
While § 943.201(2) requires the state to prove the defendant used personal identifying information belonging to an actual person, it need not prove that the defendant knew the information belonged to another “real, actual person.”
Evidence was sufficient to establish intent to deprive owner of property
State v. Adam J. Gajeski, 2014AP612-CR, District 3, 10/7/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The evidence was sufficient to support the guilty verdict on a theft charge because the jury could have reasonably inferred Gajeski intended to permanently deprive the owner of the property at the time he took the property.
Extended statute of limitation for theft runs from actual discovery, not from when theft should have been discovered
State v. Kim B. Simmelink, 2014 WI App 102; case activity
The court of appeals holds that § 939.74(2)(b)’s extended statute of limitation for certain theft charges runs from actual discovery of the theft, and not from when the theft should have been discovered with the exercise of reasonable diligence.