On Point: I. Ch. 947: Against public peace

City of New Richmond v. Warren Wayne Slocum, 2016AP1887, District 3, 10/11/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Slocum unsuccessfully challenges the sufficiency of the evidence used to find he violated a New Richmond municipal ordinance, § 50.88(a)(1), which tracks § 947.01(1).

State v. Kerry A. Siekierzynski, 2015AP2350-CR, District 3, 9/7/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Siekierzynski’s acts during an angry, emotional confrontation with his ex-wife over child visitation were enough to support the guilty verdict for disorderly conduct.

State v. Ginger M. Breitzman, 2015AP1610-CR, District 1, 8/16/16 (not recommended for publication), petition for review granted 3/13/2017; case activity (including briefs)

The court of appeals rebuffs Breitzman’s arguments that there was insufficient evidence to convict her of child neglect and disorderly conduct and that her trial lawyer was ineffective.

State v. William M. Gruber, 2014AP1069, 2/5/15, District 4 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); click here for docket and briefs

The court of appeals bills this as “a State Capitol protester case with a twist.” The “twist” is that Gruber was cited for disorderly conduct under one administrative rule whereas other protesters were cited for lacking a permit under another rule. So when the circuit court dismissed the charges in this case based on the reasoning used in the “no permit” cases, it erred.

Robert W. Evans, Jr., v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Justice, 2014 WI App 31, overruled by Doubek v. Kaul, 2022 WI 31; case activity

A conviction for disorderly conduct under § 947.01 may qualify as a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A), thus depriving the defendant of the right to possess a firearm.

Evans’s application for a permit to carry a concealed weapon was denied after DOJ concluded his 2002 disorderly conduct conviction qualified as a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.”

State v. Kaleb K., 2013AP839, District 4, 11/27/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Kaleb posted a video on YouTube that depicted him “rapping” a song about his Spanish teacher. The song used “crude and vulgar sexual language” about the teacher. (¶2). (The trial court was harsher, characterizing the video as “obscene and hate-filled” and “shocking, hard to watch, really disgusting.” (¶3).) Based on the video Kaleb was charged in juvenile court with disorderly conduct under § 947.01(1) and unlawful use of a computerized communication system under § 947.0125(2)(d).

State v. William G. Bennett, 2012AP1757-CR, District 2, 1/30/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Evidence that Bennett sent a lewd and obscene letter to a person was sufficient to support conviction for disorderly conduct because the content of the letter placed it beyond a mere “personal annoyance” to the victim. Purely written speech can constitute disorderly conduct even if that written speech fails to cause an actual disturbance,

State v. Bradley S. Johnson, Outagamie Co. Circ. Ct. No. 12CM495

circuit court decision; case activity

Panhandling prosecution under § 947.02(4) is dismissed with prejudice because the vagrancy statute is unconstitutional under first amendment analysis: panhandling (“begging”) is a form of protected speech and its criminalization under § 947.02(4) is fatally vague and overbroad. State v. Starks, 51 Wis.2d 256, 186 N.W.2d 245 (1971) (loitering statute unconstitutional as providing insufficient notice of prohibited conduct,

State v. Tyler H., 2012AP914, District 3, 11/6/12,  court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

Evidence held sufficient to support delinquency adjudication, where juvenile called mother “a fucking whore” after she struck him during a family “squabble” in their home.

¶9        We conclude Tyler’s conduct was of the type that tends to cause or provoke a disturbance.  First, we reject Tyler’s argument that his language could not provoke a disturbance because a disturbance was already occurring.

State v. William J. Zarda, 2011AP386-CR, District 3, 5/17/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Zarda: Ricky Cveykus; case activity

Under settled authority, the disorderly conduct statute, § 947.01, is neither overbroad (¶5, citing State v. Douglas D., 2001 WI 47, 243 Wis. 2d 204, 626 N.W.2d 725); nor vague (¶6, citing State v. Zwicker,