On Point: J. Ch. 948: Against children

State v. David J. Lenz, 230 Wis.2d 529, 602 N.W.2d 173 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Lenz: Steven D. Phillips, SPD, Madison Appellate.

Issue: Whether intercepts of tax refunds can be considered payments toward support obligations.

Holding: The nonsupport statute doesn’t require that payments be made “voluntarily,” and tax refund intercepts therefore count.

“The intercepts are payments from Lenz’s assets. Although he did not directly make them,

State v. Christopher M. Clutter, 230 Wis.2d 472, 602 N.W.2d 324 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Clutter: Martha K. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate.

Issue: Whether the nonsupport defense of inability to pay is viable by showing “lack of financial resources alone.”

Holding: “(L)ack of financial resources alone is insufficient to demonstrate inability to pay.”

Inability to pay is a defense to nonsupport. Clutter, on postconviction motion,

State v. David J. Lenz, 230 Wis.2d 529, 602 N.W.2d 173 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Lenz: Steven D. Phillips, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether a charge of § 948.22(2) nonsupport based on arrearages accrued more than six years prior to the charge is barred by the statute of limitations.

Holding: The crime of nonsupport is complete after each 120-day period of intentional failure to pay, including arrearages as well as current obligations,

State v. Ronald L. Monarch, 230 Wis.2d 542, 602 N.W.2d 179 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Monarch: Craig S. Lambert

Issue: Whether a charge of § 948.22(2) nonsupport based on arrearages accrued more than six years prior to the charge is barred by the statute of limitations

Holding:: The crime of nonsupport is complete after each 120-day period of intentional failure to pay, including arrearages as well as current obligations,

State v. Mark Inglin, 224 Wis.2d 764, 592 N.W.2d 666 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Inglin: Stephen M. Glynn & Robert R. Henak

Holding: Inglin argues denial of right to offer an affirmative defense to § 948.31(1)(b), namely that his actions were necessary to prevent mental harm to the child. Although his argument “present[s] an intriguing due process theory based on the interplay of § 948.04(2), Stats., and 948.31(4)(a), Stats.

State v. Mark Inglin, 224 Wis.2d 764, 592 N.W.2d 666 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Inglin: Stephen M. Glynn & Robert R. Henak

Holding: § 948.31(1)(b) penalizes several different actus reus alternatives, including taking a child away, or withholding a child more than 12 hours beyond court approval. Inglin had his ex-wife’s consent to take their child on a camping trip to Colorado. He deceived her, though, and fled with the child to Canada.

State v. Gary R. Brunette, 220 Wis. 431, 583 N.W.2d 174 (Ct. App. 1998)
For Brunette: Kevin Schram

Issue/Holding: Seven-year old’s testimony that she was touched on or near her “privates” and “potty place” sufficient to sustain conviction for first-degree sexual assault.

State v. Teresa L. Bellows, 218 Wis. 2d 614, 582 N.W.2d 53 (Ct. App. 1998)
For Bellows: Martha K. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

…The State was required to prove that: (1) Bellows was responsible for the welfare of her three children; (2) she intentionally contributed to their neglect; and (3) the children were under the age of eighteen. See Wis J I-Criminal 2150. Only the second element was contested and now forms the basis for Bellows’