On Point blog, page 9 of 12

§ 948.07, Enticement — Elements

State v. John S. Provo, 2004 WI App 97, PFR filed 5/7/04
For Provo: William H. Gergen

Issue/Holding: “… We hold that § 948.07 requires only that the defendant cause the child to go into any vehicle, building, room, or secluded place with the intent to engage in illicit conduct, but not that the child necessarily be first separated from ‘the public,’” ¶1. That is,

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§ 948.12(1m), Possession of Child Pornography – Sufficiency of Evidence, Element of “Possession”

State v. Jack P. Lindgren, 2004 WI App 159, PFR filed 8/20/04
For Lindgren: Stephen M. Compton

Issue: Whether the evidence was sufficient, on the element of possession, to sustain conviction for possessing child pornography, where the defense expert “testified that no evidence of any child pornography had been saved on Lindgren’s computer,” ¶23.

Holding:

¶25. Lindgren’s challenge to the concept of possession in the context of computer material has been recently,

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§ 948.22, Nonsupport — Modification of Support Payments – Factors: Incarceration

State v. Terry L. Dumler, 2003 WI 62, affirming summary order
For Dumler: Todd G. Smith

Issue/Holding:

¶ 1.… The central issue before this court is whether the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in refusing to reduce Dumler’s child support payments in light of Dumler’s incarceration and resulting change in income. Although we find it appropriate for a court to consider incarceration when reviewing a request for modification,

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§ 948.02(2), Attempted Sexual Assault (Intercourse) – Crime Known to Law Despite Lack of “Formal” Intent Element

State v. James F. Brienzo, 2003 WI App 203, PFR filed 10/10/03
For Brienzo: Jerome F. Buting

Issue: Whether attempted sexual assault of a child (by intercourse), § 948.02(2), is a crime known to law, in that the offense lacks an intent element and any crime of intent, § 939.32, requires specific intent for the completed act.

Holding: Sexual contact explicitly requires “intentional touching,” and therefore supports a charge of attempted assault by contact, 

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Sexual Contact, § 948.02(2) — Definition of “Chest,” § 939.22(19) — Applicability to Male Victim

State v. Michael J. Forster, 2003 WI App 29, PFR filed 1/31/03
For Forster: Martha K. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether designation of “breast,” in § 939.22(19), applies to males as well females, so that touching of a male breast may constitute sexual assault.

Holding: The statute plainly applies to the “intimate parts,” including “chest,” “of a human being,” and therefore applies to both genders.

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Sexual Assault, § 948.02(2) — Sufficiency of Evidence

State v. Michael J. Forster, 2003 WI App 29, PFR filed 1/31/03
For Forster: Martha K. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: The male victim’s testimony that the defendant “rubbed his nipple in a circular motion, while kissing [his] neck, for approximately twenty-five minutes,” established that the defendant touched an intimate part (chest) with illicit intent. ¶¶19-20.

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§ 948.025, Repeated Sexual Assault — Remedy for Violation of Multiple Charging Proscription

State v. John S. Cooper, 2003 WI App 227, PFR filed 11/14/03
For Cooper: John A. Birdsall

Issue: Whether the trial court properly remedied violation of § 948.025(3) (impermissible to charge in same action both repeated-acts and individual acts of sexual assault involving same victim in same time period) by dismissing the repeated-acts charge instead of the individual-act charges.

Holding:

¶15. We hold that a court may reverse a conviction on the repeated acts charge under Wis.

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§ 948.02(2), 2nd-Degree Sexual Assault (by Contact) — Elements – “Intentional” (Vs. “Knowing”) Contact

State v. John A. Jipson, 2003 WI App 222
For Jipson: Martha K. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: The specifically prohibited “purpose” of sexual contact (i.e., sexual degradation, humiliation, arousal, or gratification) is not listed in § 948.02(2), but is nonetheless defined in § 948.01(5) as an element. ¶9 and id., n. 4, following State v. Bollig, 2000 WI 6, ¶50, 232 Wis.

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Due Process – Scienter, § 948.12

State v. John Lee Schaefer, 2003 WI App 164, PFR filed 8/21/03
For Schaefer: Jefren E. Olsen, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶32. Schaefer claims that by allowing conviction for possession of child pornography when a defendant “reasonably should know” that the child depicted is under eighteen years of age, Wis. Stat. § 948.12 omits a scienter requirement for the offense. He contends that in expressing the intent element regarding the minority of the depicted child in the pornographic materials as “knows or reasonably should know,”

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§ 948.02(2), Attempted Sexual Assault (Intercourse); § 948.07 (Attempted) Enticement – Initiated Over Internet – First Amendment

State v. James F. Brienzo, 2003 WI App 203, PFR filed 10/10/03
For Brienzo: Jerome F. Buting

Issue/Holding: Prosecution for attempted sexual assault of a child initiated over the Internet isn’t barred by the first amendment. ¶¶23-24, applying State v. Robins, 2002 WI 65, 253 Wis. 2d 298, 646 N.W.2d 287 (permitting prosecution for enticement). Same re: attempted enticement, ¶2:

We conclude that pursuant to State v.

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