On Point blog, page 1 of 1
COA holds that difference between “L meth” and “D meth” does not create a defense to RCS prosecution
State v. Walter L. Johnson, 2024AP79-CR, 2/13/25, District IV (recommended for publication); case activity
In a case resolving a hot issue for OWI litigators, COA rejects challenges to an RCS prosecution based on the chemical difference between “L meth”–found in certain nasal decongestant sprays–and “D meth,” which is found in illicit street drugs.
Court of Appeals: Aiding buyer in drug sale can lead to Len Bias liability because it also aided dealer
State v. Terry L. Hibbard, 2022 WI App 53; case activity (including briefs)
In a decision that allows for a sweeping expansion of aiding and abetting prosecutions in Len Bias cases, the court of appeals holds that a person assisting only a buyer a drug transaction could also be prosecuted for reckless homicide if the buyer dies from using the drug because any act aiding the buyer in getting the drugs also necessarily aids the seller in making the delivery.
Partial SCOW defense win; two charges for two different strength pills multiplicitous
State v. Brantner, 2020 WI 21, 2/25/20, affirming in part and reversing in part a summary order, 2018AP53; case activity (including briefs)
Brantner was arrested (for reasons unrelated to this case) in Kenosha County by Fond du Lac County detectives. They took him to jail in Fond du Lac, where a booking search revealed several different types of pills concealed in his boot. He was tried, convicted and sentenced in Fond du Lac on five counts of drug possession and five associated bail-jumping counts. The supreme court now rejects his argument that he didn’t “possess” any of the drugs in Fond du Lac County–that the arrest in Kenosha terminated his possession because he lacked control over the pills. But it agrees with him that his conviction on two of the counts (with their associated bail-jumping counts) is a double-jeopardy violation; the bare fact that he had pills with two different oxycodone dosages (5 and 20 milligram) will not support two different charges of possessing that drug.
Double Jeopardy – Mulitple Punishments – Drug Tax Stamp Assessment, §§ 139.87-139.96, And Subsequent Prosecution For Possessing Same Drug
Stephen Dye v. Frank, 355 F.3d 1102 (7th Cir 2004)
For Dye: Christopher M. Bailey
Issue/Holding:
To determine whether a civil penalty is so punitive that it is should be characterized as criminal punishment, we must consider the factors listed by the Supreme Court in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963), and reaffirmed in Hudson v.
§ 961.41(2), Maintaining Drug Residence — Amendment of Information at Close of Case
State v. Davon R. Malcom, 2001 WI App 291, PFR filed 11/27/01
For Malcom: John D. Lubarsky, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue: Whether the trial court properly amended the information, after close of evidence, to add a charge of keeping a place “which is resorted to by persons using controlled substances” to the charge of using the same place to manufacture, keep or deliver controlled substances (both charges being alternatives under § 961.41(2).
Defenses – “Statutory Double Jeopardy” – Drug Offenses – § 961.45
State v. Colleen E. Hansen, 2001 WI 53, 243 Wis. 2d 328, 626 N.W.2d 195, on certification
For Hansen: Pamela Pepper
Issue: “¶8 … ‘Does Wis. Stat. § 961.45 bar prosecution for the state crime of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, where a defendant previously has been convicted, based on the same conduct, for the federal crime of conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute? Stated differently,