On Point blog, page 3 of 4
Defenses – “Statutory Double Jeopardy” – Drug Offenses, § 961.45 – “Same Conduct” Test
State v. Julio C. Bautista, 2009 WI App 100, PFR filed 7/16/09
For Bautista: Jefren E. Olsen, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue/Holding: Section 961.45 bars successive drug prosecutions by dual sovereignties premised on the “same act” (or “conduct”), State v. Colleen E. Hansen, 2001 WI 53. Although broader than the Blockburger “elements-only” test, this “same-conduct” test does not bar state prosecution for conspiracy to deliver marijuana following federal conviction for delivering cocaine.
Delivery of Controlled Substance – Sufficiency of Evidence (and Corroboration of Confession Rule)
State v. Edward Bannister, 2007 WI 86, 302 Wis. 2d 158, 734 N.W.2d 892, reversing 2006 WI App 136
Issue/Holding: Bannister’s confession to giving morphine to someone who died from an overdose of the substance was sufficiently corroborated to support his his conviction:
¶ 22 We first address whether the State satisfied the corroboration rule during the course of Bannister’s trial. The corroboration rule is a common-law standard.
Conspiracy to Manufacture Controlled Substance — § 961.41(1x), Elements — Generally
State v. Henry E. Routon, 2007 WI App 178, PFR filed
For Routon: Jefren E. Olsen, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue/Holding:
¶18 Wisconsin Stat. § 939.31 sets forth the elements of the crime of conspiracy applicable under Wis. Stat. § 961.41(1x).[8] Section 939.31 provides:
…. whoever, with intent that a crime be committed, agrees or combines with another for the purpose of committing that crime may,
Conspiracy to Manufacture Controlled Substance — Undercover Agent as Party to Agreement, Generally
State v. Henry E. Routon, 2007 WI App 178, PFR filed
For Routon: Jefren E. Olsen, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue/Holding:
¶19 The crime that is the subject of the conspiracy need not be committed in order for a violation of Wis. Stat. § 939.31 to occur; rather, the focus is on the intent of the individual defendant. State v. Sample,
Conspiracy to Manufacture Controlled Substance — Sufficiency of Evidence – Knowledge of Intended Use – Agreement
State v. Henry E. Routon, 2007 WI App 178, PFR filed
For Routon: Jefren E. Olsen, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue/Holding: Evidence of conspiracy to manufacture controlled substance is sufficient, notwithstanding that the psilocybe spores that defendant sold were themselves legal, given “abundant evidence from which it is reasonable to infer that Routon marketed the psilocybe spores to persons who wanted to use them for the illegal purpose of growing mushrooms and that this was the predominant part of the business,” ¶30.
Possession of Controlled Substance, PTAC – Sufficiency of Evidence
State v. Charles E. Dukes, 2007 WI App 175
For Dukes: Robert N. Meyeroff
Issue/Holding:
¶22 Dukes contends that this evidence is insufficient because there was “no physical evidence linking [him] to the drug house and the drugs in the drug house,” because neither his fingerprints nor DNA were on any of the items recovered. He claims he did not live in the apartment, insisting that the evidence shows only that he was found sleeping on the floor where an overnight guest might sleep,
Keeping Drug Vehicle, § 961.42(1) – Elements, Generally
State v. Wayne Charles Slagle, 2007 WI App 117
For Slagle: Richard D. Martin, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate
Issue/Holding:
¶2 … Because the State charged Slagle with keeping or maintaining a “vehicle” used for “keeping” cocaine, the State needed to prove the following three elements:
1. Slagle kept or maintained a vehicle.
2. Slagle’s vehicle was used for keeping cocaine. “Keeping” requires that the cocaine be kept for the purpose of warehousing or storage for ultimate manufacture or delivery.
Keeping Drug Vehicle, § 961.42(1) – Element of “Keeping” – More than Mere Transport Required
State v. Wayne Charles Slagle, 2007 WI App 117
For Slagle: Richard D. Martin, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate
Issue/Holding:
¶7 The interpretation of the statutory term “keeping” as “warehousing or storage for ultimate manufacture or delivery” comes from State v. Brooks, 124 Wis. 2d 349, 354-55, 369 N.W.2d 183 (Ct. App. 1985). Neither party challenges this interpretation of the statute. [5] Furthermore, Slagle does not dispute that the evidence shows the cocaine in his truck was “for ultimate manufacture or delivery.” The only dispute here is whether the trial evidence shows the cocaine was being “warehoused” or “stored” in Slagle’s truck.
§ 940.42, Attempted Intimidation of Witness – Elements – Sufficiency of Evidence: Addressing Parent of Child-Witness
State v. Alvin M. Moore, 2006 WI App 61, PFR filed 3/21/06
For Moore: Donna L. Hintze, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue: Whether an effort at dissuading a child witness which was directed at the child’s mother satisfies the elements of attempted intimidation of a witness, § 940.42.
Holding:
¶10 To prove attempted intimidation of Tamika, the State was required to prove that: (1) Tamika was a witness;
Possession with Intent to Deliver — Sufficiency of Evidence, Proof of Intent
State v. Sheldon C. Stank, 2005 WI App 236
For Stank: Dennis P. Coffey
Issue/Holding:
¶45 We further reject Stank’s argument that insufficient evidence existed to support the “intent to deliver” element of count two. According to Peasley v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 224, 229, 231-32, 265 N.W.2d 506 (1978), the finder of fact may consider many factors indicative of intent to deliver,