On Point: 2. Elements

State v. Marker Alan Sperber, 2013AP358-CR, District 3, 10/15/13 (not recommended for publication); case activity

This appeal turns on Wis JI-Criminal 2670, which explains the 5 elements of the crime the Sperber was charged with–a hit and run causing death to the victim.  The 2nd element requires that the defendant know that his vehicle was involved in an accident involving a person.  The problem here was that Sperber was driving in the dark on wet roads flanked by blackened snowbanks.  

Winnebago County v. Rahb J. Kettleson, 2012AP2230, District 2, 5/29/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The testimony of a citizen-witness–that a car operated by Kettleson “was probably going about 65 to 68[,]” came within five or ten feet of the rear of his vehicle before passing him, made at least six lane changes without signaling, and was traveling about the same speed while coming within approximately five to ten feet of other cars he was passing–was sufficient to support Kettleson’s conviction for reckless driving:

¶9        To convict Kettleson,

State v. Ross M. Brandt, 2009 WI App 115
For Brandt: John M. Yackel

Issue/Holding: Although it carries a maximum penalty of 9 months’ imprisonment, hit-and-run causing injury less than serious bodily harm, §§ 346.67(1) and 346.74(5)(b), is a felony.

Obviously, this result is going to make life more difficult for hit-run representation, for the obvious reason: it’s one thing to advise your client to plead out to a misdemeanor,

State v. Michael G. Mertes, 2008 WI App 179, PFR filed 12/17/08
For Mertes: Andrea Taylor Cornwall, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate

Issue: Whether finding the sleeping occupant of a vehicle parked at a gas station, with engine off but key in the ignition, along with other factors sufficiently proved the OWI element of “operating.”

Holding:

¶13      Wisconsin Stat. § 346.63(3)(b) defines “operate” as “the physical manipulation or activation of any of the controls of a motor vehicle necessary to put it in motion.” Mertes’ argument focuses almost exclusively on the definition of “operation” under Wis.

State v. Thomas P. Tecza, 2008 WI App 79, PFR filed 5/22/08
For Tecza: Timothy P. Swatek

Issue: Whether a roadway within a gated community entry to which is guarded by a security station is “held out to the public for use of their motor vehicles” so as to support drunk driving conviction within § 346.61.

Holding:

¶18      … We read Phillips as inquiring into whether the premises were available for use to the public or “to a defined limited portion of the citizenry.”Richling,

State v. Aprylann Wuteska, 2007 WI App 157, PFR filed 6/14/07
For Wuteska: Mark H. Bennett

Issue/Holding: The plain text of § 346.67(1)(a) requires the operator of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to a person or damage to a vehicle to identify him or herself as the operator:

¶13 Applying these principles, we conclude the only reasonable meaning of Wis.

State v. Dawn R. Dartez, 2007 WI App 126, PFR filed 4/23
For Dartez: Bill Ginsberg

Issue/Holding: The definition of “highway” for purposes of the hit-and-run statute, § 346.67(1), is found in § 340.01(22), ¶ n. 3.

State v. Dawn R. Dartez, 2007 WI App 126, PFR filed 4/23
For Dartez: Bill Ginsberg

Issue: Whether hit-and-run liability attaches to an accident occurring on private property.

Holding:

¶13      In this case, as already noted, we are concerned with the meaning of “accident” in Wis. Stat. § 346.67(1) in conjunction with the requirement of “upon the highway” in Wis. Stat.

State v. Jonathan J. Hubbard, 2007 WI App 240, (AG’s) PFR filed 11/20/07
For Hubbard: Steven Zaleski

Issue/Holding: The construction of “materially impaired” by State v. Waalen, 130 Wis. 2d 18, 27, 386 N.W.2d 47 (1986), clarifies the meaning of that OWI element:

¶9    In Waalen, … (t)he court stated that material impairment “exists when a person is incapable of driving safely,

State v. Stephen D. Harmon, 2006 WI App 214, PFR filed 10/26/06
For Harmon: Timothy A. Provis

Issue/Holding:

¶14      The “two clear purposes” of Wisconsin’s hit-and-run statute are:

    (1) to ensure that injured persons may have medical or other attention with the least possible delay; and (2) to require the disclosure of information so that responsibility for the accident may be placed.