On Point: Blood Test Admissibility

State v. Christopher Drew Helwig, 2019AP448-CR, 6/4/20, District 4, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The circuit court admitted a blood/urine analysis form and lab report containing blood test results into evidence during Helwig’s OWI trial. On appeal Helwig argued that these documents were hearsay. And because the nurse who drew the blood did not testify at trial, the admission of these documents violated the Confrontation Clause. The court of appeals rejects both arguments.

State v. Shannon G. Potocnik, 2019AP523, 4/14/20, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication) case activity (including briefs)

There’s a deep split nationwide about whether the community caretaker doctrine can ever permit entry into a home. Wisconsin has held that it can, and this pro se appeal is of course necessarily fact-bound. But the decision is thorough and provides a good summary of state community-caretaker law as it stands, along with a much briefer discussion of blood draws based on exigency.

State v. Justin T. Kane, 2018AP1885-CR, District 4, 2/6/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Kane’s consent to a blood draw after his arrest for OWI was voluntary under all the circumstances.

State v. Anthony J. Madland, 2019AP146-CR, District 3, 1/28/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Madland asserted that he requested an alternative chemical test under § 343.305 and that the officer who read the “informing the accused” form to him misled him as to his right to request an alternative test. The court of appeals rejects the claims in light of the circuit court’s fact findings.

State v. John W. Lane, 2019AP153-CR, District 4, 10/17/19 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Lane consented to a blood draw after his OWI arrest, but a week later wrote the State Hygiene Lab saying he was revoking his consent to the collection and testing of his blood. The authorities tested the blood anyway. Lane’s challenge to the test result is foreclosed by State v. Randall, 2019 WI 80, 387 Wis. 2d 744, 930 N.W.2d 223.

State v. Lonnie P. Ayotte, Jr., 2018AP839-CR, 7/25/19, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Like Jessica Randall, Ayotte consented to a blood draw after his OWI arrest but then asserted his right to privacy in his blood and told authorities they couldn’t test his blood for alcohol without a warrant. As they did with Randall, the authorities tested the blood anyway. And like Randall,

State v. Jessica M. Randall, 2019 WI 80, 7/2/19, reversing an unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

A majority of the supreme court holds that a person who has been arrested for OWI and consented to a blood draw cannot prevent the testing of the blood sample for alcohol or drugs by advising the state she is revoking her consent.

State v. Gerald J. Vanderhoef, 2016AP2052-CR, District 1, 4/30/19 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Vanderhoef’s silence in response to the “Informing the Accused” form constituted a refusal to consent to a chemical test, so the subsequent blood draw was unlawful. However, the state subpoenaed the results of his urine test, and that evidence was admissible.

State v. Jessica M. Randall, 2017AP1518, petition for review of unpublished opinion granted 10/9/18; case activity

Issue:

Was Randall entitled to suppression of the results of a test of a blood sample that she voluntarily gave to police under the implied consent law because she informed the lab that she was withdrawing her consent before the lab had analyzed the blood to determine the presence and quantity of drugs and alcohol?

State v. Collin M. Gallagher, 2017AP1403, 4/5/18, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Police took Gallagher’s blood by a warrant that the parties agree was supported by probable cause of operating while intoxicated. He argues, though, that the warrant did not, by its terms, authorize the subsequent testing of his blood–or, that if it did authorize testing, its failure to specify what sorts of testing were permitted rendered it an unconstitutional “general warrant.”