On Point blog, page 4 of 10
Consent to draw blood was voluntary
State v. Justin T. Kane, 2018AP1885-CR, District 4, 2/6/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Kane’s consent to a blood draw after his arrest for OWI was voluntary under all the circumstances.
Officer complied with implied consent law
State v. Anthony J. Madland, 2019AP146-CR, District 3, 1/28/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Madland asserted that he requested an alternative chemical test under § 343.305 and that the officer who read the “informing the accused” form to him misled him as to his right to request an alternative test. The court of appeals rejects the claims in light of the circuit court’s fact findings.
SCOW’s decision in Randall is binding on whether consent to blood test can be withdrawn
State v. John W. Lane, 2019AP153-CR, District 4, 10/17/19 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Lane consented to a blood draw after his OWI arrest, but a week later wrote the State Hygiene Lab saying he was revoking his consent to the collection and testing of his blood. The authorities tested the blood anyway. Lane’s challenge to the test result is foreclosed by State v. Randall, 2019 WI 80, 387 Wis. 2d 744, 930 N.W.2d 223.
Statements driver made before arrest admissible; so was retrograde extrapolation testimony
State v. Christopher J. Durski, 2018AP1750-CR, District 2, 8/21/19 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Durski was arrested at a motel, where he had decamped after a family dispute. In investigating the family dispute police learned Durski drank alcohol before leaving for the motel, so they tracked him down. Durski wasn’t in custody during the officers’ initial questioning of him at the motel, so his statements were admissible despite the lack of Miranda warnings. So was the state’s retrograde extrapolation evidence.
Challenge to blood test quickly disposed of
State v. Lonnie P. Ayotte, Jr., 2018AP839-CR, 7/25/19, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Like Jessica Randall, Ayotte consented to a blood draw after his OWI arrest but then asserted his right to privacy in his blood and told authorities they couldn’t test his blood for alcohol without a warrant. As they did with Randall, the authorities tested the blood anyway. And like Randall,
SCOW: Driver can’t revoke consent to test of validly drawn blood sample
State v. Jessica M. Randall, 2019 WI 80, 7/2/19, reversing an unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)
A majority of the supreme court holds that a person who has been arrested for OWI and consented to a blood draw cannot prevent the testing of the blood sample for alcohol or drugs by advising the state she is revoking her consent.
Driver’s silence constituted refusal; subpoenaed urine test results were admissible
State v. Gerald J. Vanderhoef, 2016AP2052-CR, District 1, 4/30/19 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Vanderhoef’s silence in response to the “Informing the Accused” form constituted a refusal to consent to a chemical test, so the subsequent blood draw was unlawful. However, the state subpoenaed the results of his urine test, and that evidence was admissible.
Traffic stop, field sobriety tests lawful
State v. Faith A. Parafiniuk, 2018AP1956, District 2, 3/27/19 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The stop of Parafiniuk’s car was supported by reasonable suspicion and the officer had sufficient reason to extend the stop to administer field sobriety tests.
Court of appeals affirms extension of stop and OWI 4th for impairment from prescription medication
State v. James R. Mueller, 2018AP44-CR, 2/12/19, District 3 (1-judge opinion, eligible for publication); case activity (including briefs).
Mueller conceded that an officer had reasonable suspicion to stop him. He argued that the officer extended the stop based on a “hunch” and that his FSTs results did not provide probable cause for arrest or sufficient evidence to convict him because they test for impairment by alcohol, not prescription meds.
Dismissal after suppression ruling was premature
County of Green v. Joey Jay Barnes, 2018AP1382, District 4, 2/7/19 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The circuit court dismissed charges against Barnes after suppressing some of the evidence against him. Not so fast, says the court of appeals.