On Point: 4. Procedure

State v. David Francis Walloch, 2015AP574, District 2, 8/26/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The evidence presented at Walloch’s refusal hearing supported the finding that Walloch was the person the officers arrested and who refused to submit to chemical testing.

Ozaukee County v. Michael T. Sheedy, 2015AP172, 6/3/15, District 3 (1-judge decision, ineligible for publication); click here for docket and briefs

Sheedy was arrested for OWI and refused to submit to a blood test.  A few weeks later, the circuit court entered a default judgement against him. On appeal, Sheedy, pro se, argued that he in fact wrote to the circuit court and asked to reopen his case within the 10 days required by §343.305(2).  His appeal failed.

State v. Kyle R. Christoffersen, 2014AP1282, District 2, 1/28/15 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The judge at Christoffersen’s refusal hearing didn’t violate Christoffersen’s due process rights when it limited cross-examination about the arresting officer’s training on, and administration of, field sobriety tests and refused to allow Christoffersen to make an offer of proof by questioning the officer. (¶¶5-7, 14).

City of Portage v. Kenneth D. Cogdill, 2014AP1492, District 4, 11/20/14 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Police had probable cause to believe Cogdill had been operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant based on the statements of witnesses, the officers’ own observations, and Cogdill’s statements.

State v. Robert J. Kowalis, 2014AP258, District 2, 8/6/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The circuit court’s refusal finding under § 343.305(9) is upheld because the officer had probable cause to arrest Kowalis for operating while intoxicated.

Marquette County v. Thomas J. Wagenaar, 2013AP2454, District 4, 7/3/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

A long delay in filing the notice of intent to revoke after Wagenaar refused a chemical test under § 343.305 didn’t deprive the circuit court of jurisdiction. In addition, police had probable cause to believe Wagenaar was operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant.

Eau Claire County v. Michael A. Grogan, 2014AP172, District 3, July 1, 2014 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

A reasonable person would have understood that he was given Miranda warnings because of his obstructionist behavior, so those warnings didn’t mislead Grogan into believing that the warnings applied in the implied consent context.

State v. Dale F. Wendt, 2014AP174, District 2, 6/18/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The information known to the deputy at the time he requested Wendt to take a blood test provided probable cause to believe Wendt had driven his vehicle while intoxicated earlier that evening, despite the deputy’s lack of information as to whether Wendt drank during the time that lapsed between his driving and his contact with the deputy.

Oconto County v. Robert E. Hammersley, 2013AP1263, District 3, 3/18/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The 10-day time period to request a refusal hearing under § 343.305(10)(a) begins when the driver receives a copy of the notice of intent to revoke, not when the court receives a copy. Thus, where a notice of intent to revoke was filed in the circuit court well after the statute’s 10-day time limit had elapsed, 

State v. Carl J. Opelt, 2013AP1798, District IV, 12/27/13 (1-judge decision, ineligible for publication); case activity.

Police arrested Opelt for OWI.  While transporting him to the hospital, an officer asked him 14 times to submit to an evidentiary chemical test of his blood.  The circuit court found that Opelt refused to promptly submit to the test and thus revoked his operating privileges pursuant to implied consent law,