On Point: 5. Habitual Offender

State v. Jason L. Decorah, 2011AP662-CR, District 4, 12/8/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Decorah: Corey C. Chirafisi; case activity

Collateral attack on a prior OWI used as a current enhancer, on the ground Decorah didn’t understand the range of penalties therefore didn’t validly waive counsel. Decorah prevailed below, and the court affirms on this State’s appeal:

¶3        Decorah’s collateral attack is based on his contention that,

City of Waukesha v. James F. Murphy, 2010AP2499, District 1/2, 11/29/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Murphy: Leonard G. Adent; case activity

The City obtained dismissal of a then-pending OWI-1st, after discovering that Murphy had an OWI-related conviction. (Per Walworth Cnty. v. Rohner, 108 Wis. 2d 713, 722, 324 N.W.2d 682 (1982), the State has exclusive authority over second and subsequent drunk driving offenses.) However,

State v. Jeffrey Steinhorst, 2011AP1360-CR, District 4, 11/23/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Steinhorst: Steven Cohen; case activity

Steinhorst made a prima facie showing that he did not validly waive counsel in a prior OWI case; therefore, he is entitled to a hearing at which the State must prove proper waiver, by clear and convincing evidence, else the prior conviction may not be used to enhance his current case.

State v. Jonathan M. Reynolds, 2011AP512-CR, District 4, 8/11/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Reynolds: Steven Cohen; case activity

Reynolds collateral attack on a prior OWI conviction (on the ground waiver of counsel was ineffectual because he didn’t know the potential range of penalties) is rejected. Basic procedure discussed and applied, ¶8.

¶11      Reynolds testified that although he received a copy of the complaint,

State v. Andrew C. Holder, 2011 WI App 116 (recommended for publication); for Holder: Edward D. Burke, Jr.; case activity

Although the penalty enhancement scheme  generally allows increased penalty for each prior OWI conviction, § 346.65(2)(am)5. provides that “convictions arising out of the same incident or occurrence shall be counted as one.” Nonetheless, Burke’s driving under the influence across the Michigan border,

State v. Francis A. Malsbury, 2010AP3112-CR, District 2, 6/8/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Malsbury: Andrew R. Walter; case activity

Prior conviction, in Washington state in 1999 for reckless driving amended from driving under the influence, qualified as a prior OWI and therefore subjected Malsbury to criminal prosecution.

¶7        We hold that Malsbury’s Washington reckless driving conviction counts as a prior conviction for purposes of Wisconsin’s accelerated OWI penalty structure.  

State v. Marilee Devries, 2011 WI App 78 (recommended for publication); for Devries: Matthew S. Pinix; case activity

OWI – Repeater – Proof, Prior “Conviction”

Certified copies of proceedings in foreign jurisdictions established adequate proof of prior OWI “connvictions,” § 343.307(1)(d).

¶9        When Wisconsin’s driving laws provide for the enhancement of penalties for a current offense based on prior offenses, the State must present “‘competent proof’” of those earlier offenses.  

State v. Brian M. Joski, 2010AP2223-CR, District 3, 5/3/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Joski: Thomas J. Coaty; case activity

A prior conviction used to enhance a new sentence may be collaterally attacked on the basis of violation of right to counsel, in other words, that the defendant didn’t validly waive counsel within the requirements set by State v. Klessig,

State v. George McGee, 2010AP3040-CR, District 3, 4/26/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for McGee: Steven G. Richards; case activity

McGee’s collateral attack on a prior OWI conviction used to enhance his present sentence is necessarily limited to denial of the constitutional right to counsel, ¶5. Although McGee represented himself in the challenged prior, he failed to show that his waiver of counsel was invalid.

State v. Gerard W. Carter, 2010 WI 132, reversing 2009 WI App 156; for Carter: Craig M. Kuhary; State BiC; Carter Resp.; Reply

Prior DL suspension under Illinois’ “zero tolerance” law (which suspends or revokes operating privileges of drivers under legal drinking age with any alcohol concentration) satisfies § 343.307(1)(d) and therefore supports OWI enhancement,