On Point blog, page 17 of 33
Circuit court had jurisdiction over OWI 1st despite the fact defendant had a prior countable OWI conviction
State v. John N. Navrestad, 2014AP2273, District 4, 7/2/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Disagreeing with the result reached in two recent unpublished decisions that addressed the same issue, a court of appeals judge holds that a circuit court had jurisdiction to convict Navrestad of OWI 1st in violation of a local ordinance even though he had a prior offense at the time of the conviction.
Revocation of driving privileges upheld despite pro se litigant’s efforts to comply with statute
Ozaukee County v. Michael T. Sheedy, 2015AP172, 6/3/15, District 3 (1-judge decision, ineligible for publication); click here for docket and briefs
Sheedy was arrested for OWI and refused to submit to a blood test. A few weeks later, the circuit court entered a default judgement against him. On appeal, Sheedy, pro se, argued that he in fact wrote to the circuit court and asked to reopen his case within the 10 days required by §343.305(2). His appeal failed.
Blood draw by paramedic in jail was reasonable and complied with § 343.305(5)(b)
County of Sauk v. Thomas D. McDonald, 2014AP1921, District 4, 5/7/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
McDonald was arrested for OWI and taken to the county jail, where his blood was drawn by a paramedic employed by the city’s ambulance service. Contrary to McDonald’s claims, his blood draw was constitutionally reasonable and the paramedic who performed the blood draw was a “person acting under the direction of a physician,” as required by § 343.305(5)(b).
Challenge to sufficiency of the evidence is frivolous; sanctions ordered
Village of DeForest v. Michael Brault, 2014AP2398, District 4, 4/16/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Brault’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence for his conviction for OWI 1st is frivolous, so sanctions under Rule 809.25(3) are appropriate.
Police had probable cause to administer PBT
City of Sheboygan v. Nathan J. Becker, 2014AP1991, District 2, 2/11/15 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
After police stopped Becker because of erratic driving at 11:30 p.m. on July 4 they observed additional evidence of impairment—glassy eyes, slurred speech, odor of alcohol. Becker admitted he’d been drinking and turned in a mixed performance on the FSTs. Under the totality of the circumstances, the officer had probable cause to ask Becker for a preliminary breath test under § 343.303 and County of Jefferson v.
Circuit court lacked subjected matter jurisdiction to hear OWI, first offense
City of Stevens Point v. Jared T. Lowery, 2014AP742, 2/5/15; District 4 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); click here for docket and briefs
It seems the City didn’t know of Lowery’s two prior OWI convictions when it charged him with, and obtained a conviction for, OWI first under a city ordinance. Only the State (not a city) may prosecute someone for OWI, third offense. So the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to try and convict Lowery for OWI first.
Statute of limitations barred re-prosecution of OWI that was improperly charged as a first offense
State v. Benjamin J. Strohman, 2014AP1265-CR, District 3, 2/3/15 (1-judge decision; ineligible for prosecution); case activity (including briefs)
Rejecting the state’s arguments that the statute of limitation had been tolled, the court of appeals holds the state could not re-charge Strohman for an OWI offense that was improperly treated as a first offense because the time limit for charging the offense had expired.
No error in limiting cross examination and rejecting offer of proof about FSTs at refusal hearing
State v. Kyle R. Christoffersen, 2014AP1282, District 2, 1/28/15 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
The judge at Christoffersen’s refusal hearing didn’t violate Christoffersen’s due process rights when it limited cross-examination about the arresting officer’s training on, and administration of, field sobriety tests and refused to allow Christoffersen to make an offer of proof by questioning the officer. (¶¶5-7, 14).
SCOW applies good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule to pre-McNeely blood draws, addresses exigency needed to justify a warrentless blood draw
State v. Cassius A. Foster, 2014 WI 131, 12/26/14, affirming a court of appeals summary disposition; majority opinion by Justice Crooks; case activity
State v. Alvernest Floyd Kennedy, 2014 WI 132, 12/26/14, affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision; majority opinion by Justice Gableman; case activity
State v. Michael R. Tullberg, 2014 WI 134, 12/26/14, affirming a per curiam court of appeals decision; majority opinion by Justice Ziegler; case activity
In these three cases, the supreme court addresses two issues arising from Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013): If a blood draw was conducted before McNeely in reliance on State v. Bohling, 173 Wis. 2d 529, 494 N.W.2d 399 (1993), does the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule mean the test results should not be suppressed? And, if the dissipation of alcohol by itself doesn’t constitute exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless blood draw, what circumstances do establish such an exigency? Foster and Kennedy hold that the good-faith exception applies to pre-McNeely searches. Tullberg addresses the second question.
Witness reports and officers’ observations provided probable cause to arrest for OWI
City of Portage v. Kenneth D. Cogdill, 2014AP1492, District 4, 11/20/14 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
Police had probable cause to believe Cogdill had been operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant based on the statements of witnesses, the officers’ own observations, and Cogdill’s statements.