On Point blog, page 19 of 33
Lack of scienter requirement in statute prohibiting driving with a detectable amount of a controlled substance doesn’t violate due process
State v. Michael R. Luedtke, 2014 WI App 79, petition for review granted 10/15/14, affirmed, 2015 WI 42 (posts here and here); case activity
Section 346.63(1)(am), which prohibits operating a motor vehicle with a detectable amount of a restricted controlled substance in the blood, does not violate due process by failing to require proof that the defendant knowingly ingested the controlled substance. In addition, Luedtke’s due process rights were not violated when the state crime lab destroyed his blood sample before he could have it independently tested.
Implied consent law covering drivers not arrested for OWI is constitutional; defendant’s consent to blood draw was voluntary
State v. Megan A. Padley, 2014 WI App 65; case activity
The implied consent statute that allows an officer to ask for a driver for a blood sample when the officer lacks probable cause to arrest for OWI but has “reason to believe” the driver committed a traffic violation, § 343.305(3)(ar)2., is not facially unconstitutional. In addition, Padley’s consent to the blood draw in this case was voluntary. Finally, the police had the requisite “reason to believe” that Padley had committed a traffic violation and, thus, the deputy could rely on § 343.305(3)(ar)2. to put to her the choice of consent to a blood draw or automatic penalties.
Steering levers in place of a steering wheel doesn’t make a utility terrain vehicle into a motor vehicle
State v. Shawn N. Hill, 2013AP2549-CR, District 2, 5/7/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
A vehicle registered by the State as a “utility terrain vehicle” under § 23.33(1)(ng) is not a “motor vehicle” under § 340.01(35). Thus, a defendant alleged to have operated the vehicle while intoxicated should have been charged under § 23.33(4c), not § 346.63.
Deadline for requesting refusal hearing runs from the date the driver — not the court — received notice of intent to revoke
Oconto County v. Robert E. Hammersley, 2013AP1263, District 3, 3/18/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The 10-day time period to request a refusal hearing under § 343.305(10)(a) begins when the driver receives a copy of the notice of intent to revoke, not when the court receives a copy. Thus, where a notice of intent to revoke was filed in the circuit court well after the statute’s 10-day time limit had elapsed,
Reading old implied consent form didn’t taint admissibility of blood test results
State v. Lawrence A. Levasseur, Jr., 2013AP2369-CR, District 4, 2/6/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The arresting officer used an implied consent form that pre-dated the 2009 amendments to § 343.305, so it omitted language about accidents involving death or serious injury–language that did not apply to Levasseur’s situation. The use of the outdated form didn’t strip the resulting blood test result of its statutory presumption of admissibility and accuracy,
Equivocal answers amount to refusal to submit to blood test
State v. Carl J. Opelt, 2013AP1798, District IV, 12/27/13 (1-judge decision, ineligible for publication); case activity.
Police arrested Opelt for OWI. While transporting him to the hospital, an officer asked him 14 times to submit to an evidentiary chemical test of his blood. The circuit court found that Opelt refused to promptly submit to the test and thus revoked his operating privileges pursuant to implied consent law,
Use of counsel in prior cases defeats defendant’s claim that he didn’t knowingly waive his right to counsel in later case
State v. Scott J. Stelzer, 2013AP1555-CR, District 2, 12/27/13 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication), case activity
After being convicted of his 3rd OWI offense, Stelzer moved to exclude his 2nd OWI (which occurred in 1996) from the calculation of his prior convictions on the grounds that he was not represented by counsel when he pled guilty to it. Nor did he knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his right to counsel at that time.
Wisconsin Supreme Court: Discretionary authority to dismiss refusal charges is limited to cases in which defendant pleads guilty to underlying OWI
State v. Brandon H. Bentdahl, 2013 WI 106, reversing an unpublished court of appeals decision; opinion for a unanimous court by Justice Crooks; case activity
In State v. Brooks, 113 Wis. 2d 347, 348-49, 335 N.W.2d 354 (1983), the supreme court held that a circuit court has discretionary authority to dismiss a refusal charge under § 343.305 after the defendant has pleaded guilty to the underlying OWI.
Trial court properly concluded officer did not have probable cause to arrest defendant for OWI
Fond du Lac County v. Randal B. Hopper, 2012AP1719, District 2, 11/27/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The circuit court properly concluded the defendant did not unlawfully refuse to provide a breath sample because the officer lacked probable cause to arrest him for OWI:
¶10 Considering the collective knowledge of dispatch and the arresting deputy at the time the deputy arrested Hopper,
Religious objection to blood draw is not relevant at a refusal hearing
State v. Victoria M. Milewski, 2013AP1323, District 4, 11/27/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
After being arrested for OWI Milewski refused a blood test, saying her Christian Scientist beliefs prohibited her from allowing a needle to be inserted in her body; she offered to provide a urine sample instead. (¶¶2-3). At her refusal hearing she asserted her refusal to submit to the blood test for religious reasons was a reasonable objection under State v.