On Point: B. Chs. 343-346: Traffic offense

County of Fond du Lac v. Nancy C. Bush, 2012AP1486, District 2, 10/31/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

Under the implied consent law, a motorist must, when properly requested to submit to a chemical test, answer “promptly,” State v. Neitzel, 95 Wis. 2d 191, 205, 289 N.W.2d 828 (1980), else failure to respond will be construed as refusal.

State v. William R. Hartman, 2011AP622, District 4, 9/20/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

OWI – Refusal Hearing – Raising Challenge to Lawfulness of Stop

Refusal hearing supports litigation of lawfulness of stop; State v. Anagnos, 2012 WI 64, ¶42, 341 Wis. 2d 576, 815 N.W.2d 675, followed:

 ¶14      Accordingly, we reject the State’s contention that Hartman improperly raised the issue of reasonable suspicion at the refusal hearing.   

State v. Robert B. Sonnenberg, 2012AP1025, District 2, 9/19/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

Evidence held sufficient to sustain Sonnenberg’s conviction for OWI-1st. He admitted that he drank some indeterminate amount of alcohol before his car had a flat tire and then drank more on the side of the road; after an officer encountered him, he performed poorly on FSTs and his blood draw resulted in a .184 BAC.

State v. Reginald Scott Williams, 2011AP1379-CR, District 1, 9/18/12

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity

Williams drove at an excessive speed (30+ over the limit), and crashed into another car, resulting in death and serious injuries. He pleaded no contest to one count of homicide by negligent use, § 940.10 and one count of reckless driving / GBH, § 346.62(4). At the time of the pleas,

State v. Frederick J. Scott, 2012AP533-CR, District 3, 9/11/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

The threshold for illegal alcohol concentration is reduced from .08 to .02 for drivers who have at least 3 prior qualifying convictions. Scott had three priors, thus was subject to arrest and prosecution for driving with a PAC of .03. However, prior convictions may be collaterally attacked if obtained in violation of the right to counsel,

State v. Lisa M. Arentz, 2011AP2307-CR / State v. Eric R. Hendricks, 2012AP243-CR, District 2, 9/5/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity (Arentz; Hendricks)

Criminal OWI prosecution is premised on, and a resulting sentence enhanced by, a prior civil-forfeiture OWI conviction (which does not itself require unanimous jury verdict upon proof beyond reasonable doubt). Arentz and Hendricks raise the same arguments: the elements of the underlying civil forfeiture must be proved to the jury beyond reasonable at the criminal trial;

State v. Marilyn M. Torbeck, 2012AP522-CR, District 2, 8/1/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

¶6        … For the State to charge Torbeck with OWI under § 346.63(1)(a), DFE must be either an intoxicant, a controlled substance, a controlled substance analog, or a drug.  DFE is not listed as a controlled substance under either Wisconsin or federal law.  A “controlled substance analog” is defined as “a substance the chemical structure of which is substantially similar to the chemical structure of a controlled substance.”  Wis.

Dane County v. Amy Jolene Judd, 2011AP2106, District 4, 7/19/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

Reasonable suspicion supported temporary stop, State v. Meye, 2010AP336-CR, unpublished slip op. (WI App July 14, 2010) (“odor of intoxicants alone is insufficient to raise reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop”), distinguished:

¶7        I disagree that Meye is analogous to the present case.  

State v. Dimitrius Anagnos, 2012 WI 64, reversing 2011 WI App 118; case activity

OWI – Refusal Hearing – Authority to Litigate Constitutionality of Traffic Stop 

Constitutionality of the traffic stop  may be raised as a defense at a refusal hearing, § 343.305(9)(a)5.a.

¶29  In this case, the relevant portion of the statute is found in sub. (9)(a)5.a.  That subsection permits circuit courts to consider “[w]hether the officer had probable cause to believe the person was driving or operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol . 

Village of Elm Grove v. Richard K. Brefka, 2011AP2888, District 1/2, 6/19/12, WSC review granted 11/14/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication), supreme court review granted 11/14/12; case activity

The municipal court lacks competence to extend the 10-day time deadline for requesting a refusal hearings, given the clear language of §§ 343.305(9)(a)4. and (10)(a). Village of Butler v.