On Point blog, page 30 of 34
OWI – Compliance with § 343.395(4)
Waukesha County v. Eric D. Smith, 2008 WI 23, affirming unpublished decision
For Smith: Kirk B. Obear
Issue/Holding: By reading the required statutory information verbatim, the officer fully complied with § 343.305(4); he did not err by failing to inform the driver that he might incur penalties different from those in Wisconsin relative to the state that issued his license nor by telling the driver that if he refused to take the chemical test he would get a hearing within 10 days.
OWI – Sufficiency of Evidence: “Operated” Vehicle on “Highway”
State v. Michael G. Mertes, 2008 WI App 179, PFR filed 12/17/08
For Mertes: Andrea Taylor Cornwall, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate
Issue: Whether finding the sleeping occupant of a vehicle parked at a gas station, with engine off but key in the ignition, along with other factors sufficiently proved the OWI element of “operating.”
Holding:
¶13 Wisconsin Stat. § 346.63(3)(b) defines “operate” as “the physical manipulation or activation of any of the controls of a motor vehicle necessary to put it in motion.” Mertes’ argument focuses almost exclusively on the definition of “operation” under Wis.
OWI — Gated Community Roadway, Open to Public Use, Support for Drunk Driving under § 346.61
State v. Thomas P. Tecza, 2008 WI App 79, PFR filed 5/22/08
For Tecza: Timothy P. Swatek
Issue: Whether a roadway within a gated community entry to which is guarded by a security station is “held out to the public for use of their motor vehicles” so as to support drunk driving conviction within § 346.61.
Holding:
¶18 … We read Phillips as inquiring into whether the premises were available for use to the public or “to a defined limited portion of the citizenry.”Richling,
OWI – Second or Subsequent Offense – Out-of-State Administrative (Non-Refusal) Suspension Doesn’t Qualify
State v. Daniel J. Machgan, 2007 WI App 263
For Machgan: Patrick M. Donnelly
Issue/Holding: An out-of-state administrative DL suspension, not the result of a refusal, isn’t counted as a “conviction” for purposes of OWI enhancement:
¶12 After examination of these relevant statutes, we conclude that Wis. Stat. § 343.307, as the specific statute addressing out-of-state convictions, suspensions or revocations that are to be counted as priors for the purpose of penalty enhancement,
Hit-and-Run, § 346.67(1)(a) – Elements – Operator ID
State v. Aprylann Wuteska, 2007 WI App 157, PFR filed 6/14/07
For Wuteska: Mark H. Bennett
Issue/Holding: The plain text of § 346.67(1)(a) requires the operator of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to a person or damage to a vehicle to identify him or herself as the operator:
¶13 Applying these principles, we conclude the only reasonable meaning of Wis.
Hit & Run, § 346.67(1) – Elements – “Highway”
State v. Dawn R. Dartez, 2007 WI App 126, PFR filed 4/23
For Dartez: Bill Ginsberg
Issue/Holding: The definition of “highway” for purposes of the hit-and-run statute, § 346.67(1), is found in § 340.01(22), ¶ n. 3.
Hit & Run, § 346.67(1) – Elements – “Accident” Occurring on “Highway,” and Relation to Private Property
State v. Dawn R. Dartez, 2007 WI App 126, PFR filed 4/23
For Dartez: Bill Ginsberg
Issue: Whether hit-and-run liability attaches to an accident occurring on private property.
Holding:
¶13 In this case, as already noted, we are concerned with the meaning of “accident” in Wis. Stat. § 346.67(1) in conjunction with the requirement of “upon the highway” in Wis. Stat.
Implied Consent – Test for Adequacy of Warning, Generally
State v. Darren A. Kliss, 2007 WI App 13
For Kliss: Michael C. Witt
Issue/Holding:
¶7 … Because the implied consent law makes no provision for the right to counsel, an officer is correct to record a refusal if the arrestee insists on speaking to an attorney before answering.…¶8 … County of Ozaukee v. Quelle, 198 Wis. 2d 269, 276, 542 N.W.2d 196 (Ct.
Refusal, § 343.305(9) and Implied Consent Law – Interaction with Miranda Warnings
State v. Darren A. Kliss, 2007 WI App 13
For Kliss: Michael C. Witt
Issue/Holding: Administering Miranda rights prior to the “Informing the Accused” caution applicable to OWI does not invalidate the latter (at least where the motorist is concurrently under arrest for a separate crime):
¶14 There is no dispute that Thomas read Kliss the Miranda warning prior to reading the Informing the Accused.
OWI – “Materially Impaired” – Judicial Construction, State v. Waalen, Absorbed into Elemental Meaning
State v. Jonathan J. Hubbard, 2007 WI App 240, (AG’s) PFR filed 11/20/07
For Hubbard: Steven Zaleski
Issue/Holding: The construction of “materially impaired” by State v. Waalen, 130 Wis. 2d 18, 27, 386 N.W.2d 47 (1986), clarifies the meaning of that OWI element:
¶9 In Waalen, … (t)he court stated that material impairment “exists when a person is incapable of driving safely,