On Point: 9. Crimes

State v. Christopher Drew Helwig, 2019AP448-CR, 6/4/20, District 4, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The circuit court admitted a blood/urine analysis form and lab report containing blood test results into evidence during Helwig’s OWI trial. On appeal Helwig argued that these documents were hearsay. And because the nurse who drew the blood did not testify at trial, the admission of these documents violated the Confrontation Clause. The court of appeals rejects both arguments.

State v. George E. Savage, 2019AP90-Cr, petition for review of an unpublished option granted, 5/19/20, case activity

Issues (adapted from the State’s petition for review):

1.  Under Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985), when a defendant claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with a guilty plea, he must prove that but for his lawyer’s deficient performance  he would have proceeded to trial.  More recently, Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958 (2017) held that a defendant can, in some circumstances, prove Strickland prejudice even without a reasonable probability of success at trial.  Given the facts of this case, did Savage prove that he was entitled to withdraw his guilty plea even though he couldn’t show a reasonable probability of success at trial?

2.  State v. Sholar, 2018 WI 53, 381 Wis. 2d 560, 912 N.W.2d 89 holds that a court cannot decide an ineffective assistance of counsel claim if a Machner hearing has not occurred. In Savage’s case, the circuit court did conduct a Machner hearing,  but the court of appeals reversed and remanded on both deficient performance and prejudice because the circuit court misapplied State v. Dinkins, 2012 WI 24, ¶ 5, 339 Wis. 2d 78, 810 N.W.2d 787. Should the court of appeals have affirmed under the rule that the court of appeals may sustain a circuit court decision if there are facts in the record to support it?

State v. Phyllis M. Schwersenska, 2018AP1619-CR, District 4, 4/30/20 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Schwersenska was convicted of embezzling money from a joint bank account she held with her daughter, H.R. The court of appeals holds trial counsel wasn’t ineffective for failing to raise the defense that, as joint owner of the account, none of the money in the account belonged solely to H.R. and so she can’t be guilty of theft from H.R.

State v. Mister N.P. Bratchett, 2018AP2305-CR, 4/22/20, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity

Bratchett was convicted of mutilating a corpse under §940.11(1), which requires proof that: (1) the defendant mutilated a corpse, and (2) he did so with intent to conceal a crime. On appeal, Bratchett argued that there was insufficient evidence to support the second element. Part of the problem was that State never specified the crime to be concealed.

State v. Shannon G. Potocnik, 2019AP523, 4/14/20, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication) case activity (including briefs)

There’s a deep split nationwide about whether the community caretaker doctrine can ever permit entry into a home. Wisconsin has held that it can, and this pro se appeal is of course necessarily fact-bound. But the decision is thorough and provides a good summary of state community-caretaker law as it stands, along with a much briefer discussion of blood draws based on exigency.

State v. Mitchell L. Christen, 2019AP1767-Cr, 3/17/20, District 4 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); review granted 9/16/16; case activity (including briefs)

Interesting case. Section 941.20(1)(b) makes operating or going armed with a firearm while under the influence of an intoxicant a misdemeanor.  Christen argued that the statute violates the 2nd Amendment “as applied” to anyone who engages in the prohibited conduct while inside his or her home. The State declined to file a response brief, which means it conceded the point. Still, the court of appeals rejected Christen’s argument and affirmed.

State v. Corey Stauner, 2019AP81-CR, District 3, 3/10/20, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

This seems wrong. The State charged Stauner with resisting an officer and bail jumping for committing that crime. The jury acquitted him of resisting an officer but found him guilty of bail jumping. The court of appeals recognized that the 2 verdicts were inconsistent, but said that this result was permissible pursuant to State v. Rice, 2008 WI App 10, 307 Wis. 2d 335, 743 N.W.2d 517 (2007).

If you’re waiting for a decision on whether solicitation of 1st degree reckless injury is a crime in Wisconsin and on whether solicitation of 1st degree recklessly endangering safety is a lesser included offense of 1st degree reckless injury, STOP! SCOW just dismissed the case raising these issues–State v. Kelly James Kloss–as improvidently granted. SCOW’s really DIGing it this term. This is the second time in less than a month that it has issued a Dismissed as Improvidently Granted order.

Kansas v. Garcia, USSC No. 17-384, 2020 WL 1016170, 3/3/20, reversing and remanding State v. Garcia, 401 P.3d 588 (Kan. 2017); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

In a five-to-four vote, the Supreme Court has upheld Kansas’s prosecution of noncitizens who used stolen social security numbers to gain employment.

The Kansas Supreme Court held that federal law in the form of the Immigration Reform and Control Act precluded prosecution of Garcia and some other defendants for identity theft because of 8 U.S.C.

State v. Brantner, 2020 WI 21, 2/25/20, affirming in part and reversing in part a summary order, 2018AP53; case activity (including briefs)

Brantner was arrested (for reasons unrelated to this case) in Kenosha County by Fond du Lac County detectives. They took him to jail in Fond du Lac, where a booking search revealed several different types of pills concealed in his boot. He was tried, convicted and sentenced in Fond du Lac on five counts of drug possession and five associated bail-jumping counts. The supreme court now rejects his argument that he didn’t “possess” any of the drugs in Fond du Lac County–that the arrest in Kenosha terminated his possession because he lacked control over the pills. But it agrees with him that his conviction on two of the counts (with their associated bail-jumping counts) is a double-jeopardy violation; the bare fact that he had pills with two different oxycodone dosages (5 and 20 milligram) will not support two different charges of possessing that drug.