On Point blog, page 13 of 87
Circuit court was wrong about the availability of a defense to charges of violating § 301.45
State v. George E. Savage, 2019AP90-CR, District 1, 1/22/20 (not recommended for publication), petition for review granted, 5/19/20; case activity (including briefs)
Savage pleaded guilty to violating the sex offender registry statute for not providing updated information about where he was residing. He moved to withdraw his plea, asserting his trial lawyer was ineffective for failing to advise him he had a defense to the charge under State v. Dinkins, 2012 WI 24, 339 Wis. 2d 78, 810 N.W.2d 787. The circuit court rejected the claim based on an erroneous understanding of Dinkins, so it has to reassess Savage’s claim.
“True threat” instruction wasn’t needed at disorderly conduct trial
State v. Kaprisha E. Greer, 2019AP806-CR, District 1, 1/22/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Greer seeks a new trial in the interest of justice on the ground that the jury at her disorderly conduct trial should have been instructed about the meaning of “true threat” because the state elicited evidence about a threat during its case-in-chief. The court of appeals rejects her claim.
SCOW to address lifetime ban on firearms for felons and guilty plea waiver rule
State v. Leevan Roundtree, 2018AP594-CR, review of per curiam opinion granted, 1/14/20; case activity
Issues:
1. Section 941.29(2) prohibits any person convicted of a felony—even if it doesn’t involve physical violence–from possessing firearms the rest of his life. Is this statute unconstitutional as applied to a person convicted of failure to pay child support?
2. Does a guilty plea waive a claim that the statute of conviction is unconstitutional as applied?
COA: requiring internet identifiers of sex offender registrants doesn’t violate First Amendment
State v. James L. Jackson, 2020 WI App 4; case activity (including briefs)
Jackson pleaded to the crime of failing to give updated information to the sex offender registry. The information at issue was the fact that he’d created a Facebook account and email address. This ran afoul of Wis. Stat. § 301.45(2)(a)6m., which requires a registrant to turn over (among other things) the “name or number of every electronic mail account the person uses” and “the name and Internet address of every public or private Internet profile the person creates, uses, or maintains.” On appeal, he argues that this provision unconstitutionally burdens his right to engage in anonymous speech.
SCOW: 7 misdemeanor retail thefts can =1 felony theft
State v. Autumn Marie Love Lopez & State v. Amy J. Rodriguez, 2019 WI 101, 11/27/19, affirming a published court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)
This appeal asked whether the State may charge multiple acts of misdemeanor retail theft under §943.50 as one felony under §971.36(3)(a). The justices split 3-2-2. Five of them answered “yes,” but did not fully agree on a rationale for that mandate. The justices also disagreed over the role titles play in statutory construction and over whether both appellants in a consolidated appeal must file a petition for review.
SCOW’s decision in Randall is binding on whether consent to blood test can be withdrawn
State v. John W. Lane, 2019AP153-CR, District 4, 10/17/19 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Lane consented to a blood draw after his OWI arrest, but a week later wrote the State Hygiene Lab saying he was revoking his consent to the collection and testing of his blood. The authorities tested the blood anyway. Lane’s challenge to the test result is foreclosed by State v. Randall, 2019 WI 80, 387 Wis. 2d 744, 930 N.W.2d 223.
Barring PBT evidence didn’t violate right to present defense
State v. Jude W. Giles, 2018AP1967-CR, District 3, 10/8/19 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Jude’s sought to admit the results of his preliminary breath test results (.076) to lay a foundation for his expert’s opinion that alcohol was still being absorbed into his blood, making the state hygiene lab’s blood test result (.144) higher than his blood alcohol content at the time he was driving. (¶¶2-5). The circuit court properly disallowed the evidence because it runs smack dab into § 343.303 and State v. Fischer, 2010 WI 6, 322 Wis. 2d 265, 778 N.W.2d, both of which strictly prohibit the admission of PBT results.
A riding lawn mower is a “motor vehicle” for purposes of OWI statute
State v. Keith H. Shoeder, 2019 WI App 60; case activity (including briefs)
So if you’re going to drink and drive your riding mower, stay on your lawn.
COA upholds conviction for violating injunctions; rejects unfair prejudice, vagueness and sufficiency challenges
State v. Michael K. Lorentz, 2018AP1515, 10/1/19 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The state charged Lorentz with violating four injunctions. One count was brought under Wis. Stat. § 813.12(8)(a) (for violating a domestic abuse injunction regarding his ex-wife) and three under Wis. Stat. § 813.122(11) (for violating three child abuse injunctions–one for each of their three children). Each injunction required Lorentz to “avoid” the “residence” the mother and children shared.
Standard OWI jury instruction sufficiently conveyed meaning of “impaired”
State v. Kari E. Mravik, 2018AP2300-CR, District 4, 8/29/19 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
At her OWI 2d trial, Mravik asked the judge to modify Wis. J.I.—Criminal 2663’s definition of “under the influence of an intoxicant.” The trial judge declined. The court of appeals finds no error because the instruction as a whole conveys the correct meaning of the phrase.