On Point blog, page 20 of 88
Court rejects challenge to strict application of 10-day deadline for requesting refusal hearing
State v. Hector Miguel Ortiz Martinez, 2017AP668, District 1, 12/27/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
After his arrest for OWI, Martinez refused to submit to a breath test. The arresting officer gave him the standard notice of intent to revoke operating privileges containing the standard written warning that the driver has 10 days to request a refusal hearing. Martinez requested a refusal hearing, but not within the 10-day limit under § 343.305(10)(a), so the circuit court declined to hold a hearing. (¶¶3-5). Martinez argues that a language barrier and incomplete information from the arresting officer mean the standard notice he was given was not legally sufficient to start the 10-day clock running. Yes it was, says the court of appeals.
COA: Expert testimony not needed to show mental harm to child
State v. Darrin K. Taylor, 2016AP1956 & 1957, 12/20/2017, District 2 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Taylor was convicted at trial of seventeen charges related to sexual assault of a child, S.F. On appeal he attacks only his conviction for causing mental harm to a child and the associated bail-jumping count. He argues the evidence was insufficient to show that S.F. suffered “mental harm” as it is defined in the statute, or that his post-assault contact with her was a substantial cause of said harm.
Defense wins in calculation of the 10-year period under § 346.65(2)(am)2.
State v. Bobby Lopez, 2017AP923-CR, District 2, 2/13/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
In order to be “within” the 10-year period under § 346.65(2)(am)2., the subsequent offense must occur before the tenth anniversary of the prior offense. Thus, Lopez’s July 9, 2016, OWI offense is not “within [the] 10-year period” that began on July 9, 2006, the date of his prior offense, and he can’t be charged with second-offense OWI.
Defense evidence properly excluded for lack of foundation
State v. Scott F. Ufferman, 2016AP1774-CR, District 3, 11/14/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Ufferman complains the trial court’s evidentiary rulings improperly stymied his defense against the charge of operating with a detectable amount of THC. The court of appeals holds the trial court’s rulings were correct.
It’s a fact—the defendant’s hair looked “marvelous”!
State v. Keith J. Eggum, 2016AP2036-CR, District 2, 11/8/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
And that factual finding dooms Eggum’s claim that his “noticeably disheveled” appearance made his trial unfair. Eggum’s complaint about the presence of extra officers for courtroom security fares no better. And topping it all off, Eggum’s First Amendment defense to the disorderly conduct charge makes no headway, either.
Police officer can be a person who works or volunteers with children under § 948.095
State v. Gary Lee Wayerski, 2015AP1083-CR, District 3, 10/31/17 (not recommended for publication), petition for review granted 3/13/18, and modified, and afford as modified, 2019 WI 11; case activity (including briefs)
Rejecting Wayerski’s argument to the contrary, the court of appeals holds that a police officer alleged to have sexually assaulted two teenage boys could be convicted under § 948.095(3)(a), which prohibits a person over age 21 “who engages in an occupation or participates in a volunteer position that requires him or her to work or interact directly with children” from having sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a child “whom the person works or interacts through that occupation or volunteer position.” The court also rejects the challenges Wayerski makes to the conduct of his trial.
Evidence sufficient to establish disorderly conduct
City of New Richmond v. Warren Wayne Slocum, 2016AP1887, District 3, 10/11/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Slocum unsuccessfully challenges the sufficiency of the evidence used to find he violated a New Richmond municipal ordinance, § 50.88(a)(1), which tracks § 947.01(1).
SCOW to address whether warrantless blood draw of unconscious motorist violates 4th Amendment
State v. Gerald Mitchell, 2015AP304-CR; certification granted 9/11/17; case activity (including briefs)
Issue:
Whether the warrantless blood draw of an unconscious motorist pursuant to Wisconsin’s implied consent law, where no exigent circumstances exist or have been argued, violates the Fourth Amendment.
The statutes authorize fines for 7th and greater OWI offenses
State v. Michel L. Wortman, 2017 WI App 61; case activity (including briefs)
A glitch in the OWI penalty statute appears to suggest that OWI 7th and greater offenses don’t allow for a fine, but only for the imposition of the forfeiture provided for first-offense OWI. The court of appeals concludes otherwise. The court also rejects Wortman’s claim that he was under arrest when a sheriff’s deputy transported him back to the scene of the accident he was in.
Wisconsin law governs “new crime” element of bail jumping, though “new crime” occurred in Illinois
State v. Andrei R. Byrd, 2014AP2721-CR, District 4 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Byrd was released on bond for 2 felonies that imposed 2 conditions: don’t leave Rock County and don’t commit any new crimes. He went to Illinois, drank too much, and started shouting at a 4th of July party. An officer saw him move toward a woman and raise his hand, causing her to move backward into a defensive posture. He was arrested for assault under Illinois law. Then the State of Wisconsin charged him with 4 counts of felony bail jumping for violating the 2 conditions of the bonds on his 2 felonies (2 x 2 = 4).