On Point: 9. Crimes

Micah D. Stern v. Michael Meisner, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 15-2558, 2/9/16

Stern’s conviction for using a computer to facilitate a sex crime against a child under § 948.075 is constitutional because the Wisconsin appellate court’s conclusion that the statute allows conviction based on the defendant’s “reason to believe” the victim is a minor was neither unreasonable nor unforeseeable.

State v. Robert A. Schoengarth, 2015AP1834-CR, 2/11/16, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion when it ordered that police could not testify about Schoengarth’s performance on field sobriety tests.

State v. David W. Howes, 2014AP1870-CR, 1/28/16, District 4; certification granted 4/7/16, reversed, 2017 WI 18; case activity (including briefs)

Issue:

This appeal presents a single recurring issue: whether provisions in Wisconsin’s implied consent law authorizing a warrantless blood draw from an unconscious suspect violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. More specifically, the issue is whether the “implied consent,” deemed to have occurred before a defendant is a suspect, is voluntary consent for purposes of the consent exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.

County of Eau Claire v. Susan M. Sandas, 2015AP612 & 2015AP613, 1/20/16, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The evidence was sufficient to prove Sandas was operating while intoxicated due to her use of Oxycodone and Fluoxitine despite the testimony from her primary care doctor that he had no evidence she was abusing her prescriptions and testimony from a forensic scientist that those medications wouldn’t have caused the nystagmus observed by the arresting officer.

State v. Keith D. McEvoy, 2015AP1262, District 4, 12/30/2015 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Under the facts of this case, the temporary suspension of McEvoy’s license based on his blood alcohol content didn’t equitably estop the State from seeking to revoke his license based on his refusal to submit to a chemical test of his blood.

State v. Bradley A. Anderson, 2015AP1573-CR, 12/23/15, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Anderson’s consent to a blood draw after his OWI arrest was not vitiated by being told that, if he refused the blood draw, his driving privileges would be revoked and the officer would get a warrant for a blood draw. In addition, the circuit court properly found that Anderson didn’t later withdraw his consent to the blood draw.

State v. Tommy K. Miller, 2015AP1211-CR, District 4, 12/23/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The seizure of Miller’s car was justified under the community caretaker doctrine because the officer’s observations led him to believe Miller’s passenger was in distress. Having lawfully seized the car, the officer’s subsequent discoveries gave him reason to ask Miller to perform field sobriety tests (FSTs) and submit to a preliminary breath test (PBT).

State v. James Lee Eady, Jr., 2016 WI App 12; case activity (including briefs)

Under the forgiving standard for assessing the sufficiency of evidence, the state managed to introduce enough circumstantial evidence to prove that the bank Eady robbed was “chartered” by a state of the federal government, and therefore was a “financial institution” for purposes of § 943.87.

City of Stevens Point v. Todd P. Beck, 2015AP978, District 4, 12/17/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

State law confers automatic admissibility on the results of blood alcohol tests performed in accord with Wis. Stat. § 343.305, but does the plaintiff’s failure to show compliance with that statute render such results inadmissible?

On a bypass petition; case activity (including briefs)

Issues (from the appellant’s brief):

Does a circuit court lack subject matter jurisdiction to enter an OWI 1st offense civil judgment if a defendant has a prior unknown out-of-state OWI conviction?