On Point: 9. Crimes

State v. Adam J. Gajeski, 2014AP612-CR, District 3, 10/7/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The evidence was sufficient to support the guilty verdict on a theft charge because the jury could have reasonably inferred Gajeski intended to permanently deprive the owner of the property at the time he took the property.

City of Tomah v. Steven Seward, 2014AP735, District 4, 9/25/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Applying State v. Post, 2007 WI 60, 301 Wis. 2d 1, 733 N.W.2d 634, the court of appeals holds there was reasonable suspicion to stop Seward based on a police officer’s observations of his weaving within his lane of travel for about one mile at 11:34 p.m.

State v. Kim B. Simmelink, 2014 WI App 102; case activity

The court of appeals holds that § 939.74(2)(b)’s extended statute of limitation for certain theft charges runs from actual discovery of the theft, and not from when the theft should have been discovered with the exercise of reasonable diligence.

State v. Thomas W. Koeppen, 2014 WI App 94; case activity

A “motor bicycle” is a bicycle with a motor added, and can be either pedaled or self-propelled using the motor, § 340.01(30). Whether a person can be charged under the OWI/PAC statute based on his operation of a motor bicycle depends on whether a motor bicycle is a “motor vehicle” under § 340.01(35). The court of appeals concludes that a plain-language reading of the relevant statutes shows a motor bicycle is a motor vehicle, “at least when the motor bicycle being operated is self-propelled, rather than pedaled.” (¶1).

State v. Victor J. Godard, 2014AP396-CR, District 4, 8/28/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The arresting officer provided Godard with accurate information about the implied consent law and thus did not cause Godard to refuse to submit to the implied consent blood test or deny him his right to a second test.

State v. Todd J. Giese, 2014 WI App 92; case activity

Expert testimony regarding retrograde extrapolation of Giese’s blood alcohol concentration is admissible under new version of § 907.02(1) despite the fact some experts doubt its reliability because it was the product of reliable principles and methods and based upon sufficient facts and data.

State v. Robert J. Kowalis, 2014AP258, District 2, 8/6/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The circuit court’s refusal finding under § 343.305(9) is upheld because the officer had probable cause to arrest Kowalis for operating while intoxicated.

State v. Brian A. Patterson, Appeal No. 2013AP749-CR, District 1, 7/22/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity

The State charged Patterson with 1st-degree intentional homicide in a shooting death, but the jury convicted him of a lesser-included offense: 1st degree reckless homicide.  In a cut-and-dried decision, the court of appeals held the evidence sufficient to support the conviction, and found no circuit court error in allowing the jury to consider 1st-degree reckless homicide, instructing the jury, or sentencing Patterson.

Marquette County v. Thomas J. Wagenaar, 2013AP2454, District 4, 7/3/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

A long delay in filing the notice of intent to revoke after Wagenaar refused a chemical test under § 343.305 didn’t deprive the circuit court of jurisdiction. In addition, police had probable cause to believe Wagenaar was operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant.

Eau Claire County v. Michael A. Grogan, 2014AP172, District 3, July 1, 2014 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

A reasonable person would have understood that he was given Miranda warnings because of his obstructionist behavior, so those warnings didn’t mislead Grogan into believing that the warnings applied in the implied consent context.