On Point blog, page 35 of 87
Securities fraud — factual basis for plea; definition of “security”
State v. James C. Hudson, 2013 WI App 120; case activity
Hudson’s untrue statements to persons to get them to invest in his country music career provided a factual basis for his plea to two violations of ch. 551’s prohibition against making untrue statements of material fact in connection with the sale of a “security” because his conduct involved “securities.” A security includes an “investment contract,” which under § 551.102(28)(d)1.
Sufficiency of evidence — bail jumping; stipulation to bail status. Self-defense — failure to ask for instruction
State v. Adrian Castaneda, 2012AP1596-CR, District 1, 8/13/13; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity
Sufficiency of evidence to support felony bail jumping conviction
The state and the defense stipulated to the fact that Castaneda had been charged with a felony and agreed the jury would be told only that Castaneda had committed a “crime.” (¶¶3-4, 7-9). A proposed instruction that defined a “crime”
OWI — Probable cause to request preliminary breath test; admissibility of evidence of defendant’s refusal to take the test
State v. Raylene A. Brinkmeier, 2013AP15-CR, District 4, 8/1/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The police had probable cause under § 343.303 to request Brinkmeier to submit to a preliminary breath test (PBT):
¶13 Contrary to Brinkmeier’s argument, the evidence supporting probable cause in this appeal does not differ significantly from the evidence in [County of Jefferson v.
Conspiracy — sufficiency of evidence; propriety of response to jury question; multiplicitousness of conspiracy and solicitation charges. Sentencing — erroneous exercise of discretion in imposing fine
State v. Ronnie L. Thums, 2012AP929-CR, District 4, 7/25/13; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity
Sufficiency of evidence of conspiracy
Thums was charged with offering money to Trepanier, a fellow prison inmate, to kill Thums’s ex-wife and others associated with her. (¶2). In response to Trepanier’s questions about how he’d be paid, Thums told Trepanier to burglarize his ex-wife’s mother’s home and then drew a map depicting the location of that home and his ex-wife’s home.
Refusal — sufficiency of evidence that officer conveyed implied consent warnings
State v. Randel R. Clark, 2012AP2661, District 4, 7/25/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The record supports the circuit court’s conclusion that the police officer used reasonable means to convey the necessary implied consent warnings to Clark under the standard in State v. Piddington, 2001 WI 24, ¶24, 241 Wis. 2d 754, 623 N.W.2d 528, despite Clark’s claims he couldn’t hear the officer,
Exposing genitals to a child, § 948.10, is limited to situations involving face-to-face contact and therefore doesn’t cover “sexting”
State v. Zachary P. Stuckey, 2013 WI App 98; case activty
The court of appeals concludes that the prohibition in § 948.10 against exposing genitals to a child is a “variable obscenity” statute, and to avoid unconstitutional application it must be read to require proof the defendant knew he was exposing himself to someone under the age of 18. Because the statute does not explicitly include that element,
Repeated child sexual assault, § 948.025: instruction on first degree child sexual assault as lesser-included; other acts evidence; date of offense; ineffective assistance of counsel
State v. Robert T. Warriner, 2012AP244-CR, District 2/1, 7/2/13; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity
Instruction on first degree child sexual assault as lesser-included of repeated child sexual assault
At trial the child testified that Warriner sexually assaulted her on only two occasions, so the trial court agreed, over Warriner’s objections, to read the instruction for first-degree sexual assault of a child, § 948.02(1).
Blood draw at jail by EMT was reasonable
State v. Constance Ilene Osborne, 2012AP2540-CR, District 4, 6/27/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The results of a blood draw done by an EMT at the jail after Osborne was arrested for OWI were admissible because the method and manner of the blood draw were reasonable and the EMT was acting under the direction of a physician, as required by § 343.305(5)(b).
Wisconsin Supreme Court: Deadline for requesting refusal hearing cannot be extended
Village of Elm Grove v. Richard K. Brefka, 2013 WI 54, affirming unpublished court of appeals opinion; Justice Bradley, for a unanimous court; case activity
The 10-day deadline for filing a request for a refusal hearing, §§ 343.305(9)(a)4. and (10)(a), is mandatory, and may not be extended based on excusable neglect.
Brefka was issued a Notice of Intent to Revoke Operating Privileges on December 12 after he refused a chemical test.
Refusal hearing — sufficiency of evidence; lawfulness of blood draw after refusal
State of Wisconsin/City of Sturgeon Bay v. Bradley H. Hart, 2013AP85, District 3, 6/18/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The circuit court’s finding that Hart refused a chemical is not clearly erroneous, despite Hart’s being from Illinois, where the law is different, and his acquiescence, without physical resistance, to the blood draw done after his initial refusal. He was advised of Wisconsin law before he was asked to submit to a test,