On Point: 9. Crimes

State v. Marilyn M. Torbeck, 2012AP522-CR, District 2, 8/1/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

¶6        … For the State to charge Torbeck with OWI under § 346.63(1)(a), DFE must be either an intoxicant, a controlled substance, a controlled substance analog, or a drug.  DFE is not listed as a controlled substance under either Wisconsin or federal law.  A “controlled substance analog” is defined as “a substance the chemical structure of which is substantially similar to the chemical structure of a controlled substance.”  Wis.

Dane County v. Amy Jolene Judd, 2011AP2106, District 4, 7/19/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

Reasonable suspicion supported temporary stop, State v. Meye, 2010AP336-CR, unpublished slip op. (WI App July 14, 2010) (“odor of intoxicants alone is insufficient to raise reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop”), distinguished:

¶7        I disagree that Meye is analogous to the present case.  

State v. Roshawn Smith, 2012 WI 91, reversing in part, affirming in part unpublished decision; case activity

Standard of Review: Sufficiency of Evidence 

¶29  We understand Smith’s central argument regarding the standard of review on the evidentiary question to be summed up in the proposition that a jury verdict of guilt[9] must be reversed on appeal if “[t]he inferences that may be drawn from the circumstantial evidence are as consistent with innocence as with guilt.” 

State v. Harry Thompson, 2012 WI 90, reversing unpublished decision; case activity

Section 970.02(1)(a) imposes several mandatory duties at initial appearance: the judge must inform the defendant of the charge, furnish him with a copy of the complaint, and personally inform him of the penalties for any felonies in the charge; and, the complaint must set forth the possible penalties, ¶62. These obligations apply to any offense in the complaint carrying a mandatory minimum sentence, 

State v. Scott E. Ziegler, 2012 WI 73, on certification; case activity

Interfering with Child Custody, § 948.31(2) – Elements

Language in State v. Bowden, 2007 WI App 234, ¶18, 306 Wis. 2d 393, 742 N.W.2d 332, that one method of violating § 948.31(2) (interference with child custody) requires the parent’s “initial permission” to take child, is now “withdrawn”:

¶52  Pursuant to the plain language of Wis.

State v. Dimitrius Anagnos, 2012 WI 64, reversing 2011 WI App 118; case activity

OWI – Refusal Hearing – Authority to Litigate Constitutionality of Traffic Stop 

Constitutionality of the traffic stop  may be raised as a defense at a refusal hearing, § 343.305(9)(a)5.a.

¶29  In this case, the relevant portion of the statute is found in sub. (9)(a)5.a.  That subsection permits circuit courts to consider “[w]hether the officer had probable cause to believe the person was driving or operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol . 

Village of Elm Grove v. Richard K. Brefka, 2011AP2888, District 1/2, 6/19/12, WSC review granted 11/14/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication), supreme court review granted 11/14/12; case activity

The municipal court lacks competence to extend the 10-day time deadline for requesting a refusal hearings, given the clear language of §§ 343.305(9)(a)4. and (10)(a). Village of Butler v.

Question Presented:

Whether withdrawing from a conspiracy prior to the statute of limitations period negates an element of a conspiracy charge such that, once a defendant meets his burden of production that he did so withdraw, the burden of persuasion rests with the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was a member of the conspiracy during the relevant period — a fundamental due process question that is the subject of a well-developed circuit split.

Wisconsin State v. Tally Ann Rowan, 2012 WI 60, on certification review ; case activity

Extended Supervision Conditions – Suspicionless Searches 

A condition of extended supervision “that allows any law enforcement officer to search [Tally]’s person, vehicle, or residence for firearms, at any time and without probable cause or reasonable suspicion,” was tailored to the particular facts and thus neither overbroad nor unrelated to Tally’s rehabilitative needs.

State v. Daniel Lee Rueden, Jr., 2011AP001034-CR, District 4, 6/7/12

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Rueden: Eileen A. Hirsch, Kaitlin A. Lamb, SPD; case activity

Felon-in-possession, § 941.29, is not unconstitutional either facially or as applied in this instance; State v. Pocian, 2012 WI App 58, deemed controlling.

¶6        We need not discuss the specifics of Rueden’s facial and as-applied challenges because,