On Point: 9. Crimes

State v. Frederick J. Scott, 2012AP533-CR, District 3, 9/11/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

The threshold for illegal alcohol concentration is reduced from .08 to .02 for drivers who have at least 3 prior qualifying convictions. Scott had three priors, thus was subject to arrest and prosecution for driving with a PAC of .03. However, prior convictions may be collaterally attacked if obtained in violation of the right to counsel,

State v. Lisa M. Arentz, 2011AP2307-CR / State v. Eric R. Hendricks, 2012AP243-CR, District 2, 9/5/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity (Arentz; Hendricks)

Criminal OWI prosecution is premised on, and a resulting sentence enhanced by, a prior civil-forfeiture OWI conviction (which does not itself require unanimous jury verdict upon proof beyond reasonable doubt). Arentz and Hendricks raise the same arguments: the elements of the underlying civil forfeiture must be proved to the jury beyond reasonable at the criminal trial;

State v. Scott E. Schmidt, 2012 WI App 113 (recommended for publication); case activity

Adequate Provocation Defense, §§ 939.44(1),  940.01(2)(a) – Test for Admissibility

The “some evidence,” rather than Schmidt’s proposed less stringent “mere relevance,” standard controls admissibility of evidence of adequate provocation that would reduce first- to second-degree intentional homicide:

¶9        When applying the some evidence standard, “the circuit court must determine whether a reasonable construction of the evidence will support the defendant’s theory viewed in the most favorable light it will reasonably admit of from the standpoint of the accused.”  [State v.

State v. Michael P. Green, 2011AP2137-CR, District 2, 8/8/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); case activity

Traffic stop, based on report by gas station attendant of suspected drunk driver, was sufficiently reliable to support investigatory stop.

¶10      This court has previously held that a tip shows sufficient indicia of reliability to justify an investigative stop when the informant identifies himself or herself to the dispatcher,

State v. Mark M. Benson, 2012 WI App 101 (recommended for publication); case activity

Equal Protection – Homicide of Unborn Child by Intoxicated Use of Motor Vehicle, §§ 939.75(2)(b)3, 940.09(1)(c) 

Section § 939.75(2)(b)3 exempts from criminal liability any “act by a woman who is pregnant with an unborn child that results in the death of or great bodily harm, substantial bodily harm or bodily harm to that unborn child.”

State v. Jason M. Jacobs, 2012 WI App 104 (recommended for publication); case activity

Search & Seizure – Consent – Blood Draw

Following a fatal traffic accident, Jacobs performed field sobriety tests well enough that he wasn’t placed under arrest, but he was asked to submit to a blood draw. Jacobs called his attorney, who advised him not to consent to the draw, but Jacobs nonetheless agreed to go to the hospital with an officer to have a blood test.

State v. Marilyn M. Torbeck, 2012AP522-CR, District 2, 8/1/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

¶6        … For the State to charge Torbeck with OWI under § 346.63(1)(a), DFE must be either an intoxicant, a controlled substance, a controlled substance analog, or a drug.  DFE is not listed as a controlled substance under either Wisconsin or federal law.  A “controlled substance analog” is defined as “a substance the chemical structure of which is substantially similar to the chemical structure of a controlled substance.”  Wis.

Dane County v. Amy Jolene Judd, 2011AP2106, District 4, 7/19/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

Reasonable suspicion supported temporary stop, State v. Meye, 2010AP336-CR, unpublished slip op. (WI App July 14, 2010) (“odor of intoxicants alone is insufficient to raise reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop”), distinguished:

¶7        I disagree that Meye is analogous to the present case.  

State v. Roshawn Smith, 2012 WI 91, reversing in part, affirming in part unpublished decision; case activity

Standard of Review: Sufficiency of Evidence 

¶29  We understand Smith’s central argument regarding the standard of review on the evidentiary question to be summed up in the proposition that a jury verdict of guilt[9] must be reversed on appeal if “[t]he inferences that may be drawn from the circumstantial evidence are as consistent with innocence as with guilt.” 

State v. Harry Thompson, 2012 WI 90, reversing unpublished decision; case activity

Section 970.02(1)(a) imposes several mandatory duties at initial appearance: the judge must inform the defendant of the charge, furnish him with a copy of the complaint, and personally inform him of the penalties for any felonies in the charge; and, the complaint must set forth the possible penalties, ¶62. These obligations apply to any offense in the complaint carrying a mandatory minimum sentence,