On Point: 9. Crimes

State v. David D. Austin, 2011AP1042, District 1, 4/10/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); pro se; case activity

Because Austin was no longer in custody under the conviction he sought to collaterally attack pursuant to § 974.06, the court lacked jurisdiction to entertain his motion. It is not enough that he was in custody under some sentence, rather than the particular conviction he sought to attack:

¶12      Austin submits that the wording of Wis.

State v. Traci L. Scott, 2011AP2115-CR, District 2, 3/21/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Scott: Rex Anderegg; case activity

The court rejects Scott’s challenge to a prior OWI conviction, concluding that she aware of the range of punishments, dangers of self-representation, etc. General test recited:

¶2        A defendant facing an enhanced sentence based on a prior conviction may only collaterally attack that prior conviction based on the denial of the constitutional right to counsel.  

State v. Heidi L. Fleischmann, 2011AP2558-CR, District 3, 3/20/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Fleischmann: Sarvan Singh; case activity

The State satisfied its burden of proving that Fleischmann operation of a motor vehicle, in a parking lot adjacent to an empty business building, was on “premises held out to the public for use of their motor vehicles,” § 346.61.

¶8        Whether a premises is held out to the public depends on the owner’s intent.  

State v. Todd M. Anderson, 2011AP1499-CR, District 2, 3/14/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Anderson: pro se; case activity

Frozen Lake Winnebago is a public “premises” within § 346.61, therefore supports prosecution for operating a vehicle on the lake while intoxicated. City of Kenosha v. Phillips, 142 Wis. 2d 549, 419 N.W.2d 236 (1988), discussed and applied.

¶9        Unlike the Phillips court,

State v. Matthew R. Steffes, 2012 WI App 47 (recommended for publication), petition for review granted, 10/16/12; for Steffes: Jeffrey W. Jensen; case activity

Conspiracy to Commit Theft by Fraud, §§ 939.31, 943.20(1)(d) – Sufficiency of Evidence 

Evidence held sufficient to sustain Steffes’ conviction for conspiracy to commit theft by fraud, based on his participation in a prisoners’ “burn-out” telephone scam.

State v. William Dinkins, Sr., 2012 WI 24, affirming 2010 WI App 163; for Dinkins: Steven D. Phillips, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity; note: the court affirms the mandate (reversal of conviction and dismissal of charge), but “upon a different rationale,” ¶63; the net effect is, “affirmed, as modified“

Although homelessness is not in and of itself a defense to prosecution for failing to register as a sex offender, 

State v. Timothy Jon Eloe, 2011AP1970-CR, District 2, 2/29/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Eloe: John C. Orth; case activity

¶5        To be sufficient, a criminal complaint need only be minimally adequate in setting forth essential facts establishing probable cause.  State v. Adams, 152 Wis. 2d 68, 73, 447 N.W.2d 90 (Ct. App. 1989).  Further, the adequacy of the complaint is to be evaluated “in a common sense rather than a hypertechnical manner.”  Id.

State v. Sean T. Powell, 2012 WI App 33 (recommended for publication); for Powell: Richard L. Kaiser; case activity

Conviction for CCW, § 941.23, requires proof of a “dangerous weapon,” which is in turn defined under §  939.22(10) to include “any firearm.” The pattern instruction, Wis JI-Criminal 910 embellishes the definition: “A firearm is a weapon that acts by force of gunpowder.” Powell argues that, because the State failed to show that his loaded,

State v. Michael A. Imbruglia, 2011AP1373-CR, District 2, 2/8/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Imbruglia: Rick Ramirez; case activity

In circuit court, Imbruglia successfully challenged use of a Colorado conviction as an OWI enhancer (on the ground that statute isn’t “substantially similar” to Wisconsin’s). However, after another OWI arrest the very next day, the State reasserted that same conviction to enhance the new charge.

State v. James M. Johnson, 2011AP2374-CR, District 2, 2/8/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); pro se; case activity

Evidence – Johnson left voicemail message on complainant’s work phone – held sufficient to sustain conviction for violating temporary restraining order.

¶8        Regarding the nature of the voice mail message and its violation of the TRO, the TRO itself states that Johnson is to “avoid contact that harasses or intimidates the petitioner,” contact defined as including contact by phone.