On Point: 9. Crimes

City of Sun Prairie v. Michael H. Smith, 2010AP2607, District 4, 5/26/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Smith: Tracey A. Wood; case activity

¶9        Wisconsin Stat. § 343.305(5)(a) imposes the following obligations on law enforcement: “(1) to provide a primary test at no charge to the suspect; (2) to use reasonable diligence in offering and providing a second alternate test of its choice at no charge to the suspect;

State v. Yancy D. Freland, 2011 WI App 80 (recommended for publication); for Freland: Michael D. Zell; case activity

Conviction for an out-of-state sex offense comparable to a misdemeanor in Wisconsin will be treated as a misdemeanor for sex offender registration purposes, § 301.45(6).

¶12      Wisconsin Stat. § 301.45(1d)(am)1. specifically defines has been “[f]ound to have committed a sex offense by another jurisdiction” to include a person who has been convicted “for a violation of a law of another state that is comparable to a sex offense.”[7] Taken as a whole,

County of Milwaukee v. James R. Matel, 2010AP1950, District 1, 5/24/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Matel: Andrew Mishlove; case activity

Personal jurisdiction may be conferred on an OWI-1st defendant by mailing the uniform traffic citation, coupled with filing of the citation with the trial court. Personal service isn’t required by § 345.11(5). State ex rel. Prentice v. Milwaukee Cnty.,

Columbia County v. Mark Devos, 2010AP2349, District 4, 5/19/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Devos: Rex Anderegg; case activity

The DOT Informing the Accused form that was read to Devos contained language beyond that specified in § 343.305(4): “In addition, under 2003 Wisconsin Act 97, your operating privileges will also be suspended if a detectable amount of a restricted controlled substance is in your blood.” (This information must be provided to an accused pursuant to § 343.305(8).) Devos argues that DOT thereby effectively amended § 343.305(4) without legislative authorization,

State v. Jenny L. Nowak, 2010AP1499-CR, District 3, 5/17/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Nowak: Keith F. Ellison; case activity

Warrantless entry into Nowak’s garage was justified under hot pursuit doctrine, given “probable cause to believe Nowak committed a jailable offense—specifically, resisting by failure to stop,” § 346.17(2t) (punishable by 9 months imprisonment), ¶15. (Citing, State v. Richter,

Village of Menomonee Falls v. Jesse Schaefer, 2010AP2485, District 2, 5/18/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Schaefer: James A. Gramling, Jr.; case activity

¶4        As a threshold matter, we address the Village’s contention that the municipal court lacked competency to proceed on Schaefer’s Wis. Stat. § 806.07 motion to reopen.  Whether a court has lost competence to proceed presents a question of law that we review de novo.  

State v. William J. Zarda, 2011AP386-CR, District 3, 5/17/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Zarda: Ricky Cveykus; case activity

Under settled authority, the disorderly conduct statute, § 947.01, is neither overbroad (¶5, citing State v. Douglas D., 2001 WI 47, 243 Wis. 2d 204, 626 N.W.2d 725); nor vague (¶6, citing State v. Zwicker,

State v. Marilee Devries, 2011 WI App 78 (recommended for publication); for Devries: Matthew S. Pinix; case activity

OWI – Repeater – Proof, Prior “Conviction”

Certified copies of proceedings in foreign jurisdictions established adequate proof of prior OWI “connvictions,” § 343.307(1)(d).

¶9        When Wisconsin’s driving laws provide for the enhancement of penalties for a current offense based on prior offenses, the State must present “‘competent proof’” of those earlier offenses.  

State v. Isaac Hughes, Sr., 2011 WI App 87 (recommended for publication); for Hughes: Benbow P. Cheesman, Jr.; case activity

Conviction for escape, § 946.42(3), may be sustained even if the jury never actually saw the judgment of conviction that landed the defendant in custody.

¶12      We agree with the trial court that, when considered in light of all the other evidence adduced at trial,

State v. Donovan M. Burris, 2011 WI 32, reversing unpublished decision; for Burris: Byron C. Lichstein; case activity

Utter Disregard for Life – After-the-Fact Conduct

¶7   We conclude that, in an utter disregard analysis, a defendant’s conduct is not, as a matter of law, assigned more or less weight whether the conduct occurred before, during, or after the crime.  We hold that,