On Point: 9. Crimes

State v. Jenny L. Nowak, 2010AP1499-CR, District 3, 5/17/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Nowak: Keith F. Ellison; case activity

Warrantless entry into Nowak’s garage was justified under hot pursuit doctrine, given “probable cause to believe Nowak committed a jailable offense—specifically, resisting by failure to stop,” § 346.17(2t) (punishable by 9 months imprisonment), ¶15. (Citing, State v. Richter,

Village of Menomonee Falls v. Jesse Schaefer, 2010AP2485, District 2, 5/18/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Schaefer: James A. Gramling, Jr.; case activity

¶4        As a threshold matter, we address the Village’s contention that the municipal court lacked competency to proceed on Schaefer’s Wis. Stat. § 806.07 motion to reopen.  Whether a court has lost competence to proceed presents a question of law that we review de novo.  

State v. William J. Zarda, 2011AP386-CR, District 3, 5/17/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Zarda: Ricky Cveykus; case activity

Under settled authority, the disorderly conduct statute, § 947.01, is neither overbroad (¶5, citing State v. Douglas D., 2001 WI 47, 243 Wis. 2d 204, 626 N.W.2d 725); nor vague (¶6, citing State v. Zwicker,

State v. Marilee Devries, 2011 WI App 78 (recommended for publication); for Devries: Matthew S. Pinix; case activity

OWI – Repeater – Proof, Prior “Conviction”

Certified copies of proceedings in foreign jurisdictions established adequate proof of prior OWI “connvictions,” § 343.307(1)(d).

¶9        When Wisconsin’s driving laws provide for the enhancement of penalties for a current offense based on prior offenses, the State must present “‘competent proof’” of those earlier offenses.  

State v. Isaac Hughes, Sr., 2011 WI App 87 (recommended for publication); for Hughes: Benbow P. Cheesman, Jr.; case activity

Conviction for escape, § 946.42(3), may be sustained even if the jury never actually saw the judgment of conviction that landed the defendant in custody.

¶12      We agree with the trial court that, when considered in light of all the other evidence adduced at trial,

State v. Donovan M. Burris, 2011 WI 32, reversing unpublished decision; for Burris: Byron C. Lichstein; case activity

Utter Disregard for Life – After-the-Fact Conduct

¶7   We conclude that, in an utter disregard analysis, a defendant’s conduct is not, as a matter of law, assigned more or less weight whether the conduct occurred before, during, or after the crime.  We hold that,

State v. Robert Lyle Lawver, Jr., 2010AP382-CR, District 4, 5/5/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Lawver: Cole Daniel Ruby; case activity

Conviction for disorderly conduct upheld on following facts:

¶9        The pertinent facts include the following.  Lawver was walking at night down an unlit highway, traveling with traffic, so that he would not have been in a position to see motorists approaching from behind him. 

State v. Brian M. Joski, 2010AP2223-CR, District 3, 5/3/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Joski: Thomas J. Coaty; case activity

A prior conviction used to enhance a new sentence may be collaterally attacked on the basis of violation of right to counsel, in other words, that the defendant didn’t validly waive counsel within the requirements set by State v. Klessig,

State v. Eliseo Peralta, 2011 WI App 81(recommended for publication); for Peralta: Martin J. Pruhs; case activity

Conspiracy, § 939.31 – “Overt Act”

The “overt act” element of conspiracy, though it must go “beyond mere planning and agreement,” may be “virtually any act,” even if “insignificant,” ¶¶19-21. Thus, Peralta’s “communication to an undercover police detective that a large quantity of cocaine was ready for immediate delivery”

State v. Michael D. Below, 2011 WI App 64 (recommended for publication); for Below: Joseph L. Sommers; case activity

Below indisputably caused massive injuries that resulted in the victim’s death, albeit after medical staff terminated life support. His reckless acts were therefore a “substantial factor” in, hence caused, her death. He was not entitled to a theory of defense instruction authorizing the jury to acquit him on the basis that the termination of life support was an intervening cause of death.