On Point: 9. Crimes

court of appeals decision (1-judge; not for publication); pro se; Resp. Br.

Controlled Substance – Prescribed by Out-of-State Doctor
Possession of marijuana, prescribed by California doctor under laws of that state, may be prosecuted in Wisconsin: though an exception exists for possession obtained by prescription from a “practitioner,” § 961.41(3g), the practitioner must be licensed in Wisconsin, § 961.01(19)(a). ¶10.

Well, the court’s conclusion might be grammatically sound,

court of appeals decision (3-judge; not recommended for publication); for Evans: George Tauscheck; BiC: Resp.; Reply

Testimony from 4 (of a total of 9) false imprisonment victims wasn’t necessary to sustain the convictions on those counts:

… (A) reasonable jury could have determined beyond a reasonable doubt from circumstantial evidence that Nathan B., Nicholas B., Nigel B. and Rashod H. did not consent to being restrained by Evans.

State v. Mitchell D. Pask, 2010 WI App 53; for Pask: Jefren E. Olsen, SPD, Madison Appellate; Resp. Br.; Reply Br.

¶1 … (W)hen there is evidence that a defendant has an intention to take a child to a place that is partially screened or hidden from view, a jury may find that it is with the purpose to take the child away from public safety.

State v. Benjamin W. Mercer, 2010 WI App 47; prior history: Certification, 7/1/09, rejected 9/10/09; for Mercer: Steven P. Sager

A person can knowingly possess images of child pornography while viewing them on a computer, even though they aren’t stored on the hard drive.

¶29      Our impression of these cases is that courts are more concerned with how the defendants got to the website showing child pornography,

decision below: 2009 WI App 143; for Conner: Steven J. House

Issues:

What degree of specificity is required in charging dates of allege conduct in a criminal information to satisfy the accused’s constitutional due process rights of notice of the charged offenses?

Does Wis. Stat. § 940.32(2m)(b) require that the state prove that a “course of conduct,” constituting two or more acts, occur after the operative prior conviction in order to establish a violation of the aggravated stalking offense?

decision below: 2009 WI App 161; for Patterson: David R. Karpe

Issues:

Is contributing to the delinquency of a child resulting in death a lesser-included offense of first-degree reckless homicide under Wis. Stat. § 939.66(2)?

Can one contribute to the delinquency of a 17-year-old individual when such individuals are no longer subject to juvenile delinquency petitions?

Was a reckless homicide jury instruction defective because it gave as an element to be proved that the deceased used and died from a substance “alleged to have been delivered by the defendant?”

Was there prosecutorial misconduct in refreshing the recollection of witnesses with the testimony and statements of other witnesses?

State v. James W. Smith, 2010 WI 16, affirming 2009 WI App 16; for Smith: Shelley M. Fite, SPD, Madison Appellate

The § 301.45 reporting requirement applicable to any violation of false imprisonment of a minor not the defendant’s child is rationally related to a legitimate government interest in protecting the public, particularly children, ¶¶27-36.

Keep in mind that Smith challenged the statute as applied to him.

decision below: 2009 WI App 156; for Carter: Craig M. Kuhary

Issues:

Do violations of Illinois’ zero tolerance (absolute sobriety) law count as prior offenses for sentence enhancement purposes under Wisconsin’s Operating While Intoxicated (OWI) Law (Wis. Stat. §§ 346.63 and 346.65)?

What methodology are trial courts to employ in determining whether to count out-of-state OWI-related offenses for sentence enhancement purposes under Wis. Stat. § 343.307?

court of appeals decision; for Pittman: Kathleen M. Quinn; BiC; Resp. Br.; Reply Br.

Armed Robbery, § 943.32 – Dangerous Weapon
Although Rittman neither in fact possessed a dangerous weapon, his cautioning that no one would get hurt if the teller gave him money coupled with putting his hand in his pocket sufficed to prove the victim’s reasonable belief that he was threatening to use a dangerous weapon:

¶10      The statutes tell us in what is mostly a tautology that: “‘Reasonably believes’ means that the actor believes that a certain fact situation exists and such belief under the circumstances is reasonable even though erroneous.” Wis.

State v. Christopher J. Lesik, 2010 WI App 12, PFR filed
For Lesik: Anthony Cotton

Issue/Holding: Sexual assault (intercourse) of a child, § 948.02, isn’t unconstitutionally overbroad, against a theory that it criminalizes acts undertaken for “proper medical purpose.” Although the statute is silent with respect to medical conduct, potential overbreadth may be cured through judicial construction and the court therefore “conclude(s) here that ‘sexual intercourse’ as used in the sexual assault of a child statute does not include ‘bona fide medical,