On Point: 9. Crimes

State v. Christopher Baron, 2009 WI 58, affirming 2008 WI App 90
For Baron: Daniel P. Dunn

Issue/Holding: The charge of identity theft, based on Baron’s alleged conduct in sending emails from Fischer’s account without authorization and with intent to harm his reputation, is “content based” within the meaning of First Amendment analysis:

¶38      In the case at hand, we conclude that Wis.

State v. Michael Scott Long, 2009 WI 36, affirming in part and reversing in part unpublished opinionF
For Long: Joseph L. Sommers

Issue: Whether “restrained or confined” element of false imprisonment was established where the defendant hugged the complainant tightly while committing an act of sexual contact.

Holding:

¶28      This court has previously explained that confinement is the “restraint by one person of the physical liberty of another.”

State v. Ross M. Brandt, 2009 WI App 115
For Brandt: John M. Yackel

Issue/Holding: Although it carries a maximum penalty of 9 months’ imprisonment, hit-and-run causing injury less than serious bodily harm, §§ 346.67(1) and 346.74(5)(b), is a felony.

Obviously, this result is going to make life more difficult for hit-run representation, for the obvious reason: it’s one thing to advise your client to plead out to a misdemeanor,

State v. Christopher Baron, 2009 WI 58, affirming 2008 WI App 90
For Baron: Daniel P. Dunn

Issue/Holding: First amendment analysis applies to an identity theft charge alleging that Baron sent emails from Fischer’s account without authorization and with intent to harm his reputation:

¶16      In order to determine if a First Amendment analysis is required, we must first consider whether conduct alone or speech,

State v. Garrett L. Huff, 2009 WI App 92, PFR filed 6/3/09
For Huff: Jeffrey W. Jensen

Issue/Holding: Impossibility of fulfilling goal of conspiracy (here: election bribery, where other “conspirators” were undercover officers ineligible to vote) doesn’t preclude conviction, given Wisconsin’s recognition of “unilateral” conspiracies, State v. Sample, 215 Wis. 2d 487, 573 N.W.2d 187 (1998):

¶11   … Thus,

State v. Jeremy Denton, 2009 WI App 78 / State v. Aubrey W. Dahl, 2009 WI App 78
For Denton: Paul G. Bonneson
For Dahl: Patrick M. Donnelly

Issue/Holding: Though merely incidental to robbery, kidnapping charge is supported on theory that ordering the victim to relinquish property holds that person to service against his or her will:

¶26      … The defendants contend that,

State v. James D. Miller, 2009 WI App 111, PFR filed 8/3/09
Pro se

Issue/Holding:

¶52   We conclude as a matter of law that shooting a person in the thigh at a range of sixteen feet with a shotgun is practically certain to cause at least a protracted loss or impairment of the function of the person’s leg, and is therefore injury constituting “great bodily harm” within the meaning of the statutes.

State v. Dione Wendell Haywood, 2009 WI App 178
For Haywood: Robert E. Haney

Issue/Holding: In a battery-to-officer prosecution, it is no defense that the officer refused to leave the premises when the resident withdrew consent to enter, because acting “lawfully” is not an element:

¶11      The flaw in Haywood’s contention, however, is that a law-enforcement officer need not be acting “lawfully” for what he or she does to be done in the officer’s “official capacity.”  Rather,

State v. Michael Scott Long, 2009 WI 36, affirming in part and reversing in part unpublished opinion
For Long: Joseph L. Sommers

Issue: Whether use of force element of second-degree sexual assault was established where the defendant asked the complainant to rate his penis then hugged her so that she could feel his penis through their clothing.

Holding:

¶24      Long’s arguments are not persuasive.

State v. James D. Miller, 2009 WI App 111, PFR filed 8/3/09
Pro se

Issue/Holding: Miller incontrovertibly had some basis to fire a shotgun at his drunken, violent antagonist and even if not adequate to establish full self-defense was enough to defeat the reckless injury element of utter disregard for human life, thereby requiring entry of judgment of acquittal on remand, ¶¶31-44.

Lengthy clips from the court’s detailed analysis omitted,