On Point blog, page 61 of 87
Securities Fraud, § 551.41(2) – Elements – Sufficiency of Evidence
State v. Louis H. LaCount, 2008 WI 59, affirming 2007 WI App 116
For LaCount: T. Christopher Kelly
Issue/Holding:
¶29 The State was required to prove three elements beyond a reasonable doubt to convict LaCount of securities fraud. First, the prosecution had to establish that LaCount sold Wills a security, here, an investment contract. Wis. Stat. § 551.41. Second, the prosecution had to prove that LaCount made an “untrue statement of a material fact or [omitted] to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made,
Guilty Pleas – Factual Basis – Particular Instances: Using Computer to Facilitate Child Sex-Crime
State v. Eric T. Olson, 2008 WI App 171
For Olson: Byron C. Lichstein
Issue/Holding: The “act other than element” of § 948.075(3) isn’t satisfied by either transmission of live video of the shirtless defendant, or by his prior sexual encounters with others he met on-line:
¶11 Accordingly, we read the statute to require that, before the State may obtain a conviction under WIS. STAT.
§ 940.21, Mayhem – Elements – Generally – Includes “Forehead”
State v. Leonard J. Quintana, 2008 WI 33, affirming 2007 WI App 29
For Quintana: James B. Connell, Robyn J. DeVos, William R. Kerner
Issue/Holding:
¶70 To constitute mayhem, the State must show that the defendant had (1) the specific intent to disable or disfigure; (2) by cutting or mutilating the tongue, eye, ear, nose, lip, limb, or other bodily member;
Defenses – Statute of Limitations, § 939.74 – Version Applicable to Since-Repealed, Ch. 944 Offense
State v. Bruce Duncan MacArthur, 2008 WI 72, on Certification
For MacArthur: Alex Flynn
Amicus: Robert R. Henak
Issue/Holding: Alleged violations, between 1965 and 1972, of since-repealed ch. 944 sexual assault statutes come within the statute of limitations provision extant during that time frame.
There is, of course, a whole lot more to it than that, at least in terms of getting to that point,
Jury Instructions – Conclusive Presumptions – Misconduct in Public Office, § 946.12(3), Elements of Duty and Intent
State v. Sherry L. Schultz, 2007 WI App 257; prior history: State v. Scott R. Jensen, 2004 WI App 89, affirmed, 2005 WI 31
For Schultz: Stephen L. Morgan, Jennifer M. Krueger
Issue/Holding: Jury instructions on the elements of duty and intent under § 946.12(3) created mandatory conclusive presumptions:
¶10 Schultz contends that the following sentences in the jury instruction given by the trial court operated as mandatory conclusive presumptions on the issues of intent and duty: “The use of a state resource to promote a candidate in a political campaign or to raise money for a candidate provides to that candidate a dishonest advantage” (establishing the intent element);
Delivery of Controlled Substance – Sufficiency of Evidence (and Corroboration of Confession Rule)
State v. Edward Bannister, 2007 WI 86, 302 Wis. 2d 158, 734 N.W.2d 892, reversing 2006 WI App 136
Issue/Holding: Bannister’s confession to giving morphine to someone who died from an overdose of the substance was sufficiently corroborated to support his his conviction:
¶ 22 We first address whether the State satisfied the corroboration rule during the course of Bannister’s trial. The corroboration rule is a common-law standard.
OWI – Second or Subsequent Offense – Out-of-State Administrative (Non-Refusal) Suspension Doesn’t Qualify
State v. Daniel J. Machgan, 2007 WI App 263
For Machgan: Patrick M. Donnelly
Issue/Holding: An out-of-state administrative DL suspension, not the result of a refusal, isn’t counted as a “conviction” for purposes of OWI enhancement:
¶12 After examination of these relevant statutes, we conclude that Wis. Stat. § 343.307, as the specific statute addressing out-of-state convictions, suspensions or revocations that are to be counted as priors for the purpose of penalty enhancement,
Hit-and-Run, § 346.67(1)(a) – Elements – Operator ID
State v. Aprylann Wuteska, 2007 WI App 157, PFR filed 6/14/07
For Wuteska: Mark H. Bennett
Issue/Holding: The plain text of § 346.67(1)(a) requires the operator of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to a person or damage to a vehicle to identify him or herself as the operator:
¶13 Applying these principles, we conclude the only reasonable meaning of Wis.
Hit & Run, § 346.67(1) – Elements – “Highway”
State v. Dawn R. Dartez, 2007 WI App 126, PFR filed 4/23
For Dartez: Bill Ginsberg
Issue/Holding: The definition of “highway” for purposes of the hit-and-run statute, § 346.67(1), is found in § 340.01(22), ¶ n. 3.
Hit & Run, § 346.67(1) – Elements – “Accident” Occurring on “Highway,” and Relation to Private Property
State v. Dawn R. Dartez, 2007 WI App 126, PFR filed 4/23
For Dartez: Bill Ginsberg
Issue: Whether hit-and-run liability attaches to an accident occurring on private property.
Holding:
¶13 In this case, as already noted, we are concerned with the meaning of “accident” in Wis. Stat. § 346.67(1) in conjunction with the requirement of “upon the highway” in Wis. Stat.