On Point: 9. Crimes

State v. David Richard Turnpaugh, 2007 WI App 222
For Turnpaugh: David P. Geraghty, Michael Sosnay

Issue/Holding: Reversal of the conviction for the crime on which the bail-jumping “was premised” also requires reversal of the bail-jumping conviction, ¶8.

This isn’t to say that bail-jumping requires >conviction on the underlying offense, see, e.g., State v. Kelley L. Hauk, 2002 WI App 226,

State v. Monika S. Lackershire, 2007 WI 74, reversing 2005 WI App 265
For Lackershire: Steven P. Weiss, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶29      Lackershire’s second argument centers on the somewhat unique posture of this case. A violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.02(2) is generally viewed as a strict liability offense. Unlike other sexual assault offenses, where consent of the victim may be a central issue,

State v. Jeffrey L. Torkelson, 2007 WI App 272, PFR filed 11/30/07
For Torkelson: Timothy A. Provis

Issue/Holding: The remedy for violation of the § 948.025(3) prohibition on charging multiple offenses in the same proceeding is limited to dismissal of the charges (not new trial):

¶26   … Wisconsin Stat. § 948.025(3) simply prohibits the State from charging certain enumerated offenses in the same action as a violation of § 948.025.

State v. Shawn B. Ebersold, 2007 WI App 232
For Ebersold: Lester A. Pines

Issue: Whether message sent via Internet chat room supports prosecution for § 948.11(2)(am), verbally communicating harmful material to child.

Holding:

¶9    In this case, the parties dispute whether Wis. Stat. § 948.11(2)(am) prohibits communication of a harmful description or narrative account to a child via an Internet chat message.

State v. Isaiah Bowden, 2007 WI App 234
For Bowden: Jason R. Farris

Issue/Holding: Conviction for interference with custody, § 948.31(2), doesn’t require that the child be within the parent’s immediate presence or control:

¶18   The State posits that the withholding method of interference focuses on permission, not being in the parent’s presence. We agree. The withholding method addresses a situation where the person who takes the child has some initial permission to do so.

State v. Henry E. Routon, 2007 WI App 178, PFR filed 
For Routon: Jefren E. Olsen, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶18   Wisconsin Stat. § 939.31 sets forth the elements of the crime of conspiracy applicable under Wis. Stat. § 961.41(1x).[8] Section 939.31 provides:

…. whoever, with intent that a crime be committed, agrees or combines with another for the purpose of committing that crime may,

State v. Henry E. Routon, 2007 WI App 178, PFR filed 
For Routon: Jefren E. Olsen, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: 

¶19   The crime that is the subject of the conspiracy need not be committed in order for a violation of Wis. Stat. § 939.31 to occur; rather, the focus is on the intent of the individual defendant. State v. Sample,

State v. Henry E. Routon, 2007 WI App 178, PFR filed 
For Routon: Jefren E. Olsen, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:  Evidence of conspiracy to manufacture controlled substance is sufficient, notwithstanding that the psilocybe spores that defendant sold were themselves legal, given “abundant evidence from which it is reasonable to infer that Routon marketed the psilocybe spores to persons who wanted to use them for the illegal purpose of growing mushrooms and that this was the predominant part of the business,” ¶30.

State v. Charles E. Dukes, 2007 WI App 175
For Dukes: Robert N. Meyeroff

Issue/Holding:

¶22      Dukes contends that this evidence is insufficient because there was “no physical evidence linking [him] to the drug house and the drugs in the drug house,” because neither his fingerprints nor DNA were on any of the items recovered. He claims he did not live in the apartment, insisting that the evidence shows only that he was found sleeping on the floor where an overnight guest might sleep,

State v. Wayne Charles Slagle, 2007 WI App 117
For Slagle: Richard D. Martin, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶2    … Because the State charged Slagle with keeping or maintaining a “vehicle” used for “keeping” cocaine, the State needed to prove the following three elements:

1.         Slagle kept or maintained a vehicle.

2.         Slagle’s vehicle was used for keeping cocaine. “Keeping” requires that the cocaine be kept for the purpose of warehousing or storage for ultimate manufacture or delivery.