On Point blog, page 70 of 89
OWI — Enhancement – Collateral Attack, Prior Refusal
State v. Keith S. Krause, 2006 WI App 43
For Krause: Roger G. Merry
Issue/Holding: Because collateral attack on a prior conviction used as a sentencing enhancer is limited to denial of counsel, and because the right to counsel does not attach to a civil proceeding, a refusal revocation is not subject to collateral attack on its use as an OWI enhancer:
¶12 In an enhanced-penalty situation,
Common Law defenses – Collateral Attack on Element of Custody Order, § 948.31, as Procured by Fraud
State v. John W. Campbell, 2006 WI 99, on certification
For Campbell: Charles B. Vetzner, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue: Whether a § 948.31 defendant is entitled to raise a common-law privilege defense against the element of “legal custody” by collaterally attacking the court’s custody order as having been procured by fraud.
Holding:
¶56 There are good reasons not to recognize a common law affirmative defense of fraud to interference with child custody.¶57 One species of affirmative defense——exemplified by self-defense and the now-abrogated privilege to resist unlawful arrest——that courts recognize arises where a person is faced with the difficult decision whether to commit a crime or suffer an injury not otherwise susceptible to effective redress.
Enhancement – OWI Prior, Collateral Attack – Procedure
State v. Alan J. Ernst, 2005 WI 107, on certification
For Ernst: Jeffrey W. Jensen
Issue1: Whether violation of the standards mandated by State v. Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d 194 ¶24, 564 N.W.2d 716 (1997) for valid waiver of counsel supports a collateral attack on a prior conviction.
Holding1:
¶25 … For there to be a valid collateral attack,
OWI – Penalty Provision – Timing of Priors
State v. Brandon J. Matke, 2005 WI App 4, PFR filed 1/6/05
For Matke: James B. Connell
Issue: Whether the number of prior OWI convictions used for penalty enhancement, § 346.65(2), is determined as of date offense is committed or date of sentencing for offense.
Holding:
¶5. How and when to count prior OMVWI convictions for purposes of penalty enhancement under Wis.
OWI — Evidence – Admissibility, Field Sobriety Tests
State v. Richard B. Wilkens, 2005 WI App 36
For Wilkens: Waring R. Fincke
Issue/Holding:
¶14. In Wisconsin, the general standard for admissibility is very low. Generally, evidence need only be relevant to be admissible. See Wis. Stat. § 904.02; State v. Eugenio, 219 Wis. 2d 391, 411, 579 N.W.2d 642 (1998) (“All relevant evidence is admissible unless otherwise provided by law.”).
OWI — Implied Consent, Driver’s Request for Additional Test, § 343.305 (5)(a), Made After Release From Custody – Timeliness
State v. Patrick J. Fahey, 2005 WI App 171
Issue: Whether requested alternative testing at agency expense is deemed a “request” within § 343.305(5)(a) where made after driver was released from custody, left police department, and then returned about 15 minutes later, ¶7.
Holding:
¶14 … The State, in keeping with the circuit court’s decision, argues that it is unreasonable to think that the legislature meant to hold open the time period for a request beyond when a suspect is released from custody.
OWI – Penalty Provision – Enhancement – Proof (and Apprendi)
State v. Brandon J. Matke, 2005 WI App 4, PFR filed 1/6/05
For Matke: James B. Connell
Issue/Holding:
¶16. Matke also contends that the trial court’s interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2), which is now ours as well, violates due process because it permits the court to sentence him for a sixth OMVWI without requiring the State to convince a jury beyond a reasonable doubt that he had five prior OMVWI convictions.
§ 939.32, Attempt, Committed as PTAC Conspiracy
State v. Neil P. Jackson, 2005 WI App 104
For Jackson: Timothy A. Provis
Issue/Holding:
¶7 Jackson alleges that the jury instruction on conspiracy violated his right to due process because, he contends, “conspiracy to attempt” is a nonexistent crime. Jackson relies on United States v. Meacham, 626 F.2d 503 (5th Cir. 1980), and People v. Iniguez,
§ 940.09, Homicide by Intoxicated use of Vehicle (Boat) – Homicide by Intoxicated Use of Vehicle (Boat) – Constitutionality
State v. Peter A. Fonte, 2005 WI 77, reversing unpublished decision
For Fonte: Martha A. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue/Holding: § 940.09 is constitutional, as against a challenge that it relieves the State of proving a causal connection between intoxication and death; reasoning in, and result of, State v. Caibaiosai, 122 Wis. 2d 587, 363 N.W.2d 574 (1985) reaffirmed, ¶38.
§ 940.09, Homicide by Intoxicated use of Vehicle (Boat) – Sufficiency of Proof of “Operating”
State v. Peter A. Fonte, 2005 WI 77, reversing unpublished decision
For Fonte: Martha A. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue/Holding: Fonte’s emotionally charged statement to a police officer at the scene that he “thought the boat was out of gear,” corroborated by a companion’s “grudging admission that he had agreed that Fonte was operating the boat” is sufficient to satisfy the § 940.09 element of “operating,” ¶21.