On Point: 9. Crimes

State v. James W. Keith, 2003 WI App 47, PFR filed 3/5/03
For Keith: Christopher A. Mutschler

Issue/Holding:

¶10 WISCONSIN STAT. § 343.305(5)(a) requires police to offer an alternative chemical test to persons who submit to a chemical test under § 343.305 and who request an alternative test.

…

¶12 The record shows that after Keith’s arrest, while traveling to the hospital,

State v. Guy W. Colstad, 2003 WI App 25
For Colstad: T. Christopher Kelly

Issue/Holding: Authority to administer a preliminary breath test requires probable cause to believe a drunk driving law has been violated. ¶23. Probable cause existed here, given the driver’s (mild) odor of intoxicants; the “suspicious circumstance” of the collision (i.e., with a child on an unobstructed street, and the driver allegedly watching for children);

State v. Richard L. Verkler, 2003 WI App 37
For Verkler: Christopher A. Mutschler

Issue/Holding:

¶1. In State v. Reitter, 227 Wis. 2d 213, 217-18, 595 N.W. 2d 646 (1999), our supreme court held that law officers are under no affirmative duty to advise custodial defendants that the right to counsel does not apply to the implied consent setting.

State v. James F. Brienzo, 2003 WI App 203, PFR filed 10/10/03
For Brienzo: Jerome F. Buting

Issue: Whether attempted sexual assault of a child (by intercourse), § 948.02(2), is a crime known to law, in that the offense lacks an intent element and any crime of intent, § 939.32, requires specific intent for the completed act.

Holding: Sexual contact explicitly requires “intentional touching,” and therefore supports a charge of attempted assault by contact, 

State v. Evan Zimmerman, 2003 WI App 196, (AG) PFR filed 9/10/03
For Zimmerman: Keith A. Findley, UW Law School

Issue/Holding: Although “most of the persuasive evidence against” Zimmerman was his own statements and alibi; and although a conviction may not be based solely on a negative inference drawn from the defendant’s own version, other evidence sufficiently supported the conviction, including: “evidence of his obsessive behavior,

State v. Theodore J. Krawczyk, 2003 WI App 6, PFR filed 1/21/03
For Krawczyk: John T. Wasielewski

Issue/Holding:

¶25. Krawczyk next argues that he was incorrectly charged as “a party to the crime” of felony murder and that this error also rendered his plea to that offense unknowing. We agree with Krawczyk that the State did not need to include the party-to-a-crime allegation in the felony murder charge.

State v. Anthony M. Cotton, 2003 WI App 154
For Cotton: Timothy T. Kay

Issue/Holding:

¶19. Following the preliminary hearing and bindover, the State filed an information containing new charges pertaining to Cotton’s encounter with Paikowski-one count of battery or threat of battery to Paikowski and a further similar count regarding Paikowski’s family pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 940.201(2)(a) and (b). These charges require the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the defendant caused or threatened to cause bodily harm to the victim or victim’s family,

State v. Munir A. Hamdan, 2003 WI 113, on bypass
For Hamdan: Chris J. Trebatoski

Issue/Holding:

¶46. Under its broad police power, Wisconsin may regulate firearms. It may regulate the time, place, and manner in which firearms are possessed and used. The concealed weapons statute is a restriction on the manner in which firearms are possessed and used. See State v.

State v. Munir A. Hamdan, 2003 WI 113, on bypass
For Hamdan: Chris J. Trebatoski

Issue/Holding:

¶20. To convict a person of carrying a concealed weapon in violation of Wis. Stat. § 941.23, the State must prove three elements. First, the State must show that a person who is not a peace officer went armed with a dangerous weapon. State v.

State v. Pamela L. Peters, 2003 WI 88, on certification
For Peters: Terry W. Rose

Issue/Holding:

¶1. This case is before the court on certification from the court of appeals on a question of first-impression regarding the scope of Wisconsin’s identity theft statute, Wis. Stat. § 943.201(1999-2000). Specifically, the question is whether a defendant who misappropriates another’s identity and uses it during an arrest and in subsequent bail proceedings to obtain lower bail has done so “to obtain credit,