On Point blog, page 81 of 89
§ 948.11(2) — Exposing Minors to Harmful Materials — Constitutionality
State v. John T. Trochinski, 2002 WI 56, affirming unpublished decision
For Trochinski: James L. Fullin, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue: Whether § 948.11(2) is unconstitutional because it doesn’t require proof of knowledge of the age of the person to whom harmful materials are displayed (minority being the sole differentiating factor between noncriminal/protected and criminal conduct.
Holding:
¶39. We conclude that the constitutionality of Wis.
Double Jeopardy – Multiplicity: Child Pornography – Possession of Materials Stored on Disks
State v. James E. Multaler, 2002 WI 35, affirming 2001 WI App 14, 246 Wis. 2d 752, 632 N.W.2d 89
For Multaler: Jeffrey W. Jensen
Issue/Holding:
¶58. Applying these standards, we agree with the court of appeals that the 28 counts to which Multaler pled were not identical in fact. Although some of the downloaded image files contained multiple images,
§ 948.40(1), Contributing to delinquency of Minor — Sufficiency of Evidence — Intent Element
State v. Luther Williams, III, 2002 WI 58, on certification
For Williams: Martha K. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue/Holding: The evidence was sufficient to establish the intent element, and therefore to support conviction, for contributing to delinquency of a minor, § 948.40(1): “The jury reasonably could infer from the evidence that Williams was aware that his participation in illegal gambling with James D.
Disclosure of Confidential Child Abuse Reporting, § 48.981(7) — “Disclosure” Element
State v. David C. Polashek, 2002 WI 74, affirming in part and reversing in part, 2001 WI App 130
For Polashek: Nila J. Robinson
Issue: Whether the element of “disclosure” in § 48.981(7) requires that the recipient not previously have been aware of the confidential information.
Holding: Given the plain meaning of “disclosure,” as defined by various dictionaries, as well as construciton of the term under the Federal Privacy Act:
¶23.
Drug Tax Stamp, §§ 139.87-139.96 — Constitutionality
State v. Glover B. Jones, 2002 WI App 196, PFR filed 8/22/02
For Jones: Mark D. Richards
Issue/Holding: The drug tax stamp law, §§ 139.87-139.96, amended to address State v. Hall, 207 Wis. 2d 54, 557 N.W.2d 778 (1997), doesn’t violate the privilege against compelled self-incrimination, ¶33-36.
Double Jeopardy – Multiplicity: Harassment Injunction (§ 813.125(4)) Not Lesser Offense of Harassment (§ 947.013(1r))
State v. Michael A. Sveum, 2002 WI App 105, PFR filed 5/10/02
For Sveum: Ian A.J. Pit
Issue/Holding: Violation of harassment injunction isn’t lesser offense of harassment, each requiring proof of distinct element. ¶¶23-28. (Court stressing, in particular, that for harassment defendant need only be “subject” to injunction but not actually violate it. ¶25.)
OWI – Informed Consent, Hearing Impaired Driver
State v. Michael S. Piddington, 2001 WI 24, 241 Wis. 2d 754, 623 N.W.2d 528, affirming State v. Piddington, 2000 WI App 44, 233 Wis.2d 257, 607 N.W.2d 303
For Piddington: Michelle Ann Tjader
Issue: Whether BAC results were suppressible because the profoundly deaf defendant could not have heard the implied-consent law recitation of rights.
Holding:
¶1 … We hold that § 343.305(4) requires the arresting officer under the circumstances facing him or her at the time of the arrest,
Due Process / Right to Unanimous Verdict – Jury Agreement on Underlying Acts
State v. William G. Johnson, 2001 WI 52, 243 Wis. 2d 365, 627 N.W.2d 455
For Johnson: Martha K. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue: Whether § 948.025 (repeated sexual assault of a child) violates the rights to due process and unanimous verdict by not requiring unanimity that each predicate act occurred.
Holding: Unanimity is required on the elements of an offense, but generally not the alternate modes of commission unless required by considerations of due process.
OAR/OAS – Rescission of HTO Status
State v. Jeremy J. Hanson, 2001 WI 70, 628 N.W.2d 759
For Hanson: James B. Connell
Issue: Whether DOT rescission of a defendant’s HTO status under § 351.09 “relates back” to the date of the charged offense so as to nullify that HTO classification and render him or her ineligible for enhanced sentencing.
Holding:
¶32. Given the accepted meaning of the language of § 351.09 and the legal effect attributable to ‘rescind’ and ‘rescission,’ we conclude that the effect of the Department’s recalculation of Hanson’s HTO status was an annulment and abrogation of that status from the outset of its existence.
OWI – Implied Consent: Warrantless Blood-Sample Analysis
State v. Paul J. VanLaarhoven, 2001 WI App 275
For VanLaarhoven: Michele Anne Tjader
Issue: Whether a blood sample, properly obtained under the Implied Consent law, may be analyzed without a warrant.
Holding: The Implied Consent law requires that all who apply for a driver’s license consent not only to provide a sample, but also a chemical analysis of the sample, ¶¶7-8. More broadly: “the examination of evidence seized pursuant to the warrant requirement or an exception to the warrant requirement is an essential part of the seizure and does not require a judicially authorized warrant.”