On Point: 11. Defense Wins

State v. Raymond L. Nieves, 2014AP1623-CR, 4/5/16, District 1 (recommended for publication, but not published); petition for review granted 9/13/16; case activity (including briefs).

This case explores the line between Bruton v. U.S., 391 U.S. 123 (1968)(which holds that at a joint trial the confession of one defendant is inadmissible against the co-defendant unless the confessing defendant testifies and is subject to cross examination) and Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987)(which holds that a non-testifying defendant’s written confession can be admitted if it is redacted to eliminate all references to his co-defendant). Nieves and his codefendant, Maldonado, were accused of 1st degree intentional homicide. The trial court denied severance and allowed a witness testify about Maldonado’s confession while repeatedly use the term “they” (implicating Maldonado and Nieves). The court of appeals ordered a new trial because admission of the confession evidence violated the Confrontation Clause.

Lester Ray Nichols v. United States, USSC No. 15-5238, 2016 WL 1278473, (April 4, 2016), reversing United States v. Nichols, 775 F.3d 1225 (10th Cir. 2014); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

In a unanimous opinion of limited impact, the Supreme Court holds that a prior version of SORNA did not require a registered sex offender to notify his state registration authority before moving out of the country.

Sila Luis v. United States, USSC No. 14-419, 2016 WL 1228690 (March 30, 2016), vacating and remanding U.S. v. Luis, 564 Fed. Appx. 493 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (unpublished); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

The question presented in this case is whether the pretrial restraint of a criminal defendant’s legitimate, untainted assets—that is, assets not traceable to a criminal offense—needed to retain counsel of choice violates the Sixth Amendment. A majority of the U.S. Supreme Court answers “yes,” though for different reasons.

State v. Jeffrey C. Denny, 2016 WI App 27, petition for review granted 6/15/16, overruled, 2017 WI 17; case activity (including briefs)

If you are thinking about filing a motion under § 974.07 or are in the middle of litigating such a motion, you’ll want to read this decision. The court of appeals holds Denny is entitled to DNA testing of certain evidence because he showed that the items he sought to test are “relevant to the investigation or prosecution that resulted in [his] conviction….” The court also holds he is entitled to testing at public expense because it is reasonably probable he would not have been convicted if exculpatory DNA testing results had been available at the time of his conviction.

Jaime Caetano v. Massachusetts, USSC No. 14-10078, 2016WL1078932 (per curiam), vacating Commonwealth v. Caetano, 470 Mass. 774, 26 N.E.2d 688 (2015); SCOTUSblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

Jaime Caetano obtained a stun gun in order to protect herself from an abusive boyfriend. When she was prosecuted for violating a Massachusetts statute that prohibited the possession of stun guns, she argued that the law violated her 2nd Amendment right to keep and bear arms.  The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled against her. SCOTUS, in one fell swoop, granted her cert petition and reversed. Here is the meat of its two-page per curiam opinion:

Michael Wearry v. Burl Cain, USSC No. 14-10008, 2016 WL 854158 (per curiam) (March 7, 2016); reversing the 21st Judicial District Court, Livingston Parish, No. 01-FELN-015992, Div. A, application for writ denied, 161 So.3d 620 (La. 2015); Scotusblog page

The state violated Wearry’s due process rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by withholding evidence that would have affected the credibility of witnesses implicating Wearry in a capital murder. Wearry is therefore entitled to a new trial.

United States v. Gregorio Paniagua-Garcia, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 15-2540, 2/18/16

The stop of Paniagua-Garcia for texting while driving was unlawful because the officer had no basis for concluding Paniagua-Garcia was using his cellphone to send a text or email as opposed to using it in some way that isn’t prohibited.

State v. Melisa Valadez, 2016 WI 4, 1/28/2016, on certification from the court of appeals; case activity (including briefs)

What looked like a case about the meaning of “likely to result in … deportation” has turned into something else entirely: in a fractured decision, the court holds that the defendant has successfully shown she is likely to be excluded from admission to the country and raises, but does not resolve, the possibility that plea withdrawal claims for failure to give the required immigration warning must be brought within the time limits of Wis. Stat. Rule 809.30 (or perhaps within the strictures of Wis. Stat. § 974.06).

Montgomery v. Louisiana, USSC No. 14-280, 2016 WL 280758 (January 25, 2016); reversing and remanding State v. Montgomery, 141 So.3d 264 (La. 2014); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

In Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012), the Court held that sentencing laws mandating life without parole violate the Eight Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments with respect to those under age 18 at the time of their crimes; here the Court holds that Miller announced a new substantive rule that is retroactive on state collateral review.

City of West Allis v. Teresa A. Michals, 2015AP1688 & 2015AP1689, District 1, 1/26/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Police did not have reasonable suspicion to believe Michals was operating while intoxicated or in a “disorderly manner” in violation of a city ordinance.