On Point: 11. Defense Wins

Montgomery v. Louisiana, USSC No. 14-280, 2016 WL 280758 (January 25, 2016); reversing and remanding State v. Montgomery, 141 So.3d 264 (La. 2014); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

In Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012), the Court held that sentencing laws mandating life without parole violate the Eight Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments with respect to those under age 18 at the time of their crimes; here the Court holds that Miller announced a new substantive rule that is retroactive on state collateral review.

City of West Allis v. Teresa A. Michals, 2015AP1688 & 2015AP1689, District 1, 1/26/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Police did not have reasonable suspicion to believe Michals was operating while intoxicated or in a “disorderly manner” in violation of a city ordinance.

State v. Marguerite Alpers, 2015AP1784-CR, 1/12/16, District 1 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in ordering Alpers to install an ignition interlock device “on [her] husband’s car” as a condition of probation in her OWI cases because the record didn’t establish the condition was a reasonable and appropriate means of advancing the goals of rehabilitation and public protection, State v. Miller, 2005 WI App 114, 11, 283 Wis. 2d 465, 701 N.W.2d 47.

K.C. v. B.S.-S., 2015AP1702, District 2, 1/13/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

B.S.-S.’s single conviction for intentionally causing harm to a child in violation of § 948.03(2)(b) does not demonstrate “a pattern of physically … abusive behavior” under § 48.415(5), so the circuit court erred in terminating B.S.-S.’s parental rights based on that conviction.

Hurst v. Florida, USSC No. 14-7505, 2016 WL 112683 (January 12, 2016); reversing and remanding Hurst v. State, 147 So.3d 435 (Fla. 2014); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

In Florida the jury makes a recommendation as to whether to impose the death penalty, but the judge then holds a separate sentencing hearing and decides whether there are sufficient aggravating circumstances to justify the death penalty. This sentencing scheme is unconstitutional because “[t]he Sixth Amendment requires a jury, not a judge, to find each fact necessary to impose a sentence of death. A jury’s mere recommendation is not enough.” (Slip op. at 1).

United States v. Antonio West, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Case No. 14-2514, 12/30/15

The trial court erroneously excluded expert evidence that West sought to admit regarding factors that made him susceptible to making an unreliable confession to a crime.

State v. Caroline D. Prieto, 2016 WI App 15; case activity (including briefs)

Nearly three years after the defense demand, and a year after the first (of two) court orders to produce a witness list, the state still hadn’t done so. The circuit court’s response? No list, no witnesses. The state appeals and…

State v. Rafael D. Honig, 2016 WI App 10; case activity (including briefs)

Honig, convicted at trial of two first-degree child sexual assaults, asserts that his trial counsel mishandled three issues bearing on the credibility of his accusers; the court of appeals agrees.

State v. Cory S. Herrmann, 2015 WI App 97; case activity (including briefs)

In light of the Second Amendment decisions in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), and McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010), Wisconsin’s prohibition on the possession of a switchblade knife, § 941.24(1), is unconstitutional as applied to a person who possesses a switchblade in his or her own home.

State v. Patrick K. Kozel, 2015AP656-CR, District 4, 11/12/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication), petition for review granted 3/7/16, reversed, 2017 WI 3; case activity (including briefs)

The results of a blood draw done by an EMT after Kozel was arrested for OWI were inadmissible because the State failed to prove that the blood draw was conducted by a “person acting under the direction of a physician,” as required by § 343.305(5)(b).