On Point blog, page 35 of 53
Police lacked reasonable suspicion to seize driver of car in a parking lot suspected to be the site of illegal drug activity
State v. Chonsea Jerome King, 2013AP1068-CR, District 4, 2/13/14; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity
A police officer saw a car parked in a lot linked by “numerous [pieces of] intelligence” to illegal drug activity. It was 9:25 p.m. The officer watched it for about five minutes, but did not see anyone exit the vehicle or any activity outside the vehicle, though they did observe the interior lights in the car turn on and off “a couple [of] times.” (¶3).
Court of appeals reverses order for involunatry medication
Eau Claire County v. Mary S., 2013AP2098, District 3, 1/28/14 (1-judge opinion ineligible for publication); case activity
Mary S. was placed under a Chapter 51 mental health commitment and involuntary medication order in 2011, and those orders were extended once. But when the County sought to extend the orders again, Mary objected and argued that the County, which bore the burden of proof, failed to establish that Mary was incompetent to refuse medication,
Resentencing required because PSI included defendant’s compelled statements to probation agent
State v. Danny Robert Alexander, 2013AP843-CR, District 1, 1/28/14; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication), petition for review granted 6/12/14, reversed, 2015 WI 6; case activity
Alexander was on probation when he was charged with forgery. He pled to the forgery and a PSI was prepared. (¶2). Attached to the PSI were statements the defendant made to his probation agent about two other forgeries.
SCOTUS unanimously reverses 8th Circuit’s intepretation of causation required by mandatory minimum provision of Controlled Substances Act
Marcus Burrage v. United States, USSC 12-7515, 1/27/14, reversing United States v. Burrage, 687 F.3d 1015 (8th Cir. 2012).
Docket here. SCOTUSblog analysis here.
The Uniform Controlled Substances Act imposes a 20-year mandatory minimum sentence on a defendant who unlawfully distributes a Schedule I or II drug, when “death or serious bodily injury results from the use of such substance.”
Trial counsel’s failure to raise viable defense means defendant gets new trial
State v. Fontaine Washington, 2011AP2462-CR, District 1, 1/17/14; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity
Washington fled from officers trying to stop the car he was driving. (¶2). Before Washington was finally stopped and arrested, the officers in pursuit saw him throw something “shiny” out the car window; a search of the area where the object was thrown turned up a gun about 30 feet off the roadway.
Federal district court grants habeas relief based on violation of Confrontation Clause; calls Wisconsin court’s harmless error analysis “a sterilized, post-hoc rationalization for upholding the result”
Mark D. Jensen v. James Schwochert, No. 11-C-0803 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 18, 2013)
Judge William Griesbach of the U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Wisconsin, has ordered a new trial for Mark Jensen, who was convicted of killing his wife Julie based in part on the use of oral and written statements she made before her death in which she told police she suspected her husband was trying to kill her.
Capitol rotunda singer gets civil pre-trial discovery in State’s action to collect forfeiture
State v. Anica C. C. Bausch, 2014 WI App 12; case activity
Bausch participated in a “Solidarity Sing Along” at the State Capitol in the fall of 2012. The Capitol Police cited her for violating Wis. Admin. Code ADM sec. 2.14(2)(v). Bausch pled “not guilty” and served the State with requests for admissions, interrogatories, and production of documents. The State responded with a “Motion in Opposition to Application of Civil Discovery.”
Court to State: Ends of adult court jurisdiction don’t justify means violating juvenile code
State v. Cody Phillips, 2014 WI App 3; case activity
This case reached the court of appeals via a petition for leave to appeal a non-final order.
The State’s juvenile delinquency petition alleged that Phillips committed one count of 1st-dgree sexual assault of child by use or threat of force and a second count of 2nd-degree assault of a child. At the State’s request, the juvenile court waived Phillips into adult court on both counts and ultimately pled no contest to two counts of 2nd-degree sexual assault of a child.
Trial court properly concluded officer did not have probable cause to arrest defendant for OWI
Fond du Lac County v. Randal B. Hopper, 2012AP1719, District 2, 11/27/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The circuit court properly concluded the defendant did not unlawfully refuse to provide a breath sample because the officer lacked probable cause to arrest him for OWI:
¶10 Considering the collective knowledge of dispatch and the arresting deputy at the time the deputy arrested Hopper,
Hearing on motion for plea withdrawal granted; trial court failed to ensure mentally-impaired defendant understood plea
State v. Matthew Allen Lilek, Appeal No. 2012AP1855, District 1; 11/13/13, (not recommended for publication), case activity
The dispositive issue in this appeal was whether the defendant, who is legally blind and has suffered cognitive disabilities his entire life, knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered a no-contest plea to second degree sexual assault, with use of force, and to aggravated battery. During the plea colloquy, defense counsel assured the court that experts had examined his client and,