On Point: 11. Defense Wins

State v. Thomas G. Smith, 2013AP2516-CR, District 4, 7/3/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The profane comments Smith posted on a police department’s Facebook page are not “fighting words” because that category of unprotected speech only covers statements made in the context of a face-to-face communication.

Waukesha County v. Kathleen H., 2014AP90, District 2, 6/25/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The County did not show that Kathleen, the subject of a ch. 51 commitment proceeding, is incompetent to refuse medication or treatment because it did not show that the advantages, disadvantages, and alternatives to her medication were explained to her, as required by § 51.61(1)(g)4. and Outagamie County v. Melanie L., 2013 WI 67, ¶¶91, 97, 349 Wis. 2d 148, 833 N.W.2d 607.

State v. Donald Ray Michael, 2012AP2738-CR, District 1, 6/10/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity

Michael is entitled to a new trial on reckless injury and felon in possession of a firearm charges because trial counsel provided ineffective assistance at trial by failing to introduce evidence from the police department’s computer automated dispatch (CAD) report and failing to present testimony from an eyewitness to the incident.

Esteban Martinez v. Illinois, USSC No. 13-5367 (May 27, 2014) (per curiam), reversing State v. Martinez, 990 N.E.2d 215 (Ill. 2013)

In this unanimous per curiam decision, the Supreme Court reaffirms two clear rules of criminal procedure: jeopardy attaches when the jury is impaneled and sworn; and a trial court’s dismissal of the case due to insufficient evidence is an acquittal. Added together, the two rules mean the defendant cannot be retried.

State v. Gumersinda M. Gonzalez, 2013AP2585-CR, District 4, 5/8/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The officer lacked reasonable suspicion to extend the duration of a traffic stop by asking a driver to perform field sobriety tests, so evidence of THC possession obtained during the stop must be suppressed.

State v. Shawn N. Hill, 2013AP2549-CR, District 2, 5/7/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

A vehicle registered by the State as a “utility terrain vehicle” under § 23.33(1)(ng) is not a “motor vehicle” under § 340.01(35). Thus, a defendant alleged to have operated the vehicle while intoxicated should have been charged under § 23.33(4c), not § 346.63.

State v. Charles R. Kucharski, 2013AP557-CR, District 1, 5/6/14, petition for review granted 9/24/14, reversed, 2015 WI 64; case activity

This is a nice defense win, and the majority opinion makes sense.  Kucharski shot and killed his parents and pled not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. The only issue at his court trial was whether he lacked the capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct and comply with the law. The uncontested expert opinions answered “yes.” So the majority granted a new trial.  The dissent took issue with the majority’s application of § 752.35, the discretionary reversal standard.

State v. Brandon D Andre Burnside, 2013AP1293-CR, District 1, 4/29/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity

Under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in Burnside’s position would not have believed that he could stop police questioning and leave. Therefore, the statements he made to the police before they administered Miranda warnings must be suppressed.

State v. Dean M. Blatterman, 2013AP2107-CR, District 4, 4/24/14 (one-judge; ineligible for publication), petition for review granted 9/24/14, reversed, 2015 WI 46; case activity

You don’t see this very often.  The court of appeals just reversed a circuit court decision denying a motion to suppress evidence of intoxication.  The police performed field sobriety and blood tests after moving the suspect out of the general vicinity of the stop.  This converted the stop into an arrest for which there was no probable cause.

State v. Dennis R. Armstrong, 2014 WI App 59; case activity

The fact that Armstrong was entitled to eight months rather than approximately two years of sentence credit is a “new factor” because the information was unknowingly overlooked at sentencing and the amount of sentence credit was highly relevant to the circuit court’s imposition of the sentence:

¶13      At the sentencing hearing,