On Point: 11. Defense Wins

State v. Mark E. Johnson, 2011AP2673-CR, District 3, 9/25/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

Cross-examination of Johnson, on trial for possession of marijuana and bail jumping, as to his marijuana use was proper, but as to his use of cocaine (eliciting an admission) was reversible error:

¶10      Johnson concedes that, after he testified he never possessed marijuana, the State was permitted to cross-examine him about a previous instance where he possessed marijuana.  

State v. Jose O. Gonzalez-Villarreal, 2012 WI App 110 (recommended for publication); case activity

Counsel (Michael J. Knoeller) was present while the police interrogated, and elicited incriminating responses from, his client, Gonzalez-Villarreal. G-V didn’t speak English, and Knoeller doubled as interpreter. The state issued charges, and Knoeller continued to represent G-V. However, the state moved to disqualify Knoeller as counsel, arguing that his service as interpreter during the interrogation created a risk that Knoeller might have to testify.

State v. Frederick J. Scott, 2012AP533-CR, District 3, 9/11/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

The threshold for illegal alcohol concentration is reduced from .08 to .02 for drivers who have at least 3 prior qualifying convictions. Scott had three priors, thus was subject to arrest and prosecution for driving with a PAC of .03. However, prior convictions may be collaterally attacked if obtained in violation of the right to counsel,

seventh circuit decision

Habeas – Jury Exposure to Extraneous Information 

Subsequent to trial, Hall discovered that a juror’s son was a fellow inmate of Hall who initially told the juror that Hall was likely innocent, but later indicated that he “and several co-inmates had changed their mind about Hall and thought him guilty.” The (Indiana) state court ruled that this extrinsic information wasn’t prejudicial: the burden to show actual prejudice from exposure to extraneous information is on the defendant and,

State v. Noah L., 2012AP348, District 2, 8/29/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

After finding the proof sufficient to support a delinquency allegation, the trial court nonetheless declined to enter adjudication of delinquency, pending a report and recommendation from the Department of Human Services. The report was prepared, which included information not admitted into evidence at the fact-finding hearing, and the court adjudicated the juvenile delinquent.

State v. Lavon J. Ash, Sr., 2012AP381-CR, District 2, 8/15/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

Ash was sentenced to concurrent terms of one-year initial confinement, one-year extended supervision on two misdemeanor counts, a sentence structure he successfully challenges. Incompatible statutory mandates lie at the heart of the problem. In the first instance, § 973.01(1)  requires bifurcated misdemeanor sentences, which simply isn’t possible for unenhanced misdemeanors: a bifurcated sentence must be served in prison,

State v. Pierre R. Conner, 2012 WI App 105 (recommended for publication); case activity

Interrogations – Miranda-Edwards Rule – Unequivocal Request for Counsel 

The issues on a request-for-counsel challenge to in-custody interrogation are whether the individual  unequivocally invoked his right to counsel and, if so, whether he subsequently reinitiated questioning, Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981). Although the trial court found that Conner’s requests for counsel were equivocal,

seventh circuit court of appeals decision, affirming habeas grant following remand in 539 F.3d 766 (further case history: here)

Habeas Review – Evidentiary Hearing 

The rule of Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011), that 2254(d)(1) review is limited to the state-court record, doesn’t apply where the state court didn’t address a component part of the claim (here, 

State v. Marilyn M. Torbeck, 2012AP522-CR, District 2, 8/1/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

¶6        … For the State to charge Torbeck with OWI under § 346.63(1)(a), DFE must be either an intoxicant, a controlled substance, a controlled substance analog, or a drug.  DFE is not listed as a controlled substance under either Wisconsin or federal law.  A “controlled substance analog” is defined as “a substance the chemical structure of which is substantially similar to the chemical structure of a controlled substance.”  Wis.

State v. Terry G. Vollbrecht, 2012 WI App 90 (recommended for publication); case activity

§ 974.06 Motion – Laches Inapplicable 

¶17 n. 14:

While we acknowledge the State’s argument that Vollbrecht’s Wis. Stat. § 974.06 motion is barred by laches and its request that we certify the issue to the supreme court, we decline the State’s invitation.  The State concedes that the supreme court has previously held that laches does not apply under § 974.06.