On Point blog, page 46 of 53
TPR – Removal of Element from Jury – Closing Argument, Misstatement, Interest of Justice
Florence County Department of Human Services v. Jennifer B., 2011AP88, District 3, 8/19/11
court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Jennifer B.: Martha K. Askins, Shelley Fite, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity
Removal from jury consideration of a ground for termination (CHIPS orders) without prior discussion between court and parties was error:
¶10 While we agree that a directed verdict is available in the grounds phase of a TPR proceeding,
Traffic Stop: Reasonable Suspicion, Traffic Violation; OWI Refusal Hearing: Lawfulness of Arrest
State v. Dimitrius Anagnos, 2011 WI App 118 (recommended for publication); for Anagnos: Barry S. Cohen; case activity; reversed, 2012 WI 64
Traffic Stop – No Turn Signal
Failure to use a turn signal where neither traffic nor pedestrians are present doesn’t support a traffic stop:
¶9 Wisconsin Stat. § 346.34(1)(b) states that a driver must use a turn signal “[i]n the event that any other traffic may be affected.” The circuit court found that Anagnos did not violate this statute when he made a left turn without using his signal,
Jury Instructions – Elements, Exposing Child to Harmful Materials, § 948.11(2)(a)
State v. Esteban M. Gonzalez, 2011 WI 63, reversing, 2010 WI App 104; for Gonzalez: Frank J. Schiro, Kristin Anne Hodorowski; case activity
Gonzalez has shown a reasonable likelihood that the jury instructions relived the State of its burden to prove the element that he knowingly exhibited harmful material to a child.
The facts are essentially undisputed: Gonzalez watched pornography while care-taking his 3-year-old daughter,
SVP: Discharge Petition
State v. Charles M. Ermers, Jr., 2011 WI App 113 (recommended for publication); for Ermers: Steven D. Phillips, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity
A ch. 980 discharge hearing requires that the petitioner allege “facts from which the court or jury may conclude the person’s condition has changed since the date of his or her initial commitment order so that the person does not meet the criteria for commitment as a sexually violent person,”
USA v. Rondell Freeman, 7th Cir No. 09-4043, 6/17/11
7th circuit court of appeals decision
Prosecutorial Misconduct – Knowing Use of False Testimony
When the government obtains a conviction through the knowing use of false testimony, it violates a defendant’s due process rights. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 679 n.8 (1984) (discussing the evolution of the rule in Napue).
Confrontation – Lab Report Certification
Donald Bullcoming v. New Mexico, USSC No. 09-10876, 6/23/11
The question presented is whether the Confrontation Clause permits the prosecution to introduce a forensic laboratory report containing a testimonial certification—made for the purpose of proving a particular fact—through the in-court testimony of a scientist who did not sign the certification or perform or observe the test reported in the certification. We hold that surrogate testimony of that order does not meet the constitutional requirement.
TPR – Judicial Bias
Walworth County DH&HS v. Roberta J. W., 2010AP2248, District 2, 6/22/11
court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Roberta J.W.: Lora B. Cerone, SPD, Madison Appellate, case activity
By his overweening involvement in the trial process, evincing his prejudgment of the case and asking “countless questions of the witnesses” – to an extent that the GAL objected that “the judge was abusing his function and was not being fair to Roberta -,
Statute of Limitations: Attempted first-Degree Intentional Homicide
State v. Rodney A. Larson, 2011 WI App 106 (recommended for publication); for Larson: Chris Gramstrup; case activity
Prosecution for attempt rather than completed crime, §939.32, comes within the general limitation period in § 939.74(1). Therefore, although prosecution for homicide may be commenced at any time, § 939.74(2)(a), Larson’s prosecution for attempted first-degree intentional homicide had to be commenced within 6 years, and must be dismissed as untimely.
Possession with Intent to Deliver (THC) – Sufficiency of Evidence, PTAC; Stipulation – Element – Right to Jury Trial
State v. Roshawn Smith, 2010AP1192-CR, District 3, 5/26/11, aff’d and rev’d, 2012 WI 91
court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 2012 WI 91; for Smith: William E. Schmaal, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity
Evidence held sufficient to support guilty verdict, § 961.41(1m)(h)5., ptac: after agreeing to accept packages (which turned out to contained marijuana),
Sex Offender Registration: Out-of-State Convictions – “Misdemeanor Treatment,” § 301.45(6)(a)2
State v. Yancy D. Freland, 2011 WI App 80 (recommended for publication); for Freland: Michael D. Zell; case activity
Conviction for an out-of-state sex offense comparable to a misdemeanor in Wisconsin will be treated as a misdemeanor for sex offender registration purposes, § 301.45(6).
¶12 Wisconsin Stat. § 301.45(1d)(am)1. specifically defines has been “[f]ound to have committed a sex offense by another jurisdiction” to include a person who has been convicted “for a violation of a law of another state that is comparable to a sex offense.”[7] Taken as a whole,