On Point: 10. Defenses

State v. Gabriel Justin Bogan, 2014AP285-CR, District 1, 10/14/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity

In this 1st-degree reckless homicide and 1st-degree reckless endangering safety case, the court of appeals held that the evidence presented at trial did not support a “defense of others” jury instruction. Thus, Bogan’s trial lawyer was not ineffective for failing to pursue that theory of defense.

State v. Charles L. Chew, 2014 WI App 116; case activity

In its first decision addressing Wisconsin’s recently adopted “castle doctrine,” § 939.48(1m), the court of appeals holds Chew wasn’t entitled to a self-defense jury instruction under the statute because the men Chew shot at were not “in” his “dwelling.”

On review of an unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity

Issues (composed from the State’s Petition for Review)

In granting Kucharski a new trial on the issue of mental responsiblity under the miscarriage of justice prong of § 752.35, did the court of appeals substitute its judgment for that of the trial court on issues that are within the sole province of the finder of fact, so that the appellate court’s decision conflicts with this court’s decision in State v. Sarinske, 91 Wis. 2d 14, 280 N.W.2d 725 (1979)?

Should a defendant be entitled to a new trial on the affirmative defense of mental disease or defect under the miscarriage of justice prong of § 752.35 where the court of appeals does not find any error or unfairness in the defendant’s trial, but determines there is a substantial probability of a different result on retrial only by substitution its judgment for that of the fact-finder on issues that are the province of the fact-finder alone?

State v. Jacob G. Mayer, 2013AP2758-CR, District 2, 9/24/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity

The trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on the defense of voluntary intoxication and the prosecutor’s improper closing argument were harmless, but the latter is egregious enough to cause the court of appeals to refer the prosecutor to OLR.

On review of a published court of appeals decision in Kempainen (case activity) and a per curiam decision in Hurley (case activity)

Issues (adapted from the State’s  PFR in Hurley):

Did the amended complaint charging repeated sexual assault of a child, which alleged that Hurley assaulted his stepdaughter at least 26 times over a five or six-year charging period, satisfy Hurley’s due process right to prepare a defense?

Did the circuit court properly exercise its discretion in admitting “other acts” evidence that Hurley repeatedly assaulted his sister when she was 10 and he was 14 in view of the greater latitude shown “other crimes” evidence in child sexual assault cases?

Did the circuit court err in ordering a new trial due to the prosecutor’s unobjected-to remark in closing argument about Hurley’s failure in his trial testimony to make a strong denial of his sister’s allegations?

State v. Kim B. Simmelink, 2014 WI App 102; case activity

The court of appeals holds that § 939.74(2)(b)’s extended statute of limitation for certain theft charges runs from actual discovery of the theft, and not from when the theft should have been discovered with the exercise of reasonable diligence.

State v. Donyil Leeiton Anderson, 2014 WI 93, 7/30/14, reversing an unpublished per curiam court of appeals decision; majority opinion by Justice Gableman; case activity

Without explaining its reasoning, the supreme court declares that while the consumption of prescription medication in accordance with a physician’s advice may give rise to an involuntary intoxication defense under § 939.42, it can never create a mental defect that would sustain an insanity defense under § 971.15. The court also holds that mixing prescription medication with any amount of alcohol precludes a defendant from using either defense.

State v. Vernon D. Hershberger, 2014 WI App 86; case activity

As a general rule, a person may not collaterally attack a prior judicial order or judgment in a proceeding brought to enforce that order or judgment, e.g., State v. Campbell, 2006 WI 99, ¶¶51-55, 294 Wis. 2d 100, 718 N.W.2d 649. The court of appeals holds this rule also applies to proceedings brought to enforce an administrative order.

State v. Erick O. Magett, 2014 WI 67, 7/16/14, affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision; majority opinion by Justice Prosser; case activity

The circuit court erred when it prevented Magett from testifying on the issue of mental disease or defect during the responsibility phase of his NGI trial because the court mistakenly believed that Magett was not a competent witness regarding his own mental condition and that he was required to present expert testimony on the issue. The circuit court also erred in dismissing Magett’s NGI defense without hearing any testimony during the responsiblity phase. However, a majority of the supreme court holds these errors are harmless, so Magett does not get a new hearing on the issue of mental responsibility.

State v. Charles R. Kucharski, 2013AP557-CR, District 1, 5/6/14, petition for review granted 9/24/14, reversed, 2015 WI 64; case activity

This is a nice defense win, and the majority opinion makes sense.  Kucharski shot and killed his parents and pled not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. The only issue at his court trial was whether he lacked the capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct and comply with the law. The uncontested expert opinions answered “yes.” So the majority granted a new trial.  The dissent took issue with the majority’s application of § 752.35, the discretionary reversal standard.