On Point: 10. Defenses

State v. James Elvin Lagrone, 2016 WI 26, 4/22/2016, affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision, majority opinion by Ziegler, dissent by A.W. Bradley (joined by Abrahamson); case activity (including briefs)

Lagrone wasn’t told he had the right to testify during the second, mental responsibility phase of his NGI trial. He alleged in his postconviction motion that he didn’t know he had any such right. The trial court denied the motion without a hearing. The supreme court now affirms that denial in an opinion that neither (1) decides whether Lagrone had a right to testify during the second phase, nor (2) explains how the denial of that right, if it exists, can be raised in postconviction proceedings.

State v. Alina N. Caminiti, 2015AP122-CR, and State v. Matthew B. Caminiti, 2015AP123-CR, 4/6/2016, District 4 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs).

The Caminitis were members of a church in Black Earth whose leader (Matthew’s father) advocated “rod discipline”–the beating of infants and young children on the bare buttocks with wooden spoons or dowels, often resulting in bruising. The father’s convictions for conspiracy to commit child abuse were affirmed by the court of appeals in 2014; the Caminitis now appeal their convictions at trial for physical abuse of their two children on substantive due process and religious freedom grounds.

Question presented:

Whether, under Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970), and Yeager v. United States, 557 U.S. 110 (2009), a vacated, unconstitutional conviction can cancel out the preclusive effect of an acquittal under the collateral estoppel prong of the Double Jeopardy Clause?

State v. Corey R. Kucharski, 2013AP557-CR, 3/1/16, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The trial court correctly applied the elements of § 971.15, and the record supports the trial court’s finding that Kucharski failed to meet his burden of showing that he lacked mental responsibility when he killed his parents.

State v. D. T., 2015AP1476, 3/1/2016, District 1 (one-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity

D.T. asserts he was ambushed when the juvenile court took judicial notice of his file and sua sponte called a witness before lifting the stay of his five-year sentence; the court of appeals affirms after finding different grounds to lift the stay.

State v. Aman D. Singh, 2015AP850-CR, District 4, 1/7/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Singh, appealing pro se, seeks to reverse a twelve-year-old OWI-second conviction for which his sentence is long over. 

State v. Keith D. McEvoy, 2015AP1262, District 4, 12/30/2015 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Under the facts of this case, the temporary suspension of McEvoy’s license based on his blood alcohol content didn’t equitably estop the State from seeking to revoke his license based on his refusal to submit to a chemical test of his blood.

State v. Jeffrey L. Elverman, 2015 WI App 91; case activity (including state’s brief)

The court rejects all challenges to a conviction of theft of more than $10,000. The issues mostly spring from the state’s use of Wis. Stat. § 971.36(4), which permits, under certain circumstances, the aggregation of multiple thefts into a single count.

State v. Glen Artheus Beal, 2014AP2534-CR, 9/22/15, District 1 not recommended for publication); case activity

A jury convicted Beal of child abuse as a  party to a crime because multiple witnesses testified that he punched his girlfriend’s daughter and also restrained the daughter so that her mother (his girlfriend) could hit her. See §939.05(2)(a) and §939.45(5). Beal argued that although he was not entitled to assert the parental discipline privilege himself, he should have been able to present a defense based on his girlfriends’ right to assert that privilege.

Review of an unpublished court of appeals decision; affirmed 2016 WI 26; case activity (including briefs)

Issues (composed by On Point)

Does a defendant have the right to testify at the mental responsibility phase of a bifurcated criminal proceeding?

If so, is an on-the-record colloquy regarding the waiver of the right to testify required?