On Point blog, page 9 of 22
Dismissal of felon-in-possession charge doesn’t bar new charge under different provision of § 941.29
State v. Joshua Java Berry, 2016 WI App 40; case activity (including briefs)
Berry was found guilty at a bench trial of being a felon in possession of a firearm under § 941.29(2)(a) (2013-14). Before sentencing, Berry’s lawyer figured out that Berry’s prior conviction was for a misdemeanor, not a felony. The court vacated the felon-in-possession conviction and dismissed the charge with prejudice, and the state immediately recharged him under § 941.29(2)(b) (2013-14) because Berry had a prior delinquency adjudication. (¶¶2-6). Recharging him doesn’t violate the prohibition against double jeopardy.
Challenges to sufficiency of evidence and self-defense instruction in reckless homicide case rejected
State v. Phillip Kareen Green, 2015AP1126-CR, 4/26/16, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Green argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of first degree reckless homicide because it didn’t prove he acted with utter disregard for human life. He also argues for a new trial in the interest of justice on the grounds that: 1) the jury wasn’t fully instructed about the interaction between self-defense and the utter disregard element; and 2) important facts were not introduced or placed in proper context. The court of appeals rejects Green’s claims in a decision heavy on facts and light on analysis.
SCOW: No right-to-testify colloquy needed in second NGI phase
State v. James Elvin Lagrone, 2016 WI 26, 4/22/2016, affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision, majority opinion by Ziegler, dissent by A.W. Bradley (joined by Abrahamson); case activity (including briefs)
Lagrone wasn’t told he had the right to testify during the second, mental responsibility phase of his NGI trial. He alleged in his postconviction motion that he didn’t know he had any such right. The trial court denied the motion without a hearing. The supreme court now affirms that denial in an opinion that neither (1) decides whether Lagrone had a right to testify during the second phase, nor (2) explains how the denial of that right, if it exists, can be raised in postconviction proceedings.
Child abuse convictions survive due process, free exercise challenges
State v. Alina N. Caminiti, 2015AP122-CR, and State v. Matthew B. Caminiti, 2015AP123-CR, 4/6/2016, District 4 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs).
The Caminitis were members of a church in Black Earth whose leader (Matthew’s father) advocated “rod discipline”–the beating of infants and young children on the bare buttocks with wooden spoons or dowels, often resulting in bruising. The father’s convictions for conspiracy to commit child abuse were affirmed by the court of appeals in 2014; the Caminitis now appeal their convictions at trial for physical abuse of their two children on substantive due process and religious freedom grounds.
Juan Bravo-Fernandez v. United States, USSC No. 15-537, cert. granted 3/28/16
Whether, under Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970), and Yeager v. United States, 557 U.S. 110 (2009), a vacated, unconstitutional conviction can cancel out the preclusive effect of an acquittal under the collateral estoppel prong of the Double Jeopardy Clause?
Record supported trial court’s rejection of NGI defense
State v. Corey R. Kucharski, 2013AP557-CR, 3/1/16, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The trial court correctly applied the elements of § 971.15, and the record supports the trial court’s finding that Kucharski failed to meet his burden of showing that he lacked mental responsibility when he killed his parents.
Juvenile had sufficient notice at hearing to lift stay of sentence
State v. D. T., 2015AP1476, 3/1/2016, District 1 (one-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity
D.T. asserts he was ambushed when the juvenile court took judicial notice of his file and sua sponte called a witness before lifting the stay of his five-year sentence; the court of appeals affirms after finding different grounds to lift the stay.
Errors of law can’t be challenged by writ of coram nobis
State v. Aman D. Singh, 2015AP850-CR, District 4, 1/7/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
Singh, appealing pro se, seeks to reverse a twelve-year-old OWI-second conviction for which his sentence is long over.
Temporarily suspending license didn’t preclude state from seeking revocation
State v. Keith D. McEvoy, 2015AP1262, District 4, 12/30/2015 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Under the facts of this case, the temporary suspension of McEvoy’s license based on his blood alcohol content didn’t equitably estop the State from seeking to revoke his license based on his refusal to submit to a chemical test of his blood.
E pluribus unum: Court of Appeals addresses notice, unanimity, venue and statute of limitations issues arising from charging multiple thefts in a single count
State v. Jeffrey L. Elverman, 2015 WI App 91; case activity (including state’s brief)
The court rejects all challenges to a conviction of theft of more than $10,000. The issues mostly spring from the state’s use of Wis. Stat. § 971.36(4), which permits, under certain circumstances, the aggregation of multiple thefts into a single count.