On Point: 10. Defenses

State v. Nathaniel R. Lecker, 2020 WI App 65; case activity (including briefs)

The application of a statute to undisputed facts is a question of law. This is an incontrovertible maxim of appellate review. “Question of law” sounds so august and erudite and specialized, doesn’t it? A question of law is a question into which an astute lawyer–or judge–would have special insight; he or she could be trusted to come to the right–or at least a particularly sound–answer to such a question. But sometimes statutes are written in very ordinary terms with no particular resonance, and no special definition, in the legal world. And sometimes these ordinary terms are also rather elastic–or relative. In those instances, can the answer to a “question of law” be something other than a standardless, “know it when I see it” exercise of arbitrary will?

State v. Alan M. Johnson, 2020 WI App 50, state’s petition for review granted, 9/16/20, affirmed in part, reversed in part, 2021 WI 61; case activity (including briefs)

Johnson killed his brother-in-law, K.M., while he was in K.M.’s house, uninvited, to look to see whether K.M. had child porn on his computer. The court of appeals orders a new trial for Johnson because the trial court erred in denying Johnson’s perfect self-defense instruction and lesser-included offense instruction and in excluding evidence that there was, in fact, child porn on K.M.’s computer.

State v. George E. Savage, 2019AP90-Cr, petition for review of an unpublished option granted, 5/19/20, case activity

Issues (adapted from the State’s petition for review):

1.  Under Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985), when a defendant claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with a guilty plea, he must prove that but for his lawyer’s deficient performance  he would have proceeded to trial.  More recently, Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958 (2017) held that a defendant can, in some circumstances, prove Strickland prejudice even without a reasonable probability of success at trial.  Given the facts of this case, did Savage prove that he was entitled to withdraw his guilty plea even though he couldn’t show a reasonable probability of success at trial?

2.  State v. Sholar, 2018 WI 53, 381 Wis. 2d 560, 912 N.W.2d 89 holds that a court cannot decide an ineffective assistance of counsel claim if a Machner hearing has not occurred. In Savage’s case, the circuit court did conduct a Machner hearing,  but the court of appeals reversed and remanded on both deficient performance and prejudice because the circuit court misapplied State v. Dinkins, 2012 WI 24, ¶ 5, 339 Wis. 2d 78, 810 N.W.2d 787. Should the court of appeals have affirmed under the rule that the court of appeals may sustain a circuit court decision if there are facts in the record to support it?

Town of Waterford v. Christopher Pye, 2019AP737, 5/6/20, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The court of appeals rejects the municipality’s argument that the doctrine of equitable tolling applies to the two-year statute of limitation for bringing a forfeiture action.

Kahler v. Kansas, USSC No. 18-6135, 2020 WL 1325817, 3/23/20, affirming State v. Kahler, 410 P.3d 105 (Kan. 2018); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

Kansas amended its insanity defense to limit to defendants whose mental illness prevents them from forming the required intent to commit a crime. A majority of the Supreme Court holds that does not violate due process.

State v. George E. Savage, 2019AP90-CR, District 1, 1/22/20 (not recommended for publication), petition for review granted, 5/19/20; case activity (including briefs)

Savage pleaded guilty to violating the sex offender registry statute for not providing updated information about where he was residing. He moved to withdraw his plea, asserting his trial lawyer was ineffective for failing to advise him he had a defense to the charge under State v. Dinkins, 2012 WI 24, 339 Wis. 2d 78, 810 N.W.2d 787. The circuit court rejected the claim based on an erroneous understanding of Dinkins, so it has to reassess Savage’s claim.

State v. Chris K. Feller, 2019AP318, 11/27/19, District 4 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

This appeal poses an interesting question of law: whether the justification defense available in certain civil forfeiture actions applies where a driver exceeds the speed limit in order to get away from another driver who is dangerously tailgating him on the freeway.  See State v. Brown, 107 Wis. 2d 44, 318 N.W.2d 370. The court of appeals contorts the undisputed facts in order to duck the issue.

State v. Scott A. Walker, 2019AP1138, 11/7/19, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

A jury found Walker guilty of intentionally pointing a firearm at a person contrary to Wis. Stat. § 941.20(1)(c). He claims his trial lawyer was ineffective for failing to raise a defense under Wis. Stat. §§ 939.45(2) and 939.49(1), which provide a privilege “to threaten or intentionally use force against another for the purpose of preventing or terminating what the person reasonably believes to be an unlawful interference with the person’s property.” The court of appeals has some doubt that Walker adequately raised this claim at the Machner hearing, ¶¶6-7, but decides it anyway on the merits, holding there was no prejudice because the facts couldn’t possibly make out the defense.

State v. Taurus Donnell Renfro, 2019AP193, 9/17/19, District 1 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Renfro was a passenger in a car stopped by the police. He was riding from his old residence to his parents’ house–he was moving in with them. When asked, he told the officers that he was carrying a gun in his pocket, and that he didn’t have a concealed-carry permit. A jury convicted him of violating Wis. Stat. § 941.23.

State v. Daniel A. Griffin, 2019 WI App 49; case activity (including briefs)

Someone killed a young child in Griffin’s home. Both Griffin and the child’s mother were present at the time. What evidence was the jury allowed to hear about who committed the crime? If you guessed “any remotely relevant evidence implicating Griffin” (whom the state had charged) and “no evidence implicating the mother” (whom it had not) then you are a scholar of Wisconsin evidentiary law.